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Abstract
The objective o f this thesis is to contribute to the understanding of the 
development of the housebuilding industry in Korea. Starting from a description o f the 
growth o f  the industry in the regulated environment, relevant theories are investigated. 
Based on both theory and evidence, an analytic framework is then developed from which 
four main research areas are drawn.
The first area is an analysis o f the structure of the Korean housebuilding business. 
The focus is on the investigation of governance structure within the housebuilding 
business and determinants of that structure. The second area is an examination of 
efficiency in the housebuilding business. Cost structures of the housebuilding business, 
the input factor relationship, the extent of economies o f scale, and productivity are 
evaluated. The third area is an analysis o f the building firms’ diversification strategy. The 
extent o f diversification among housebuilding firms, the changing pattern and the 
motives for that diversification are examined. Finally, the fourth area brings these 
elements together to investigate the efficiency of the firms’ diversified production 
structure by estimating multi-product cost functions.
Interviews and secondary data sources were used to examine the structure of the 
Korean housebuilding business. For the analyses of the efficiency o f the business, multi­
product firms, and the firms’ diversification strategy, econometric modelling techniques 
such as Translog cost function estimation and multivariate regression estimation were 
employed.
The cost structure of the Korean housebuilding business was found to be price 
inelastic, with relatively low productivity and increasing returns to scale. Firms tended to 
depend on ‘contracting’ throughout the production process and also showed diversified 
production structures. Diversification was motivated by avoiding risks and uncertainty 
within the housebuilding business and by using retained resources efficiently. The 
diversification strategy was found to be economically efficient, although the estimated 
optimum scale suggests that the current scale o f the firms may be too large.
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Chapter 1 Introduction
1.1 Background of the Study
The housebuilding industry is one of the most important sectors of the national 
economy: it is related to the basic human needs; the need for shelter. Everyone requires a 
roof over his or her head, a source o f heat and physical comfort, a place to cook, and a 
place o f refuge from the world, as well as a place to raise a family or to take care o f family 
members: on the one hand, growth in the housebuilding industry is closely related to the 
economic and demographic situation o f each country, on the other, the industry is 
influential in itself as it affects various other economic sectors; land, labour, plant, and 
materials. The government o f each country in the world intervenes in the housing industry 
both because governments have social objectives in housing and because o f the need to 
improve efficiency of production. The government’s role is elemental by a range of 
factors: historical, demographic, economic, social and ideological. Together these factors 
influence land planning, housing policy and housing production.
The housebuilding industry has a number o f special attributes both in the nature of 
its products and in the production process: completed houses are durable, the location is 
specific, and housing units show heterogeneity in type, size, and design. The stages of 
production, from acquisition of the land on which to construct housing to the sale of the 
completed dwelling to a customer, are complex; in particular, ‘contracting’ rather than 
integration is prevalent in the building process. In most advanced countries of the world, 
the housebuilding industry has grown gradually during the post-war period by continuing 
traditions that have had a long history. In these countries, housebuilders have generally 
become specialised in the housebuilding business and the large building firms produce a 
variety o f houses all over the country.
The Korean housebuilding industry has grown rapidly over the relatively short 
period during the 1970s and 1980s. With high economic growth in the 1970s and the 
1980s, the population became concentrated in the large cities, especially in Seoul. Rapid 
economic growth has increased the demand for housing in these cities during the past 
three decades and the higher household income has also mitigated the problem of 
affordability to a large extent. The result o f the accumulation o f these pressures through
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the 1970s and early 1980s was a housing shortage particularly in the large cities. The 
supply o f housing in the mid 1980s could not meet the demand. What made the situation 
worse was the lack of developable land. There has been a tight limit in residential land 
use, as about 70 percent o f the total land was ‘greenery area’ such as mountains, green 
belt area designated around large cities and only a small percent of the total land was 
designated as a developable area. In this circumstance, the government has tightly 
regulated land use for housing and even become involved in residential land development 
and allocation in 1980s.
Some o f the major housing problems as perceived by the government over the past 
30 years were: housing shortage, a short supply of residential land, and housing price 
inflation and speculation. One single goal that has been persistently pursued by the Korean 
housing policy was ‘residential stability’, implying that families are entitled to maintaining 
a stable and comfortable residential environment. The Korean government’s housing 
policy consistently upheld three basic objectives: expansion of the housing stock, 
stabilisation o f the housing price and equitable distribution o f housing welfare.
During the 1970s and 1980s the government’s policy emphasised control over the 
excess demand for housing and over the sale price of houses. As demand rose, so did the 
price and the only way to moderate the rising price seemed to be to control demand. 
However, the demand-control approach did not work and the government decided to 
directly control the sale price. To this end the government became deeply involved in the 
demand side o f the housing market. Various policy measures for stabilisation of the 
housing price and demand control measure were introduced. The demand-control 
approach to housing problems would not work as long as there existed a significantly 
large amount o f excess housing demand to be met. Furthermore, the approach distorted 
the housing demand structure. Housing demand was less sensitive to the changes in 
market price and income as evidenced by a number of studies. Instead, the demand turned 
out to be more responsive to the changes in capital gains, i.e., the difference between the 
purchase price and the price at which the unit was sold in market. Government policy 
seems to be partly responsible for the change in housing demand behaviour in the respect 
that housing was viewed more as an investment asset than as a consumption good.
In the 1980s, the government reckoned that a permanent and the most feasible 
solution would be to expand housing production in a massive scale. Such an effort
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appeared by the mass construction plan for housing, called ‘the construction programme 
for two million dwellings’ during 1988 and 1992. The purpose of this mass construction 
plan was to alleviate the chronic housing shortage in the Seoul metropolitan area. One of 
the key strategies to achieve its goals was the supply o f a large amount o f residential land. 
The government developed a large amount of residential land in the capital area and 
provided it to the private builders. Expansion of housing credit and the removal of various 
regulations restricting residential development were followed to achieve the plan 
successfully. As a result o f mass construction policy, since 1988, the rate o f investment in 
housing increased to 7-8 percent of the GNP, and the average number o f new 
constructions to 500-600 thousand dwellings from about 200 thousand in the 1970s and 
1980s. Unlike the failure o f demand-control policies, the planned two million dwellings 
were completed successfully. During the mass construction period, the housebuilding 
industry experienced its highest quantitative growth, and also underwent significant 
restructuring. Some commentators are clear that the mass construction plan initiated by 
the Korean government contributed to the rapid growth of the industry. On the other 
hand, most housebuilding firms criticised the government intervention’s negative effects 
on the sound development o f the industry. A study of the Korean housing industry 
suggested that the industry exhibited a number of problems: the industry was poorly 
structured and disoriented, highly concentrated but poorly integrated both horizontally 
and vertically, with input factor industries as financial and manufacturing industries. There 
were also several arguments that the distortion of the production and supply sides were as 
critical as the demand side.
The Korean housebuilding industry has rapidly grown in line with the country’s 
economic development. What is outstanding is that during the growth period since 1980s, 
the government intervened strongly in the private housebuilding industry. As a result, the 
Korean housebuilding industry is known as one of the industries most regulated by the 
government.
The primary intention of this thesis is to investigate how the Korean housebuilding 
industry has grown under the government’s regulatory environment. This research started 
as there were few studies on supply side, compared to a lot o f studies carried out on the 
demand side o f the Korean housing market. This is the first detailed study on the growth 
and changes o f the Korean housebuilding industry. Research was undertaken during the
3
period between 1980 and 1995, encompassing the industry’s first stage o f growth (before 
1988), its highest growth period (1988-1992), and its slow-down period (after 1992).
1.2 Objectives of the Thesis
This research aims to investigate specialities of the Korean housebuilding industry 
and to evaluate the efficiency of the industry. Focus will be on investigation on resultant 
attributes due to the government’s regulations on the supply side of the housing sector. 
Another important intention is to show how and whether the government’s pressure on 
house production might generate the efficiency outcome in the housebuilding business and 
overall industry.
In this context, a general research question is: how has the Korean housebuilding 
industry developed under the regulatory environment ? More relevant questions may be 
derived; what is the ideal type o f production structure in the modem housebuilding 
industry and is the ideal type applicable to Korean housebuilding ? Is the current structure 
of the housebuilding business and of the building firms’ strategy efficient ?
First, building firms’ production structure will be examined. This will allow what 
changes have taken place in the production process and production structure. Thereafter, 
overall assessment of efficiency of the production structure will follow. The optimum 
scale in which building firms might operate under current conditions can be suggested.
The detail objectives of this thesis will be pursued in four stages. The first stage is 
to investigate the structure of and the changes in the Korean housebuilding industry 
during the 1980s and 1990s. In what follows we will examine the specific attributes of the 
Korean building industry and firms’ behaviour during the period. The second stage 
consists of an analysis of the structure of the housebuilding business with a view to 
evaluating the efficiency of its production structure. Cost structures and their relationship 
to scale and productivity will be examined. These considerations may have implications 
for the building firms’ behaviour under the regulatory circumstances that existed in 1980s 
and 1990s. In the third stage, the strategy of diversification adopted by housebuilding 
firms will be considered. The changing pattern of diversification will be examined, 
concentrating on the different approaches by the firms which have diversified. The 
motives behind their diversification will also be investigated. Finally, the fourth stage will
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bring together these elements to generate an overall suggestion of the housebuilding in 
Korea. We will investigate the problems the industry has faced and the overall efficiency 
of the building firms’ production structure. The impact o f government policy and 
environmental change on the growth of the industry will also be addressed.
1.3 Contents of the Thesis
Chapter 2 describes the housing situation which has prevailed over the last thirty 
years. This chapter also sets out the framework of government regulations and their 
effects on the firms’ business, and then discussion moves on to the attributes of the 
Korean housebuilding industry and its growth, as well as the changes in its structure. In 
Chapter 3, the relevant theories about nature of the housebuilding industry, how building 
firms operate their business and what kind of strategies the firms pursue to grow will be 
considered. The experience of other countries will also be examined in order to provide a 
framework for detailed empirical analyses. Chapter 4 develops research questions and 
hypotheses derived from the current literatures on the structure of the housebuilding 
industry, the building firms’ behaviour and the influence of these elements on the 
efficiency and success o f the industry. Four research areas are developed for the further, 
detailed investigation in the subsequent chapters o f this thesis.
Chapter 5 investigates the production process of the Korean housebuilding 
business from the firms’ point o f view. An effort is made to determine how firms made 
decisions about operating strategies, the range of activities they undertake, and the way 
they negotiate land purchasing contracts, manage their labour, and handle materials. 
Attention will be given to examine the governance structure observed in the production 
process and the determinants of that structure. Chapter 6 reviews the efficiency of the 
housebuilding business. An investigation is made into the way in which costs o f material, 
labour and contracting are affected by the size of building projects and by price changes in 
the input factors. The relationship between paired input factors, as well as the industry’s 
productivity and technical progress in the Korean housebuilding sector are also examined.
Chapter 7 examines the diversification strategy of the firms engaged in the 
housebuilding industry. The extent and type o f diversification, the changing patterns of 
diversification and the relationship between building firms’ diversity and performance are
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analysed. Chapter 8 attempts to explore the possible motives behind diversification in 
Korean housebuilding firms. Chapter 9 evaluates the efficiency o f the firms’ operations as 
a whole. The cost and profit structure o f the multi-product firms will be examined first, 
followed by economies of scale, economies of scope and cost complementarities which 
are derived by estimating multi-product cost function. This chapter will conclude by 
suggesting the optimum scale on which building firms should operate in the current 
situation.
Based on the arguments made in the previous chapters, Chapter 10 will offer some 
conclusions about the way in which the housebuilding business has been operating and the 
firms’ response to current circumstances. The effects o f changing government policy on 
both the individual firm and the industry as a whole are investigated and policy changes 
are suggested.
6
Chapter 2 Growth and Changes of Korean Housing Market and 
Housebuilding Industry: the Nature and Specialities
This chapter aims to review the growth and changes o f the Korean housing 
market and the housebuilding industry for last three decades. In order to provide a 
baseline for study, the housing situation and changes o f government’ housing policies are 
briefly reviewed. We also discuss how the housebuilding industry has grown under the 
regulated circumstances and what the effects o f government’s regulations are on the 
industry. Finally, the current structure of the Korean housebuilding industry is reviewed.
2.1 Overview of the Korean Housing Market
2.1.1 Changes in the Housing Situation
Korea has experienced remarkably rapid economic growth since the 1970s and per 
capita GNP reached US $10,000 in 1995. With the fruit o f such economic growth, the 
housing situation also has substantially improved to such an extent that the number of 
housing units per one hundred households increased from 69 in 1987 to 92 in 1997. Also, 
the average size o f a housing unit was about 85m2 in 1997 up from 49 m2 in 1987 (KRIHS 
1998). The housing situation can be briefly reviewed by housing shortage, housing price 
inflation and overcrowding.
(1) Housing shortage
The salient nature of the Korean housing problems was a continuously declining 
housing supply ratio in urban areas. The shortage had its roots in the wartime destruction of 
a major portion o f the existing stock and the north-to-south migration o f over a million 
people during and after the Korean War. The large initial gap between housing units and 
households was further aggravated by the high population growth in the 1960s, rural-to- 
urban migration and changes in the family structure in the 1970s and 1980s.
The housing shortage has been measured in terms o f the number o f the housing 
stock over that of the households. Its inverse is the housing shortage rate. The changes in
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housing shortage situation are shown in Table 2-1. Between 1960 and 1990, the number o f 
households expanded by 5.9 million, or 242 percent, but there was only a net addition of
3.7 million housing units to the inventory, or an increase o f 207 percent. As a result, the 
housing shortage rate increased from 17.5 percent in 1960 to 29.6 percent in 1990 until the 
government launched the Construction Programme for Two Million dwellings (1988-92).
Table 2-1 Changes in population and housing( 1960-95) (unit: 1,000, percent)
1960 1970 1980 1990 1995
Population 
Households(A) 
Housing Units(B) 
B / A (%)
24,982
4,198
3,464
82.5
30,882
5,576
4,360
78.2
37,436
7,471
5,318
71.2
43,411
10,167
7,160
70.4
44,609
11,133
9,205
82.7
Sources: National Statistical Offices (NSO), Census of Population and Housing,
Economic Planning Board (each year)
Housing shortage affected the housing tenure pattern. Korea had long been a 
nation predominantly o f home owners, as indicated in Table 2-2. In 1970, 91.7 percent o f 
housing units were owner-occupied, whereas 8.3 percent were o f rental status. In the last 
20 years the ratio o f home ownership has decreased substantially to 78.9 percent. The 
ratio fell even further down to 74.9 percent in 1995.
Table 2-2 Changes in home ownership (1970-1990) (unit: 1,000, percent)
1970 1980 1990 1995
Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent
Total Units 
-Owner 
occupied 
-Renter 
occupied
4,360
3,996
364
100.0
91.7
8.3
5,318
4,621
697
100.0
86.9
13.1
7,160
5,653
1,507
100.0
78.9
21.1
9,205
6,893
2,312
100.0
74.9
25.1
Source: NSO, Census of Population and Housing, Economic Planning Board (each year)
(2) Housing price inflation
Housing price inflation was as critical as the shortage problem itself. The price of 
housing rose almost five times during the 13-year period o f 1975-88, while the nation's 
GNP grew less than three times in real terms. Table 2-3 below shows how housing prices 
changed in the late 1980s.
There were many reasons being cited for the housing price spiral: for example,
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inflationary pressure and a lack o f investment alternatives elsewhere, yielding a return 
comparable with that o f housing investment. These reasons were certainly plausible, but 
more a fundamental reason seemed to be excess demand, combined with skewed 
distribution o f income and wealth.
The fear o f speculation existed all the time whenever high rate o f profit was 
foreseen on short-term transactions. The speculative fever, once started, almost 
instantaneously spread out to the upper-middle class and an expectation that the price would 
rise even higher led to the ‘pent-up demand’ (KRIHS 1998).
Table 2-3 Changes in housing prices( 1987-1990) (unit: percent)
1987 1988 1989 1990
All cities 
(apartment)
7.2
(10.0)
13.2
(20.1)
14.6
(20.2)
5.9
(6.4)
Seoul
(apartment)
2.1
(4 .7 )
9.1
(18.4)
16.2
(19.0)
7.5
(8.6)
Source : Korea Research Institute for Human Settlement (KRIHS)
(3) Overcrowding
Overcrowding was another important indicator o f substandard housing. It is not a 
property o f housing quality per se, but the ‘fit’ between the size o f the unit and the 
number o f occupants. The degree o f overcrowding is generally measured in two ways: 
the ratio o f persons per room and per capita floor space. The former is a better indicator 
o f function and privacy to determine over- and under-occupied dwellings.
Table 2-4 Average persons per room and per capita floor space
1960 1970 1980 1990 1995
Persons per Room 2.5 2.3 2.0 1.5 1.1
Per capita floor space(m2) n.a. 6.6 9.9 13.9 17.6
n.a.: Not available
Source: Ministry of Construction and Transportation,
An Assessment o f Korea Housing Policy and Future Policy Direction, 1995
The Table 2-4 shows that living conditions had been substantially improved in 
the last three decades. The average number of persons per room decreased from 2.5 in 
1960 to 1.1 in 1995, and per capita floor space increased from 6.6m2 in 1970 to 17.6 m2 
in 1995. This is quite high as compared with the world standards. The United Nations
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recommended room occupancy density is 1.5 persons per room and per capita floor space 
is 13.2 m2. It should be noted, however, that the improvement in room occupancy density 
and floor space has been attributable to the decrease in household size as much as to the 
improvement in housing size per se.
There were a lot o f obstacles that Korea had to overcome to improve the housing 
situation. In the following section government’s efforts to achieve an ultimate housing 
goal, ‘residential stability’ will be reviewed in chronological order.
2.1.2 Changes of the Government’s Housing Policies
Some o f the major housing problems as perceived by the government were housing 
shortage, housing price inflation and speculation, and a short supply o f residential land. 
Other related problems included overcrowding, inadequate quality of housing services, 
squatters etc. Obviously these problems were all interconnected; there was a short supply of 
housing resulting from that o f residential land, which in turn caused the housing price to 
inflate. And persistently the rising price o f housing invited speculators into the housing 
market. Housing policies as government’s effort to solve these problems and the changes 
are briefly discussed by time (KRIHS 1998).
(1) the 1960s: institution building period
The five-year economic development plan started in 1962, but housing issues 
were only marginally dealt with. The government borrowed funds from overseas to 
finance site and services projects yet the government's actual investment was negligible. 
Most funds being secured were invested in the basic infrastructure and only insignificant 
amounts o f resources were set aside for housing from the government budget. The 
housing supply ratio was almost 80 percent and the housing shortage was not considered 
as a priority problem and thus, the government did not feel the pressure to allocate 
budgetary funds for the housing sector.
However, in the latter part o f the 1960s one should note that various housing 
delivery organisations came into being, including the Korea National Housing 
Corporation (1968) and Korea Housing Bank (1967). The Housing Policy Division was 
established at the Ministry o f Construction and relevant laws and regulations were either 
newly enacted or substantially modified. Furthermore, the government revised the
housing bank law to set up a house mortgage system. It should be pointed out that most 
of the institution building works were completed in this period, which helped formulate 
more effective housing policies in the ensuing years. In the late 60s house prices rose 
seriously and a special law was adopted to discourage the speculative activities, which 
was the predecessor o f the anti-speculation measure introduced later.
During the period 1962-1971 a total o f 866,000 units o f housing were 
constructed; 326,000 units during the first five years and 540,000 units during the next 
five years. The public sector's share was only 12.5 percent.
(2) the 1970s: period of policy experimentation
The country went through rapid industrialisation and urbanisation throughout the 
1970s, and consequently, household income rose quite rapidly, which pushed housing 
demand up to the extent that it increased by almost 10 percent a year. Housing shortage 
became critical, particularly in large metropolitan areas like Seoul and Pusan. The 
housing supply ratio fell drastically even to below 60 percent in large cities down from 
80 percent in the 1960s.
The government enacted the Housing Construction Promotion Law in 1972 in 
order to meet the increasing demand for housing. It mandated the government to develop 
the massive housing construction plan and to draw upon a set o f regulations for 
effectively implementing the plan and promoting the housing industry. The plan was 
intended to produce up to 2.5 million housing units over a ten-year period 1972-81. 
However, the plan did not move forward; for one thing, the government did not make 
any investment into housing while most of its investment funds were put into developing 
the heavy industries. The other reason was housing speculation. As the price of housing 
rose tremendously, the government’s immediate concern at that time was to stabilise it. 
Housing speculation was particularly rampant in the period 1978-79 and the situation 
was very serious. Various anti-speculation measures were devised to discourage 
purchasers from speculative profits, including a land transaction permit system and a 
standard land value announcement system. Criminal charges were made against the 
illegal transfer o f properties to avoid taxes.
Private developers were not allowed to engage in residential land development 
and instead, the Korea Land Development Corporation was established to carry out them 
on government's behalf. A price ceiling system was another device that discouraged
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housebuilders from speculative profits, being applied only to newly constructed 
apartment houses. The government set the sale price by which private developers had to 
abide.
With these measures strongly enforced, housing demand suddenly subsided and 
house price dropped overnight. The housing market became almost frozen; a large 
number o f newly developed houses remained unsold and many housebuilders went out of 
business.
(3) the 1980s: the fight against housing speculation
The housing business cycle had a ten-year peak in the late 1970s, but it suddenly 
receded as a result o f strong anti-speculation measures. The industry suffered from 
severe recession. Thus, housing policy o f the early 1980s started with various incentive 
measures to promote housing construction business. The government also relaxed the 
anti-speculation measures, e.g., lowering the real estate transfer income tax rate. These 
measures, combined with the recovery o f overall economy, ignited another round of 
housebuilding business cycle. The market became heated up a few months later, but the 
government had to cool it down again by reinstating strong anti-speculation measures.
In order to solve the absolute shortage problem the government initiated the 
Construction Plan for Five Million Houses between 1982 and 1991, but the military 
government at that time did not push it through because government’s economic officials 
advocated that the plan was too costly to implement. Instead, it took legislative actions to 
help consumers and tenants secure housing rights: for example, the Tenant Protection 
Law was revised to reinforce the tenants’ rights to adequate living accommodation.
Additionally, the government introduced the ‘bond-bidding’ system in 1983 as a 
device to discourage speculative motives in housing purchase on the one hand, and to 
‘tax away’ a large portion o f the windfall gains from both real and potential speculators 
on the other. A house buyer had to participate in the competitive bidding process when 
purchasing a newly built condominium unit. The highest bidder won the unit and was 
obliged to purchase government bonds in an amount as pledged in the bid before the sale 
was officially executed.
Some measures were administrative in nature. For example, the government 
modified regulations on apartment sales to disqualify some people from apartment 
purchase. Previously one was allowed to bid for the second newly built apartment unit
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three years after purchasing the first one. But the new regulation extended the period to 
five years, and thus it helped reduce the number of market participants substantially. At 
the same time, the Office of National Tax Administration occasionally investigated 
‘professional speculators’ for tax evasions and the source o f funds when purchasing real 
estates and announced their names in public.
The other important measure was the sale price ceiling system. This was basically 
designed to control the sale price o f the newly built condominium unit and thus, to 
stabilise the housing price. Housebuilders could not set the sale price on their own. 
They had to abide by the price as ‘uniformly’ set forth by the government. This scheme 
was initiated in 1983 as a temporary device to put a lid on the escalating sale price o f the 
newly constructed apartment units. No attempt was made, however, on the part o f the 
government to do away with the measure until very recently, although it was recognised 
that such a device had adverse effects on the housing market. It controlled only the sale 
price and thus, indirectly the costs o f housing production, and had nothing to do with the 
market price.
(4) a period of mass production: 1988-1992
Government attitude toward the housing sector changed overnight in 1988. It 
developed the construction programme for two million dwellings in 1988-1992 and 
virtually poured the nation’s resources -financial and otherwise- into the housing sector 
to facilitate mass production. It also relaxed planning and land use regulations to allow 
for more intensive residential development. The plan was successful because it served as 
an effective vehicle to provide investment funds and residential land, the two most 
essential ingredients o f the massive housing construction.
However, the plan necessitated other types o f government intervention into the 
housing market. Almost all the housebuilding activities were regulated one way or the 
other, including procurement, pricing and particularly the sale. Besides, the plan’s 
success depended largely on housing speculative motives: people purchased houses to 
earn capital gains. Thus, a price spiral was inevitable to sustain the housing market. This 
led to the bubble economy and the country is still suffering from it.
For successful achievement o f the construction programme for two million 
dwellings, the key strategies were: supply o f a large amount o f residential land,
expansion o f housing credit, and removal o f various regulations restricting residential 
developments.
First, the government designated close to 68 million pyong of land for residential 
development purpose throughout the country in accordance with the National Land Use 
and Management Law. They were mostly located in large urban areas, some within the 
developed area, but mostly in peripheral areas currently zoned as ‘greenery space’. The 
quasi-governmental bodies such as the Korea Land Development Corporation (KLDC) 
and the municipalities were authorised to purchase a large amount of cheap land, mostly 
agricultural and greenery lands, and to convert them into residential uses with some 
improvements thereupon. The serviced lands were sold either to such public entities as 
the Korea National Housing Corporation (KNHC) at cost or to private builders at the 
market equivalent prices. In order to expand housing construction in the capital region 
the government announced the construction o f five new towns in 1989. There was lack 
of developable land in Seoul. This forced the government to move outside o f the 
Greenbelt Zone.
Second, with this measure, the government relaxed land use regulations. In 
particular, density control was substantially eased to allow for more intensive housing 
development. Deregulation o f land use control was followed by relaxation o f design 
standards in certain districts o f large cities. Land use conversion was also made easier for 
housing developments. The primary intent o f these measures was obviously to build 
more housing units, given the limited amount o f residential land in urban areas.
Table 2-5 Provision o f housing funds (unit: in 100 million won, %)
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992
NHF 1) 5,914 6,311 11,739 31,481 29,129 27,639
(45.4) (38.4) (38.6) (50.6) (48.5)
KHB 2) 5,219 7,725 15,535 18,542 19,389 25,494
(40.0) (47.0) (51.1) (34.9) (36.9)
CNB 3) 1,530 1,941 1,485 3,298 5,000 n.a.
Other Banks 348 214 268 206 500 n.a.
Life Ins.com. 26 252 1,363 4,253 2,000 n.a.
Total 13,037 16,443 30,390 57,780 56,018
Source : The Korea Housing Bank
1) NHF : National Housing Fund
2) NHB : Korea Housing Bank
3) CNB : Citizens National Bank
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Lastly, the government supplied a large amount o f housing funds. Table 2-5 
compares the amount of housing funds supplied by financial institutions before and after 
the plan was actually implemented in 1988. The supply o f the housing funds quadrupled 
in less than four years from 1.3 trillion won in 1987 to 5.32 trillion won in 1990. Note 
also the way in which the government controlled National Housing Funds (NHF) had 
grown during the period.
The plan was very successful in promoting housing construction on a massive 
scale. As shown in Table 2-6, the first year saw new construction o f 317,000 dwelling 
units (on the basis o f building permits issued). The figure represented an increase o f 31.2 
percent over that o f 1987.
Table 2-6 Annual construction of housing units (1988-92) (unit: 1,000)
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1988
-1991
1988
-1992
Permit Based 
Total
- Public
- Private
317
115
202
462
161
301
750
270
480
648
220
428
600
250
350
2,177
766
1,411
2,777
1,016
1,761
Completion Based 
Total 287 353 572 695 631 1,907 2,538
Source: Ministry of Construction and Transportation, Economic Planning Board
From the second year on, the number o f residential building permits issued 
accelerated to a maximum level o f 750,000 units in 1990. The 1989 figure represented 
an increase o f  40 percent over that o f 1988. Even in 1991 over 648 thousand units of 
building permits were issued, and the four-year aggregate amounted to over 2.17 million 
by the end o f 1991. In other words, the two million unit construction target was achieved 
a year ahead o f the scheduled time period. The year o f 1992 issued over 600,000 units of 
building permits, implying that over 2.77 million units were supplied for the entire five- 
year planning period, approximately 35 percent more than the initially-targeted two 
million units. Over-achievement was also foreseen even on the basis o f housing 
completion. Housing completions doubled within a two-year period from 287,000 units 
in 1988 to 572,000 in 1990. This was quite substantial, given the fact that the total 
number o f housing units produced up until 1987 averaged less than 240,000 a year. The 
housing completion rate peaked at 695,000 units in 1992.
Expansion o f the housing stock obviously helped reduce the housing shortage ratio. 
The housing supply ratio reached 79.1 percent by the end o f 1994, up by almost 10 percent
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from 69 percent in 1987 when the plan was drawn up. Massive housing construction also 
helped stabilise house prices and rents. In fact, house prices have gradually declined at a 
rate o f 0.3 to 1 percentage point per month since May 1991 according to a monthly housing 
market survey conducted by the Korea Housing Bank. The same survey found the rent 
falling between 0.7 percent and 1.6 percent over the same period. Further declines in both 
house prices and rents were recorded in ensuing months.
2.2 Growth and Changes of the Korean Housebuilding Industry
2.2.1 Physical Growth of the Industry
As a result o f the mass construction plan, the housing supply ratio, which means 
the ratio o f the number o f existing houses to the number o f households requiring 
independent houses, continuously increased. It reached up to 82.4 percent in 1995. Most 
o f the new dwellings were built in Seoul, capital region and large cities as shown in 
Table 2-7. Since 1985, about 50 % o f new dwellings were built in Seoul and capital 
regions and the other 20 %  were built in major large cities. The reason may be that the 
urban population rapidly increased due to the concentration o f economic power in these 
areas and the situation led naturally to high housing demand in the urban areas.
Table 2-7 Output o f new construction (unit: dwellings in start basis, %)
Average
’72-’76
1980 1985 1989 1990 1992 1994
Total 152,118
(100)
211,537 227,362 462,159 750,378 575,492 622,854
Seoul 30,790
(20.3)
53,375
(25.2)
52,529
(23.1)
76,273
(16.50)
120,371
(16.0)
106,441
(18.50)
86,220
(13.8)
Capital
Region1
14,412
(9.5)
40,413
(19.1)
69,551
(30.6)
133,015
(27.78)
258,426
(34.4)
176,542
(30.67)
185,186
(29.3)
Four
large cities2
13,592
(8.9)
30,350
(14.3)
30,996
(13.6)
90,406
(19.56)
142,738
(19.0)
123,105
(21.39)
135,157
(21.7)
1: Incheon city is included in the capital region. 
2: Four Cities: Pusan, Daegu, Kwangju, Daejeon
Although new houses have been built mainly in these areas, the housing supply 
ratios in Seoul and large cities appeared still lower than average (68-71 percent) as 
shown in Table 2-8. The reason is that the increase o f households in those areas was
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much higher than the increase of houses. This explains why the shortage o f houses is still 
a major problem in Seoul and large cities.
Table 2-8 The housing supply ratio in large cities
(unit: %)
Seoul
Capital regions Four large cities
Inchon Other capital 
region
Pusan Daegu Kwangju Daejon
1993 67.85 69.56 67.45 61.12 71.66 79.16 72.53
1994 66.96 76.31 68.29 67.01 68.73 76.02 82.33
1995 68.00 89.90 87.80 71.00 71.20 81.00 90.70
Source: Municipal Yearbook of Korea, 1995, Ministry of Home Affairs
These facts imply that more houses should be constructed in Korea in view o f the 
fact that many other advanced countries achieved 100 % of the housing supply ratio in 
the 1970s. Housing shortage, especially in Seoul metropolitan area and other large cities, 
is more severe. Furthermore, with the increase of household income, housing demand 
has also been changed towards preference for more spacious and diverse types o f houses, 
high-technique houses and well-located etc. The Korean housebuilding industry needs to 
be more developed both on the quantitative and qualitative sides.
2.2.2 Effects on National Economy
Housing and the national economy are connected in a number o f ways. Housing 
construction generates jobs and income. Its employment impact is significant because the 
construction industry is basically labour-intensive. The industry is also an integral part of 
the national economy in terms of its share in national output and fixed capital formation. It 
also affects the cyclical component in GNP, and therefore, it has been used as a macro- 
economic tool in adjusting and moderating the economic cycle. The effects of the massive 
housing construction upon the national economy are not easy to assess, but they ought to be 
substantial.
There are several ways in which the size o f the industry can be measured and 
expressed. The value o f housing production has also been expressed as a proportion of 
the gross national product (GNP). Table 2-9 shows housing investment ratio in Korea. 
The value o f work done by the housebuilding industry was 2,724 billion won in 1975 and 
3,951 billion won in 1980. When expressed in relation to the total value of goods and 
services produced in Korea (GNP), they were 5.1 percent and 5.4 percent of the total in
17
each year. Since the end o f the 1980s when ‘the construction programme for two million 
dwellings’ started, housing investment had increased to 14,577 billion won in 1990 and 
15,373 billion won in 1992. The housing investment ratio o f GNP have increased to 8.2 
percent o f GNP in 1990 and 7.5 percent in 1992.
Table 2-9 Housing investment (unit: dwelling, billion won in 1990 fixed price)
1975 1980 1985 1989 1990 1992 ‘95
Number of 
Houses built
175,951 211,337 227,362 462,159 750,378 575,492 619,057
Housing
Investment(A)
2,724 3,951 4,865 9,050 14,577 15,373 18,570
GNP (B) 53,109 73,418 108,130 162,634 178,262 204,231 254,705
Ratio (A/B) 5.1 5.4 4.5 5.6 8.2 7.5 7.1
Source: The Bank of Korea
The attribute o f the Korean housebuilding investment is different from those of 
many other advanced countries. The investment trend o f the advanced countries 
remained at 4-5 % during the 19th century and in the 1950s and 1960s remained at 
between 6 and 7 % (Ball, 1996 B). Housebuilding investment in Korea did not happen 
until 20 years later. In fact, the Korean housebuilding industry started to develop in the 
late 1970s. Since the mid 1980s, the investment ratios increased to 7-8 % which is a 
similar level to those o f industrialised countries 30 years ago.
Another measure of the vital role o f the housebuilding industry in the economy is 
industry’s contribution to investment measured by gross fixed capital formation. The 
construction kept constantly about 60 percent of the gross fixed capital formation, 
whereas housebuilding was only 2.3 percent in 1975 and it rapidly increased to 15 
percent in 1985 and 21.5 percent in 1995.
Table 2-10 Fixed capital formation of housing investment
(unit: billion won in current price)
1975 1980 1985 1990 1995
Gross fixed 
capital formation
2,745 12,230 23,435 66,569 128,664
Construction
(%)
1,548
(56.39)
6,811
(55.69)
13,202
(56.33)
39,605
(59.49)
76,666
(59.58)
Housebuilding
(%)
621
(2.3)
2,190
(17.9)
3,521
(15.0)
14,577
(21.9)
27,619
(21.5)
Source: The Bank of Korea, ‘ National Accounts’, 199^
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The house has been commonly regarded as an ‘end product’; however, the 
housebuilding industry has greatly influenced other industries such as land, labour and 
material industries, which are important input factors o f the housebuilding industry. 
Housebuilding necessitates other construction works such as streets, sewers, utilities, 
stores and other commercial facilities, schools and other public buildings. The volume of 
such works, o f course, depends not only on the scale o f housebuilding projects, but also 
on their location. Substantial consumer goods such as furniture, floor coverings, washing 
machines and other mechanical household equipment are necessary for housing 
production. Besides, the investment in housebuilding promotes employment and 
increases the demand o f building materials.
There are several approaches to measuring the multiplier effects, such as the 
employment generated in the manufacturing industry, distribution o f building materials 
and equipment, and building workers employed at the construction site, or the value of 
orders for materials placed per amount o f residential construction. Such studies have 
been undertaken since the 1930s in the USA. These studies need to be brought up to date 
and refined to indicate variations in multiplier effects among different countries and over 
the different times. For comparison among several countries, the multiplier effects of 
expenditures for housing production warrant more investigation.
Table 2-11 The estimate of induced effect of housebuilding investment (1990)
( unit: billion won, 1000 men)
Induced
production
Induced 
value added
Induced
Import
Induced
employment
Induced effect of 
housing investment 29,573 13,203 1,906 801
Ratio of
national economy
16.59 % 
/GNP
7.30 % 
/GNP
3.38 % 
/total import
5.04 %
/total employment
Source: A Study on Korean Housebuilding Industry, KRIHS, 1996.
As an example, a Korea Research Institute for Human Settlement’s study 
(KRIHS 1996) estimated the induced effect o f housebuilding investment. In 1990, 
14,577 billion won (about 11.2 thousand million pounds) housebuilding investment 
resulted in 29,573 billion won (about 22.7 thousand million pound) production effect 
which was 16.59 % of GNP (about 178,262 billion won). The induced value-added 
amount was 13,203 billion won (about 10.16 thousand million pounds) consisting o f
7.3 % o f GNP and the induced import amount was 1,906 billion won (about 1.47 
thousand million pounds), 3.38 % of the total import. The number o f employed induced
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directly and indirectly was 801 thousand men which represented 5.04 % o f total 
employment. The number of labourers directly employed by housing investment was 327 
thousand people.
Another recent study (KRIHS 1998) by macro-economic model using 1990 real 
figures shows that a 10 % increase in housing investment contributed to a 1 % increase in 
GNP, a 1.4 % increase in money supply (M2), a 0.5 % increase in employment, and a 
2 % increase in fixed capital formation. The same study also pointed out that a 10 % 
increase in housing investment induced a 0.6 % increase in imports and increased the 
overall balance o f payment deficit by 93 million US dollars. It also affected overall price 
levels as it raised the GNP deflator by 0.5 %. The estimated effect o f the housebuilding 
investment suggests the importance of housebuilding as an identifiable industry.
2.3 Government Intervention in the Housebuilding Industry
2.3.1 Government Intervention in the Production Stage
The Korean government’s housing policies have been directly influential in the 
housebuilding industry. Especially during the mass construction period in the late 1980s and 
in the beginning of the 1990s, the government intervened in the whole production process, 
using several supporting tools and regulations. Many scholars argued that the government’s 
involvement in the industry contributed to the rapid growth o f the Korean housebuilding 
industry and the growth o f the firms.
Figure 2-1 shows the contents o f the government intervention in the housebuilding 
process. The government’s major regulation in the housebuilding process can be 
summarised as four categories; entry regulation, intervention in two input factors; capital 
input and land input, regulation on production process, and regulation on the product. 
Appendix 1 shows each regulation’s objectives, starting year and influences on the 
housebuilding business. In the following section, the details o f government intervention and 
the influences on the building firms’ behaviour will be discussed.
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Input factors Entry regulation Output
Capital input
System of pm-selling 
of houses
| Issuance of debentures 
Land input 
[Land use regulation 
|Publie land development
Public allocation system 
of the developed land
Materials input 
Labour input
Registration/Designation
system
i Production process
Housebuilding 
firms
Installation of 
arterial facilities
House price 
ceiling system
Regulation on size 
of dwellings
Adjusted construc- 
tion cost system
Obligatory supply ratio 
of small-size houses
Figure 2-1 The government intervention in the housebuilding process
(1) Regulation on qualification of the housebuilding firms
The Korean government has regulated the entry into the industry by a registration 
system and a designation system. The registration system is a qualification system of the 
housebuilding business and was activated in 1979. The registration system was regarded 
as a kind o f supporting system rather than a regulation in the housebuilding industry. 
This was because it was an alternative licence in order to encourage private construction 
firms to enter into the housebuilding industry when the government did not issue new 
construction licences from 1975 to 1988. Moreover, the conditions o f qualification were 
not so strict.
This system was strengthened by the designation system in 1981 and the 
government strictly limited the number o f designated firms. The government treated the 
designated firms distinctively from the registered firms by selling time of house, allowance 
on issuance o f debentures and allocation o f public land. The discriminative treatments had 
an influence on expanding firms’ size. Most o f the registered firms made a strong effort to
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be designated firms. They tried to enlarge their scale o f business and size of firm to be 
designated by the government.
(2) Intervention on input factors
Regulation on landfactor
Land use regulation, public land development and the public allocation system of 
the developed land are included in the government’s intervention in land factor. These 
policy measures retain characteristics as a regulation.
□  Land use regulation
Since the early 1970s when the land use regulation system was established in 
Korea, the system has become increasingly stringent. This means that the more 
strengthened the land use regulations are, the more restricted the private sector 
development becomes. The Korean government designated the possible area for 
residential housing as urban planning area by ‘the Land Use and Management Law’. 
According to the law, only 2 percent o f the total land was designated as a developable 
area for building and about 70 percent within that area was designated additionally as 
green belt. The facts tell us about the rigidity o f land use in itself. If  a private 
housebuilding firm retained some land in the residential zone in an urban area, there 
would be no great difficulty in performing the housebuilding business. Otherwise, the 
land use regulation was operated as an entry barrier into the business.
However, since 1993 the government has revised ‘the Land Use and Management 
Law’ to enlarge the residential developable area and to improve the efficiency o f land 
use. The major change in the law was to  rearrange ten usage areas into five areas and to 
heighten the possibility o f land development. According to the revised law, ‘semi-urban 
areas’ and ‘semi-agriculture and forestry areas’ were included in the developable area, if 
the areas fulfilled certain conditions1. As a result, private builders could develop 
residential land only if  the development size was less than 30,000m2. This means that the
1 In a semi-urban area, if the area retained a population of more than 250 or more than 50 households, 
residential land development was allowed within the area. In order to develop residential land, the area should 
be designated as a settlement district first and then should be classified into a residential area by the ‘the Urban 
Planning Law’.
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semi-agriculture and forestry area around the capital region and large cities became a 
new residential land source.
□  Residential land development regulation (public land development)
The residential land development method has changed over time in Korea. In 
fact, since the beginning 1980s private developers were not allowed to engage in 
residential land development. The government has intervened in land development and 
even in the allocation process o f the developed land. The government encouraged large- 
scale land development methods and strongly limited private building firms’ 
participation in the development. The objective o f public land development was to make 
it easier to develop a large-scale residential land in the circumstances o f residential land 
shortage. Particularly in a case which a large plot o f land was owned by multi-owners, it 
would be very difficult to buy in an adequate time. Only the government’s expropriation 
right made it easy to proceed with a large development programme.
After 1980, more than 60 percent of total residential land was developed by the 
government. Particularly since 1988, when the mass construction plan for houses started, 
nearly all the residential land in the capital region was provided by the public land 
development method. Public land development was regarded as a supporting tool with 
the view that the central government developed large-scale residential land using the 
expropriation right and provided the prepared plot to building firms in a circumstance in 
which developable land was absolutely limited.
□  Public allocation system o f the developed land
Furthermore, since 1989 the Korean government has been involved in the 
allocation o f publicly developed land. The public allocation system o f developed land 
was operated as a subsequent policy measure o f ‘the public land development’. 
According to this system, the ‘Minister of Construction and Transportation’ was directly 
involved in the allocation o f the developed land to housebuilding firms. First, the 
government allocates the developed land to two housebuilding firms’ associations (those 
o f designated firms and registered firms) and thereafter, the associations usually 
distribute the pre-allocated land to their membership firms, according to their own 
decision rule (known as the random method).
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The possibility that firms get the chance to participate in the building project 
depends on the number o f membership firms applying for the project every time. 
However, even though these firms were selected as participants o f the building project, 
they could not choose the plot which they wanted as the land was distributed by a kind of 
random method. In a case where the distributed plot was not in a good location, the 
success of the project would not be guaranteed.
Considering that land is one o f the important factors in the housebuilding 
business, the government-initiated land development and allocation policies are regarded 
as an important regulation against private housebuilding.
Intervention into capital input
Among the intervention into input factors, pre-selling system o f houses and 
issuance o f debentures are relative to the capital input factor. These are regarded as a 
‘supporting tool’ rather than as a ‘regulation’.
□  system ofpre-selling o f houses
A system o f pre-selling o f houses was first introduced in 1978 for apartment 
housebuilding. Once building firms started the construction process, the firms could pre­
sell the uncompleted apartment houses, according to the extent o f the progress o f the on­
site building work. The timing by which the firm can sell houses is different between 
registered and designated firms2. For housebuilding firms, the timing by which to sell the 
unfinished house was very important. It was directly related to the inflow of money.
Table 2-12 shows the money flow in the apartment building business. In building 
apartment houses, the flow o f money occurred by the following process. About 30-35 
percent cost to total cost was necessary for purchasing the residential land and 
development. At this stage, most firms depend on either their own capital or private 
financing. Once the firms sold the apartment houses to ‘the would be buyers’, the firm 
could get some money from the buyers in advance. At first, the would-be buyers have to 
make an advance payment (20 % o f total house price) when they contract with the 
building firms to buy the house. After that, about 60 % o f the total price has to be paid at 
regular intervals. As soon as the building works are completed, the buyer has to pay the
2 In case of designated firms, if they have finished more than 10 % of the whole building works, they could sell 
the houses. The registered firms have to finish more than 20 % of the whole building works in order to 
announce the sale of houses.
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remaining 20 % as a final payment. Once the building firms selected the would-be 
buyers, the firms’ financial burden would be lessened.
Table 2-12 Money flow in the apartment housebuilding
Production stage Outflow Inflow
Acquisition of land 
and development stage
30-35 % to total cost
Construction stage 65-70 % to total cost payment from the would-be buyers
20% to total price
30% "
30% "
20% "
Advanced payment 
Midway payment 
Midway payment 
Final payment
To the firms that were suffering from chronic lack o f capital, the system o f pre­
selling of houses played an influential role to mitigate the firms’ financial difficulty. The 
advanced payment is utilised as the operating fund of firms. It is known that the 
advanced payment from the buyers consists o f 30-50 percent o f the total operating fund 
of the building firms.
□  Issuance o f debentures
The Korean government allowed the issuance of debentures in 1989 in order to 
encourage building firms to participate in the housebuilding business. The building firms 
have been able to issue debentures redeemable with houses since then. The building firms 
which issued the debentures had to construct houses in accordance with the issue conditions 
and redeem the debentures to those holding the right when the house was completed. The 
debenture redemption period may not exceed three years. The paid-in money o f debentures 
is normally used for the purchase and preparation o f residential sites, purchase o f housing 
materials, and construction expense etc.
In the introduction period (1990 and 1991), most building firms issued debentures 
and they contributed to mitigate the firms’ financial difficulty. The issuing conditions were 
very different between designated and registered firms. For designated firms, there was no 
limit in the condition and the size of issuing debentures, whereas there were some 
limitations for the registered firms3. However, since 1992, most of the housebuilding firms
3The registered firms should retain more than 500 million wons capital and hold a licence for the 
construction business. Moreover, their performance of housing construction should exceed two hundred 
dwellings per year for previous three years. The issuing scale of the debentures is also limited as less than 
average number of houses constructed for recent three years. Moreover, the registered firms should issue 
the debentures with a guarantee from ‘a financial institution’ or ‘the Korea Housing Financial Co­
operative’.
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were rather less interested in issuance o f debentures and the amount has decreased. The 
reason found was that the issuing condition of the debentures was not good enough to invest 
money, except for purchasing houses. There were some arguments (KRIHS 1995A) that in 
order to activate the issue o f debentures, it was necessary to add the characteristics of 
convertible bonds to the debentures so that the bond holder could have the right to convert 
the bond with ‘cash’ or ‘house purchasing’ under certain conditions.
(3) Regulation on production process
□  Installation o f arterialfacilities
One of the outstanding regulations in the production process is that any building 
firm which constructs more than one hundred houses per project or develops a residential 
site area larger than 16,500 m2 should build several arterial facilities with the building 
project according to ‘the Housing Construction Promotion Act’. Leading road, water 
supplies, drainage, electricity supply, gas supply or regional heating, and communication 
are included in the facilities. The government required installation o f the facilities as a 
condition o f the approval o f the project.
□  Regulation on size o f dwellings
As a regulation in the production process, there is size regulation of dwelling. 
Since 1973, the limitation on size per dwelling had been applied only for ‘the national 
houses’ (houses less than 85 m2) for low-income households. The background was that 
the public sector mainly constructed and supplied the small sized houses whereas the 
private builders may control the size o f houses as their own decision. This means if 
housebuilders wanted to build large sized houses for medium-or high-income 
households, there would be no limitation in the size o f houses.
However, since 1988 the limitation on size per dwelling has been applied on all 
the houses built by an approval o f ‘the Minister o f Construction and Transportation’. The 
background was that housebuilding firms wanted to build only large sized houses 
because they could get higher profit due to the existence o f scale economy in the 
production process. According to this regulation, any housebuilding firm cannot build 
houses larger than the size designated by ‘the Housing Construction Promotion Act’ 
since 1988.
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□ Obligatory supply ratio of small-size dwelling
There is another regulation related to size of houses, that is, ‘obligatory supply 
ratio by small-size dwellings’. According to ‘the Housing Construction Promotion Act’, 
if  it is considered necessary for balance between housing demand and supply, the 
Minister o f Construction and Transportation may determine the building proportion of 
national houses (houses less than 85 m2) within a 75 percent range o f total floor area. 
Housebuilding firms should build some proportion o f small size dwellings in every 
project, regardless o f the regional condition and the location’s situation. Before 1979, the 
proportion was more than 40 % of the total floor area. The proportion has been adjusted 
according to the demand or supply condition o f houses as time changes4.
Under this regulation, the firm could not reflect specific characteristics o f housing 
demand in certain areas or regions to the housebuilding project. In the 1990s many firms 
experienced an imbalance between housing demand and supply. That is, a lot o f small 
sized dwellings were produced in a certain area where demand was concentrated on large 
sized houses. It became a major reason to increase the number o f unsold houses5. The 
unsold house was a main problem for the firms’ financial situation and due to the 
financial burden, many firms have bankrupted since 1993.
(4) Regulation on the product
There is a regulation on the product itself. The house price control o f the 
completed house has been considered as a most important regulation.
□  House price ceiling system
Price control o f houses is one of the major regulations in the housebuilding industry. 
The Korean government has regulated the sale price o f newly built apartment houses 
since 1977. ‘The house price ceiling system’ aimed basically to stabilise housing prices 
by controlling the sale price o f newly built apartment houses.
4 After November 1979, the proportion was changed to more than 50 %. In 1981, the proportion was revised to 
50 percent area to total area as the government tried to give more autonomy to private housebuilding firms. In 
1993 the proportion was again strengthened into more than 75 percent from 50 percent.
5 Actually since 1993 the number of unsold houses increased and there was a report that the 32.3 percent of 
total unsold houses were small-size houses (less than 18 pyong) and the ratio was increased (32.3% in 1993, 
45.1 % in 1995). Ministiy of Construction and Transportation, 1995.
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At that time, the background of the house price control was explained as follows; 
since the mid 1970s the imbalance o f housing demand and supply has led to an increase 
o f house prices. Customers were not able to afford the high prices. Therefore, the 
government started to intervene in the housebuilding industry in order to protect the 
customers. From 1977 till 1981, the sale price per unit was controlled at a constant level, 
irrelevant to size o f dwellings. The ceiling price was adjusted every year between 14.7 
percent and 23.6 percent as shown in Table 2-13. During this period the social concern 
about the house price control was not so serious.
Table 2-13 Trend o f house price ceiling system
(unit: ten thousand won per pyong)
1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1985 1988
-less than 85 m 105 115 126.8
(25.7 pyong) 
-over 85 m2
55 68 78 90 105
134 134 134
Increasing ratio 
per year(%) - 23.6
%
14.7
%
15.4
%
16.7
%
0%  
27.6 %
3.1 % 
0%
3.3 % 
0%
Source: Ministry of Construction and Transportation 
1 pyong = 3.3 m2
After 1982, the price for large dwellings (over 85 m2) was controlled constantly, 
whereas the price for small dwellings (less than 85 m2) was sometimes adjusted. At that 
time, policy makers thought the house price ceiling system of newly built houses could 
lead to a fall in existing house prices. However, the regulation was not effective to 
stabilise the market price of existing houses. Instead, it brought about some side-effects 
such as concentration o f demand on the newly built apartment houses by customers 
expecting capital gain and higher financial burden for the housebuilding firms etc.
□  Adjusted construction cost system
Upon implementing the mass construction plan the government modified the price 
ceiling system in such a way that firms could reflect into price decision the cost increases in 
land, labour, and building materials. The government pronounced ‘the adjusted construction 
cost system’ in order to persuade housebuilding firms to participate in the construction plan. 
The important characteristic was that it recognised not only direct costs such as materials, 
labour, overheads, advertisements, design and inspection costs, but also interest cost of 
debts and even normal profit. The construction cost per pyong has been adjusted every year 
between 5 and 15 percent points against previous years as shown in Table 2-14.
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Table 2-14 Adjusted construction cost (unit: ten thousand won per pyong)
Size Floor 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Less than 
18 pyong
Less than
15 floors 
More than
16 floors
98
110
113
(15.3) 
127
(15.4)
123
(88)
138
(8.7)
131
(6.5) 
147
(6.5)
138
(5.3) 
155
(5.4)
146
(5.8) 
164
(5.8)
153
(4.8) 
172
(4.9)
168
(9.8)
187
(8.7)
18-25.7
pyong
Less than
15 floors 
More than
16 floors
98
110
113
(15.3) 
127
(15.4)
127
(12.4)
143
(12.6)
135
(6.3) 
152
(6.3)
142
(5.2) 
160
(5.3)
150
(5.6) 
169
(5.6)
158
(5.3)
177
(4.7)
168
(6.7)
187
(5.6)
More than 
25.7 pyong
Less than
15 floors
More than
16 floors
101
113
116
(14.8)
130
(15.0)
131
(12.9)
147
(13.0)
139
(6.1)
157
(6.8)
146
(5.0) 
165
(5.1)
154
(5.4) 
174
(5.4)
162
(5.2) 
183
(5.2)
175
(8.0)
196
(7-1)
Source: Ministry of Construction anc Transportation
The adjusted construction cost system was considered as ‘an improved method’ 
from the point o f view that it reflected an increase in input-factor price and land price and 
the cost could be adjusted every year. By this system housebuilders were able to 
differentiate the sale prices among houses within the total sale price o f the building project, 
considering size of house or customers’ preference. In fact, the adjusted construction cost 
system accelerated the building firms’ participation in the housing production in the late 
1980s. However, this was considered as only a short-term alternative and various problems 
associated with the house price ceiling system still remained intact.
2.3.2 Influences on the Housebuilding Business
So far, the government’s regulation framework on the housebuilding industry has 
been explained. The government regulated firms’ entry into the industry by a registration 
system. Especially since 1988 when the mass construction plan started, the government 
encouraged large construction firms to enter into the housebuilding industry. It treated large 
firms distinctively from the medium and small firms within this designated system. The 
government also introduced some supporting policy measures such as supply o f housing 
funds, the system of pre-selling o f houses, and issuance o f debentures. The prepaid 
money from the would-be buyers o f apartment houses and the paid-in money o f 
debentures played a role in mitigating the building firms’ financial problems. The public 
land development was regarded as another supporting tool in a view that the central
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government developed large-scale residential land using the expropriation right and 
provided the prepared plot for the building firms in a circumstance in which developable 
land was absolutely limited. Simultaneous with the government’s supporting measures, 
the participation o f the large building firms having capacity contributed to rapid growth 
o f the housebuilding industry in the mid 1980s.
However, we cannot ignore the other effects o f the government’s intervention. 
Two types o f regulation were o f particular concern; one, land development regulation 
and the other, sale price regulation. Especially during the mass construction plan period, 
strict land use regulation, residential land development regulation, and public allocation 
system of the developed land influenced firms’ business in various ways. The fact that 
the government is involved in land development means that building firms cannot expect 
any profit in the land development stage. Profit may be realised only in the building 
process. It is directly related to the firm’s profitability. The fact that the government is 
involved in the allocation process o f developed land also means that it intervenes in 
firms’ business opportunity. The question whether the firms buy public land or develop 
the land by themselves is a very important decision and may influence the pattern o f the 
firms’ production process. If  building firms purchased the developed and prepared land 
from the government, they would not need to carry out the site preparation and 
foundation works. Considering that land is one o f the most important input factors, the 
rigid regulation on land has played a role as an entry barrier into the business.
Regulation on installation of arterial facilities resulted in an increase in costs and 
may affect the profits of the project. The regulation has been operated as another entry 
barrier to the housebuilding business. I f  the firms did not have enough capital to afford the 
facilities, they could not even participate in the building project. In the circumstances that 
the government encouraged large-scale development projects, the installation o f arterial 
facilities gave much more burden to building firms and small firms without enough capital 
finally gave up participation in building projects. We found more regulations in the 
production process such as regulation on size o f dwellings and regulation on obligatory 
supply ratio of small-size dwellings. Housebuilders wanted to build as large dwellings as 
possible, because they could earn more profit from them due to economy of scale. The 
regulation on dwelling size influenced negatively on the cost and even on the profitability of 
the project. In a case where the small sized dwellings were not matched to housing demand, 
the completed houses were not sold. Those regulations prohibited the firms’ autonomy in
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the decision making process and affected marketability o f the completed houses and even 
the project’s profitability.
The sale price regulation has been considered as a major regulation to intervene in 
the building firms’ business, because it controlled the firm’s cost o f housing production, 
thus adversely affecting its financial position. With the price control there was no 
incentive for housebuilding firms to improve the quality o f housing because they did not 
need to compete with each other. It is somehow possible for large firms having high 
technique and enough capital to reduce costs through production innovation or process 
innovation. Some small firms having poor capital, low skill and little experience tried to 
reduce costs by using disqualified materials or by involving illegal processes or depending 
on low-cost contractors.
The sale price regulation has been criticised in that the house price regulation 
resulted in the deterioration of the industry by discouraging building firms from 
constructing high quality houses and by giving up the innovation efforts and R&D 
investment in housebuilding. Price control was also responsible for ‘uniformity’ in 
housing developments, lacking variety.
The various regulations made an important impact on building firms’ behaviour. 
Land use and development regulations influenced accessibility to land, density of 
housing projects, and eventually both numbers o f dwellings and land costs per unit. The 
regulations in the production process e.g. housing standard, housing type, and housing 
size influenced the quality and quantity o f houses built. Sale price regulation controlled 
the price o f houses. Housebuilding firms would have two options to increase profits: one 
was to stay in business by reducing costs of housebuilding and the other option was to 
avoid the regulation, that is, to divert into the other business. The latter option resulted in 
acceleration o f the building firms’ diversification. In the 1980s, it was observed that many 
housebuilding firms either gave up their business or diversified into other business.
2.4 Structure of the Industry
Simultaneous with physical growth of the industry, the industry has been 
restructured internally during the mass construction plan period. This section discusses 
major points of the restructuring.
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2.4.1 Main Builders: the Nature of the Firms
The main builders of houses in Korea are classified into two categories. The first 
one is small builders who were predominant over the industry by the beginning o f the 
1980s. There are thousands o f small builders and it is difficult to estimate the exact 
number, as the entry in and exit out o f the industry are easy. Those who own residential 
land can start a housebuilding business only by employing a technician as required in 
‘the Architectural Act’. They normally build single detached houses or row houses on a 
small scale, less than 10 single detached houses or less than 20 row houses per year6.
The other category includes designated and registered firms. The Korean 
government has regulated entry into large-scale housebuilding7 by a registration and 
designation system. That is, only the firms certified by the government can participate in 
large-scale housebuilding. The registration system was regarded as a kind of supporting 
system rather than a regulation. The entry in and exit out o f the industry were rather easy, 
as the qualifications o f the registered firms were not so strict8. This system was 
strengthened by the designation system in 19809. In order to pursue specialisation and 
expansion o f housebuilding, the government designated a few leading firms retaining 
qualified technicians, capital and performance among registered firms. The objectives of 
the designation system were to extend house construction by fully supporting the firms 
with excellent achievement in the housebuilding area and to protect housing quality from 
careless building by small builders and to heighten reliability o f the housebuilding firms.
Table 2-15 Number o f housebuilding firms
Types of firms 1980 1985 1989 1990 1992 1995
Designated firms 54 55 71 117 117 115
Registered firms 1,301 2,079 4,043 6,260 7,819 4,144
Source: Ministry of Construction and Transportation.
6 1996 small builders’ interview
7 Large-scale housebuilding means construction of more than 20 dwellings or residential land development of 
more than 10,000m2
8 They should retain more than 3 hundred million won capital and more than one technician in the architectural 
work.
9 The qualifications of the designated firms are stricter. According to ‘the Housing Construction Promotion 
Act’, they should retain more than 5 thousand million won capital and more than 10 technicians in the building 
fields and have more than 300 houses annual performance for the recent 3 years.
i
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Table 2-15 shows the numbers of the designated and registered firms. There were 
54 designated firms and 1,031 registered firms in 1980. The government strictly limited 
the entry into the designated firm through the designation system. The number of 
designated firms was only 55 in 1985 and it increased into 71 in 1989 when ‘the 
construction programme for two million dwellings’ started. The numbers of designated 
firms increased into 117 in 1990 and then remained 115 firms without any increase as the 
government stopped designation after 1990. The numbers of registered firms has rapidly 
increased since 1989. Many firms entered into the business during the mass construction 
period between 1988 and 1992. In fact, the mass construction plan played an influential 
role in the increase o f the firms’ entry into the industry.
Figure 2-2 shows the increasing trend of the designated and registered firms. The 
designated firms keep rather stable trends whereas the registered firms show outstanding 
changes in number. The number of registered firms was as large as 9,050 in 1991 and it 
was more than 3.4 times the number than that o f in 1988. Since 1992 when the mass 
construction plan finished, the business cycle of housebuilding has gone downward and 
nearly half o f the registered firms exited out o f the business or became bankrupt. Only 
4,122 firms remained in 1995. Another reason for the decrease of registered firms was 
that in 1992, the government changed the size of capital required as a registered firm into 
three hundred million won from a previous amount o f one hundred million won by 
revising ‘the Housing Construction Promotion Act’.
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Here, the nature o f housebuilding firms is examined in more detail. There were a 
total of 115 designated firms in 1995. 44 firms (38 %) among these belonged to big 
business groups, that is, the firms were subsidiaries of each big business group. The other 
71 firms (62 %) were independent firms. Classifying the firms by number of employees, 
about 76.8 percent of the firms belonged to the large-scale group having more than 200 
employees. Among them, 22 firms are extra large firms having more than 1000 
employees. The other 27 firms (23.2 percent) were medium-size firms having between 
20 and 200 employees.
Table 2-16 <Characteristics o f housebuilding firms in 1995
Classification
Designated firms 
(115) 
Number (%)
Registered firms 
(4144) 
number (%)
Type of 
firm
Subsidiary of business group 
independent firm
44(38.1 %) 
71 (61.9 %) NA
Size of 
employees
large (more than 200 employees) 
medium (21-200 employees) 
small ( less than 20 employees)
88 (76.8 %)* 
27 ( 23.2 %)
755 (18.2 %) 
3,240 (78.2 %) 
149 ( 3.6 %)
* 22 building firms (19.1 %) among them have more than 1,000 employees. 
Source: Association of designated firms, Association of registered firms
Most registered firms retained less than 200 employees, therefore, they belonged 
to the medium and small size group. Some of them were large firms having a general 
construction licence and more than 200 employees, but the share was rather small 
(18.2 %), compared with that of designated firms. The large firms having more than one 
billion won capital were just 2.2 percent o f the total. Medium and small registered firms 
mainly constructed residential houses only, therefore, their business was strongly 
dependent on the housebuilding business cycle10.
We may observe that the main builder has changed in the Korean housebuilding 
industry. Small builders were main builders by the beginning o f the 1980s; however, 
since the mid 1980s when the government directly intervened in the industry, the 
designated firms and registered firms have predominated the industry.
10 Interview survey with the Korea Housebuilding Firms’ Association
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2.4.2 Output of the Firms
The output produced by the designated and registered firms consisted o f about 60 
percent o f total output since the mid 1980s. Table 2-17 shows the proportions o f public 
and private sectors. The public output consists of those o f central government, local 
government and the Korea National Housing Corporation (KNHC) and the Korea 
Housing Bank (KHB). They mainly built the public houses for low-income households. 
The size o f houses was limited to small dwellings less than 18 pyong(60 m2) by ‘the 
Housing Construction Promotion Act’.
Table 2-17 Public and private output (unit: dwellings, start basis)
1975 1980 1985 1990 1995
Public
(%)
62,700
(36)
106,187
(50)
132,070
(58)
269,421
(36)
228,232
(37)
Private
(%)
117,251
(64)
105,350
(50)
95,292
(42)
480,957
(64)
390,825
(63)
Total
(%)
175,951
(100)
211,537 227,362 750,378 619,057
Source: Ministry of Construction and Transportation.
When we consider the output o f the private sector in detail, we may find some 
changes by time as shown in Table 2-18. About 60 percent o f the total private output had 
been built by small builders up to the beginning of 1980s. After that, the proportions 
decreased and those o f the designated and registered firms have increased since the mid 
1980s. Their output reached up to 80 percent or so to total output since 1985. This tells 
us that the certified housebuilding firms have led the industry since the mid 1980s. It is 
outstanding that the output of the registered firms has greatly increased since 1985.
Table 2-18 Private output (unit: dwellings, start basis)
1980 1985 1990 1995
Designated firms 17,583 19,377 146,468 142,832*
(%) (16.7) (20.3) (30.5) (34.6)
Registered firms 24,350 57,078 219,086 269,362*
(%) (23.1) (59.9) (45.6) (65.4)
Housing co-operation 63,417 18,839 115,403
& small builders (%) (60.2) (19.8) (23.9) NA
Total 105,350 95,292 480,957 390,825
(%) (100) (100) (100) (100)
Source: Ministry of Construction and Transportation. * permission basis only in 1995
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Houses can be produced in numerous different ways, showing a great variety in 
types and sizes. In Korea, there are four types o f houses; single family detached houses, 
high-rise apartment houses, row houses and multi-family unit houses. The single family 
detached house was a most popular type by the beginning o f the 1980s. Since the mid 
1980s, common house types such as high-rise apartment houses, row houses and multi­
family units in a single house have been increasingly produced in the urban areas.
Table 2-19 Types o f houses (unit: dwellings, start basis)
1980 1985 1990 1995
Common
house
Apartment 
houses (%)
76,889
(36.3)
132,114
(58.1)
501,036
(66.8)
494,410
(79.9)
Row houses 11,965 45,038 18,314 17,502
(%) (5.7) (19.8) (2.4) (2.8)
Multi-family 
units in a single 
house (%)
125,158
(16.7)
50,470
(8.2)
Single detached 122,683 50,210 105,445 56,675
houses (%) (58.0) (22.1) (14.1) (9.1)
Total 211,537 227,362 750,378 619,057
Source: Ministry of Construction and Transportation.
An apartment house is defined as a high-storey standardised house (normally 10- 
20 stories) and it is normally built on a large-scale (between 300 and 1000 dwellings). A 
row house is a low-rise common house (normally less than 5 stories) and it is built on a 
small-scale (less than 20 dwellings). The multi-family unit is a new house type11 
introduced in 1988 in urban areas. This type o f house has usually been built on sites 
where old and deteriorated single-detached houses were evacuated. The increase o f the 
multi-family units has allegedly contributed to relieving the housing shortage for low- 
income households, but it has its own weakness. Some researchers argued that the 
expansion o f this type o f house in urban areas made the residential environments 
deteriorate. The careless construction of the houses in a small residential lot brought 
about problems such as limitation of neighbour’s right to sunshine, shortage of water 
supply, sewerage, and parking lots etc.
11 The multi-family units in a single house comprises 8-9 dwellings having individual kitchen, bath and 
outdoor openings occupied and owned by each dwelling household. The purpose of this type of house is to 
raise the efficiency of residential land use and to increase the number of new houses in urban areas. The 
Korean government revised ‘the Building Act’ in 1985 to encourage building the multi-family unit and it was 
designated as a formal type of common house under ‘the Housing Construction Promotion Act’ in 1988.
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In America and the U.K., the most popular type o f house is the single-family 
house, whereas the most popular and large portion o f newly built houses in Korea is the 
high-rise apartment house. The proportion o f the apartment house has rapidly increased 
(up to 80 % o f total new dwellings) since the mid 1980s. We may find that the 
housebuilding industry has been divided into two segments throughout the high growth 
period, according to the type of houses built and the type o f builders involved. The first 
one is ‘the apartment house industry’ built by designated and registered firms certified by 
the government. The other one is ‘the single-detached house and row-house industry’ 
built by small builders. Most o f the designated and registered firms participated in the 
apartment house segment. Three reasons for this may be considered as follows; first, the 
government encouraged building firms to build apartment houses as they used the 
residential land efficiently. Second, the private firms preferred this type o f house as it is 
possible to expect economy o f scale from the mass construction o f standardised 
apartment houses. Third, the demand for apartment houses increased greatly as the 
houses had led the housing price rise since the end 1970s.
2.4.3 Market Share
Most o f the building firms competed in the same segmented industry, that is, in 
the apartment house industry, even though the firms’ size, nature and original 
characteristics were different. Sometimes, they built row houses and high-quality single 
detached houses; however, the proportion is very small.
When we considered the output level o f the firms, there were some differences 
between two types o f firm. It is known when the housebuilding business was in a good 
condition, especially between 1988 and 1992, active large designated firms built more 
than 30,000 dwellings per year and active registered firms about 5,000-10,000 dwellings 
per year12. These are very high levels o f output, even compared with those o f one o f the 
largest builders in USA in a high growth period13.
12 Interview survey in June 1996 with the Korea Housebuilding Firm Association
13 In 1948 when Levitt built Levittown in Long Island near New York City, it completed more than 35 
houses per day and 150 houses per week. It finally built more that 17,000 standardised houses in that year. 
During the boom period between 1960 and 1964, in the San Fernando Valley area, new housing averaged 
16,500 per year.
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Table 2-20 Average output per firm
(unit: dwellings per year)
1985 1988 1990 1992 1994
Designated builders 352 533 1,252 1,220 1,139
Registered builders 13 38 35 228 61
Sources: Designated firms’ association
Registered firms’ association
Table 2-20 shows the firms’ average output level and the trend. The average 
output o f the designated firms was 300-500 dwellings in the 1980s and it has increased to 
1,200 dwellings since 1988. In the case of registered firms, the average output was more 
or less 50 dwellings in 1980s and even in 1990; however, they show an exceptionally 
high output of 228 in 1992. The registered firms’ output kept at a rather low level, 
compared with those o f designated firms. This is because when business conditions were 
good, many firms joined the business, therefore, their competition became higher. There 
is another study (KRIHS 1996) to show the output level by different size o f firms. In 
1995 the average output o f large housebuilding firms was estimated to be as 2,300 
dwellings per year, that o f medium firms was 422 dwellings and o f small firms was 55 
dwellings.
There is no previous study which examines the market share of the housebuilding 
industry. Table 2-21 shows the market share of the Korean housebuilding industry. The 
market shares o f the top 5 firms were 5.05 % in 1993, 9.31 % in 1994 and 6.31 %  in 
1995. Those of the top 10 firms were respectively 8.9, 14.15 and 9.0 %  in each year as 
shown in Table 2-21.
Table 2-21 Market share o f housebuilding firms
1993 1994 1995
Top 5 firms 1 (%) 5.05 9.31 6.31
Top 10 firms 2 (%) 8.90 14.15 9.00
Total private construction (dwellings) 468,604 364,444 390,825
1: Hyundai Sanup, Booyoung, Donga, Hyundai construction, Keumho. 
2: Hyundai Sanup, Booyoung, Donga, Hyundai construction, Keumho,
Samsung, Daewoo, Woobang, LG, Daelim 
Source: the Korea Housebuilding Firm Association
There is a similar study (KRIHS, 1995) which shows the market share o f the 
construction industry. The market share o f the top 10 firms in 1995 was 30 % in the 
general construction industry. These results tell us that the degree of competition in the 
housebuilding industry is higher than in the general construction industry. As the reasons
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for this, we may consider ‘the easy entry’ and ‘the capital-intensiveness and labour­
intensiveness’ o f the housebuilding industry. The entry barrier into the housebuilding 
industry is not so strict in comparison with that o f the construction industry. The 
housebuilding business mainly depends on capital and labour. The firms which are 
interested in housebuilding can easily enter the industry if they satisfy the qualifications 
as a registered firm.
2.4.4 Growth Strategy
Another noticeable attribute o f Korean housebuilding firms was multi-production 
structure. Their main business was housebuilding and/or construction, however, they also 
diversified into various different business. Diversification is considered as a growth 
strategy which the firms pursue. Most Korean housebuilding firms diversified into other 
businesses related to their core business such as the contracting business and property 
development and management. However, in the last decade or so there has been a 
diversification into businesses very different from the building work such as mining, 
materials manufacturing and merchandising, operating hotels and restaurants, operating 
financial institutes, foreign trade, retail and wholesale and transportation.
According to ‘the Annual Report’ o f the building firms, the firms were involved 
in about 7-8 business at the same time. Some o f them were operating 20 businesses 
within the firm’s boundary. It was noteworthy that some housebuilding firms were 
involved in totally unrelated businesses such as forestry and logging, sales of motor 
vehicles, operating broadcasting businesses and financial institutions within the firm 
boundary. The involvement in the businesses such as manufacturing o f building 
materials, site preparation, labour recruitment (personal supply service), storage and 
warehousing, rental and subdividing real estate, real estate appraisal and management 
and advertising business means that the firms were operating vertically integrated 
business as well.
We may classify the building firms into three categories, based on direction of 
diversification. The first category is those which had long experience in the construction 
and civil engineering business and diversified into the housebuilding business. They 
were originally general contractors, that is, they had started their business in construction 
and entered into housebuilding at the beginning o f the 1980s. Most o f them are large-
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scale. The second category is those which had started their business in housebuilding and 
expanded into general construction area and other business. Most o f them firstly entered 
into housebuilding as a registered firm and their scales were rather small. There were 
some successful firms which originally started their business in housebuilding and grew 
into a big business group. The third category is those which had started their business in 
other (unrelated) businesses and then diversified into housebuilding and construction in 
the mid 1980s. Most o f them were large-scale and now they are all designated as 
housebuilding firms. They usually diverted their main business into housebuilding and 
construction after the mid 1980s when the housebuilding business was in a good cycle 
and ‘the construction programme for two million dwellings’ started.
The direction of the firms’ diversification can be summarised as follows. The 
large construction firms and other large firms were diversified into the housebuilding 
business since 1980 mainly in the high growth period (since the mid 1980s). We may say 
that government’s intervention has had the effect o f pushing the large firms’ entry into 
the housebuilding business. However, outstanding attribute is that the firms which had 
started their business in housebuilding also diversified into the other related and/or 
unrelated business.
We may summarise some outstanding attributes observed in the Korean 
housebuilding industry during the last three decades. First, housing output greatly 
increased especially during the mass construction period between 1988 and 1992. 
Second, large-scale firms, i.e. designated and registered firms, have dominated the 
industry. Third, mainly apartment houses have been built. Therefore, the current Korean 
housebuilding industry is characterised as an apartment house industry dominated by 
large-scale firms. Lastly, the housebuilding firms show diversified production structure. 
Here, issues on efficiency o f the diversified production structure need to be considered. 
A study on the Korean housebuilding industry (Kim and Cho, 1990) suggested that the 
Korean housebuilding industry exhibited a number o f problems; the industry was poorly 
structured and disoriented. It was highly concentrated and also poorly integrated, both 
horizontally and vertically. A large number of housebuilding firms revealed a weak asset 
structure. The management did not adequately respond to changes in the price of 
production inputs. In conclusion, they commented that the government intervention in 
the industry seems to be largely responsible for market failure. Now, we need to
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investigate the efficiency o f the government-intervened building business and the 
industry from various points o f view.
2.5 Findings and Discussion
Since the Korean war in the 1950s, the problems o f the Korean housing market can 
be summarised: housing shortage, housing price inflation and speculation, and short supply 
o f residential land. To solve these problems, the Korean government has been deeply 
involved in the housing market. By the beginning o f the 1980s, the government’s housing 
policy was focused on the demand-side, however, the government recognised that a 
demand-control policy would not work properly when demand for housing was high. Since 
the 1980s, government policy has been directed to mass construction o f housing, that is, 
supply-side o f housing. In fact, the government’s mass construction plan o f 1988-1992 
played an important role in the growth of the Korean housebuilding industry. The 
‘construction programme for two million dwellings’ provided a good business opportunity 
to the housebuilding firms. The investment ratio on housing has increased to 7-8 percent of 
GNP which is on a similar level with those of the advanced countries. About 5,000 firms 
entered into the industry during the period (1988-1992) and they enjoyed a high boom in 
housebuilding.
The mass construction period is considered to be a prosperous period o f the 
industry as the government guaranteed a certain amount o f sales to the building firms; on 
the other hand, it is considered as a period when the government introduced the strictest 
regulations in the industry. Particularly during the mass construction period, the 
government introduced some strict regulations in the newly built apartment house sector: 
residential land development regulation, public allocation system of the developed land, and 
several regulations in the production process. In the mid 1980s when residential land was 
lacking and the price o f land was high, the problem of house shortage was a keen social 
issue. This was one reason why the government directly intervened in the industry. Only the 
government could develop large-scale residential land using expropriation power. The 
government even involved itself in allocation of the land. Considering that land is one o f the 
most important input factors, the rigid land development regulation played a role as an entry 
barrier in the business. The regulation also prohibited the firms’ autonomy in the decision 
making process and therefore, building firms’ profitability.
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House price regulation was considered to be one o f the strictest regulation on firms’ 
business. The price regulation was rather pervasive as it controlled the firms’ cost of 
housing production, thus, adversely affecting its financial position. Moreover, in the 
circumstance where the prices o f newly built houses were lower than the market prices, 
once the firms built apartment houses, sales o f the completed dwellings was guaranteed, 
therefore, all the building firms, designated firms or registered firms, wanted to build 
apartment houses. The price regulation also resulted in distortion of demand structure of 
housing.
Two types o f regulations i.e. land development regulation and house price 
regulation, were considered as o f particular concern in the supply side o f housing. The 
possible strategy the building firms pursue was either cost reduction strategy or 
diversification strategy. There was no incentive for the housebuilding firms to improve the 
quality o f housing. This resulted in slowing down sound development o f industry by 
discouraging the building firms to make further effort to build high quality houses and by 
making the building firms give up innovation efforts and R&D investment in 
housebuilding.
As well as the physical growth o f the industry, the industry was restructured 
internally during the mass construction period. First, large building firms dominated the 
industry; about 70 percent or so to total private output were built by the large building firms. 
Second, the most prevalent type o f house is not single-family dwelling as in most western 
industrialised countries, but apartment houses. More than 80 % of new dwellings built 
during the mass construction period were apartment houses. As a result, the industry was 
segmented into ‘apartment houses industry’ built by large building firms and ‘single­
detached house industry’ built by small builders. The current structure o f the Korean 
housebuilding industry is characterised as an apartment house industry dominated by 
large building firms. Another attribute o f the Korean housebuilding industry is a trend for 
firms to diversify their businesses. Most of the housebuilding firms have become involved 
in other businesses in addition to housebuilding. The outstanding attribute is that even small 
building firms which started their business in housebuilding diversified into other business, 
even before they specialised in housebuilding.
In the following chapter, we investigate the current structure of the building 
business and the industry dominated by large building firms and examine the efficiency of 
the structures from various points o f view.
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Chapter 3 The Structure of the Housebuilding Industry
The objective o f this chapter is to understand the attributes o f the modem 
housebuilding industry. First, inherent attributes of housebuilding observed in the product 
and in the production process are investigated. The governance structure which prevailed in 
the production process and the business strategies the modem building firms have pursued 
are explored from the relevant literatures. From the evidence, ‘ideal’ production pattern for 
modem housebuilding firms can be set out and how the ‘ideal’ pattern is modified by 
countries’ institutional framework and policy framework can be investigated.
3.1 Nature of the Housebuilding Industry
3.1.1 Attributes of the Product and Production Process
The special attributes o f the house as a product are, as Grebler (1950) pointed 
out, bulk, weight, spatial fixity, durability, complexity and heterogeneity o f the 
completed products and the requirements of a large amount of outlay. The bulk, weight 
and spatial fixity are associated with localism o f housing demand. The localism is 
emphasised by the fact that public regulations such as building codes, subdivision 
requirements and zoning ordinances are local and show great diversity between regions. 
Builders operating outside their region should not only appraise local market prospects 
and direction o f city growth in potential territory, but also understand the local 
regulations. Variations in these regulations mean that housebuilders may not easily be 
able to transfer their pattern of land development, design and layout, use o f materials, 
labour practice and operational methods, from one place to another. Housebuilders 
operating their business outside their home area have often met with failure. This is why 
most o f the housebuilders are operating their business in their home city or adjoining 
area.
Durability is an important attribute in view of, not only the dwellings’ physical 
structures, but also o f users’ and producers’ interests of desired degree o f the dwellings. 
The durability o f the product indicates the importance o f the unique relationship between 
the number of new units and the total housing stock in any given year. Housebuilders
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have to consider the quantity o f existing stock in the area when they plan a new 
development project. The complexity as a product results from the multiple function that 
it must perform. Almost all other finished goods for customers’ use have a single 
function to perform, whereas houses are expected to provide for the collective activities 
o f the family, such as cooking, eating, washing and sleeping etc. Houses are also 
produced in various types, design and size. Heterogeneity o f houses results not only from 
the variety but also from location and neighbourhood. Besides, houses require substantial 
and continuous outlays for purchasing, renting, and maintenance and repair during the 
lifetime. The purchase o f a house requires an unusually large amount o f funds in relation 
to family income and typically involves a long-term commitment to repay a mortgage 
loan or rent which represents a large portion of a family’s budget. Therefore, the demand 
for houses may be deferred and this affects the planning scheme o f new housing. Figure 
3-1 shows the attributes of the product and the attributes in the production process.
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Figure 3-1 Attributes o f the product and production process
The attributes o f the product are reflected in the production process o f that 
product. The four distinctive attributes in the production process are summarised as 
follows. First, the place on which houses are produced is the very place where they will 
be consumed and the site is not changeable. Most of the production functions are 
performed in the location o f the projects. Second, there is seasonal concentration in
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housebuilding work as the production process is outdoors and is exposed to the vagaries 
of the weather. This involves forced interruptions and seasonal concentration o f activity. 
The seasonal concentration has been minimised by transferring on-site work to off-site 
work and by devices that make construction possible in inclement weather. Third, the 
production scale and duration are variable. The production scale affects the extent of 
repetitive processes and mechanised production. It is associated with the size of the 
market and differentiation in buyers’ tastes and preferences. Variation in buyer’s taste 
and preference also influences the production process by limiting the degree of 
standardisation. The production duration may vary between several months in the case of 
conventional construction and a few days in the case of fully prefabricated houses with 
factory-installed plumbing and heating. Fourth, the dependency on skilled labour is high 
and various kinds o f labour and materials are required in the production process. 
Hundreds o f unstandardised works have to  be carried out and management skills based 
on a stable and inter-locking relationship among various jobs is very important.
The unique attributes as a product and the specialities in the production process 
affect the industrial structure of housebuilding. The pattern of industrial progress has 
often been described as a development from manual labour, through organisation of 
repetitive processes, the application o f tools and machines, and the use o f mechanisation. 
This pattern is applicable to house building. Maisel (1953) explained that the production 
methods of housebuilding have changed a great deal; mechanisation in tools, shifts from 
on-site work to off-site work, changes in the scale o f production, and usage o f new 
materials. Ball, Harloe and Martens (1988) pointed out a tendency towards greater 
flexibility and technical development in the UK building process. The organisation and 
planning of the labour forces may be one aspect and the prefabricated and concrete 
technology may be another aspect o f process innovation. More advanced management 
strategies were adopted in the organisation of production. More flexible incentive 
schemes and growing reliance on subcontracting in 1950s and 1960s and ‘just-in-time’ 
materials, equipment and specialist workers in 1970s and 1980s may be considered as 
the examples.
3.1.2 Stage of the Housebuilding
The housebuilding process includes a number o f interrelated but temporarily 
separate activities. Generally, housebuilding is divided into sections such as planning of
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housing schemes, acquisition and assembly o f land sites, construction, and sales of the 
completed in terms o f major functions for housebuilding. Golland (1998) explained the 
development process as supply o f land, supply o f infrastructure and construction.
The housebuilding stage may be divided into three stages; the pre-construction 
stage, the construction stage, and after-construction stage as shown in Figure 3-2. 
Planning and programming of the development project, land acquisition and 
development, and installation of infrastructure are carried out in the pre-construction 
stage.
Figure 3-2 Stages in housebuilding
The planning and programming stage o f the developed project means a 
preliminary stage to define the feasibility of the building project. In this stage, relevant 
law, government’s urban planning procedure, and the dynamic nature o f demand side 
should be investigated. This stage, sometimes, takes a very long time to prepare as a 
proper condition before construction.
The land acquisition and development issue in housebuilding is associated with 
land ownership, land pricing and taxation of development land. The source o f land 
supply is basically related to the extent to which development land is owned ‘publicly’ or 
‘privately’. The way land is supplied is very much dependent on land and planning 
policies. Land ownership pattern is also influential to the housing production method.
Installation o f infrastructure is an important stage in the house development 
process raising a number of important questions; who provides it and who pays for it ? 
Infrastructure can be considered to be about the provision of ‘public’ goods and 
‘externalities’ in economic theory. As there must be roads, sewers, electricity cables and 
so on for housebuilding, infrastructure provision is also applicable within a ‘state-market 
framework’. These may be considered ‘public goods’. The grant of planning permission, 
moreover, may have the effect of creating some adverse and some beneficial
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consequences. The planning process can be argued to be a ‘non-market decision’ and 
hence decisions on planning matters are decisions which can lead to both harmful and 
beneficial externalities. However, the costs of infrastructure are borne ultimately by the 
housing consumer. The issue o f installation of infrastructure automatically depends on 
the source o f the land and ownership o f the development land.
The construction might be expected to be the main stage in the whole 
development process. The issues o f purchasing labour and materials, using building plant 
and equipment are relevant in the construction stage. Ball (1999) outlined the market 
contexts faced by housebuilders as housing market and five input factor markets; land, 
labour, materials, plant and equipment. He explained that housebuilders have to deal 
with the five specific types o f input markets as well as the housing market in which their 
products are sold.
The construction stage in housebuilding cannot be understood without reference 
to the organisation o f the entire construction industry, comprising general contractors, 
special trade contractors, dealers and manufacturers o f materials as well as miscellaneous 
labours. Housebuilders may carry out all building operations using their own employees. 
However, ‘contracting’ has been a prevalent characteristic in housebuilding. In virtually 
all countries, there has been a shift away from the direct employment o f workers to the 
hiring o f them on a contract basis. The change from ‘internal operation’ to ‘contracting’ 
which were made by the housebuilders was rather evolutionary than revolutionary. This 
issue is basically related to choice of governance structure; ‘contracting’ or ‘direct 
employment’ or ‘in-house production’. The relationships consequently affect the 
efficiency o f the housebuilding process and the potentials for innovation.
The construction stage might be expected to be a final stage in a development 
process. However, lastly, exchange of ownership and after service function are followed 
by sales o f the completed dwellings.
Housebuilding is normally carried out throughout the five stages as we discussed. 
Normally, home builders or housebuilding firms in most o f the industrialized countries 
were involved in the wide range o f building works from planning o f the housing scheme, 
land acquisition and development, purchasing input factors, building works, and to 
marketing and sales o f the products. They are, to a significant extent, active both in land 
development and housebuilding, buying greenfield or redevelopment land, conceiving 
developments and selling completed houses. They are normally called speculative 
builders. The speculative builders need a large amount o f capital to invest in land in
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advance o f building work. Profits come from both in the land development process and 
the building process. Therefore, one o f the objectives o f speculative builders is to 
minimise the conversion of the potential profits which happen in the development 
process into ‘land rent’ as presented by the land price paid to the landowner. The 
speculative builders have to consider appropriate residential schemes for the sites and 
careful and judicious purchase o f land. Timing in land purchase is obviously important. 
As a result, speculative housebuilders tend to hold a ‘land bank’. Stocks o f development 
land enable them to produce at the best time. Land banks give builders a degree of 
market power, as they are not forced to buy land at a specific time or at a specific 
location in order to build houses. The merchandising function related to purchasing of 
building inputs and the sale o f completed houses is also significant for the speculative 
builders. This is one reason why housebuilders are considered to be a type o f commercial 
merchant, buying cheap and selling dear (Ball 1988). Moreover, a series of 
entrepreneurial functions involved in market forecasting, assembly o f financial packages, 
and marketing and sales o f completed houses are also important.
On the other hand, housebuilding firms can become involved only in the 
construction stage as shown in Figure 3-2 by contracting a relationship with a client 
(main developer). In this case, the client may be a government or local government. We 
may find examples in western European countries where social or public housing is an 
important housing sector and the governments’ policy has been focused on the public 
sector. The Netherlands and Sweden are outstanding examples that the operation of 
housebuilding is strongly reliant upon the government. Control of land supply in the 
Netherlands was lined with planning and infrastructure control and design (Golland 
1998). Dutch housebuilding firms became involved only in the construction stage by the 
contracting relationship with the state. It says that housing policy in each country 
provides a regulatory framework o f the industry and affects business behaviour of 
building firms. Various policies such as housing policy, land policy and planning 
systems consist o f a regulatory framework and the regulation has been operated in 
various ways, according to whether the housing sector is ‘public’ or ‘private’.
Sometimes in the private sector we can find an example o f this. Where a building 
project is massive, therefore, the main developer contracts some o f the works to other 
building firms, the building firms participate only in actual building works in construction 
stage. That is, in the private sector, housebuilding firms are either the owner o f the 
project or are contractor by contract with the project owner.
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In these cases, private housebuilding firms involved themselves in only 
construction stage by a contracting relationship with the owner or main developer. Profit 
is made by keeping costs below the revenue received from the developer through 
payment o f the tender price. Competition between the building firm and developers 
(clients) usually takes place at the tendering stage. Most o f the building firms’ profits 
depend on taking full advantage of the contemporary institutional structures, rules and 
practices o f the various markets in which they deal. Profit may increase through 
minimising working capital and overheads. This means that profit from housebuilding 
comes from a rapid turnover o f working capital. Therefore building firms make efficient 
use o f working capital and more emphasis is focused on technical skill and production 
management. In this case, the building firms provide a pre-decided customer 
‘construction service’ according to a contract, whereas former, the building firms as a 
speculative builder, provide uncertain customers ‘completed dwellings’.
In this section, we investigated nature o f the housebuilding industry. 
Housebuilding is inherently project-orientated and skill-intensive. It requires a project 
management form of organisation to cope with the complexity and uncertainty o f the 
various labour skills and with the requirements for adaptability. Since characteristics of 
building technology require labour specialisation but also component balancing problems 
of labour specialisation, building firms may rely on contractors in sequential stage. 
According to whether the housing sector is ‘public’ or ‘private’, the behaviour o f the 
building firms participating in the building project are affected or restricted by various 
regulatory or industrial circumstances. It means that the relationship between the 
building firms and the environment are close and varied and the building firms should 
always perceive the regulatory or industrial circumstances especially when considering 
fundamental issues as project procurement systems and contracting.
3.2 Organisation of Production
3.2.1 Contracting as a Governance Structure in the Production Process
The unique attributes as a product and the specialities in the production process 
require a specific type o f organisational structure in housebuilding. The site-specific 
nature o f the project means that each project has a high number of unique features which
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need to be resolved through the project life cycle. Skill complexity required in the 
building process means that building firms cannot retain whole task information. As the 
starting point for considering these issues, the transaction cost approach proposed by 
Williamson (1975) is often cited. This approach is commonly referred to as markets and 
hierarchies. This considers the total cost o f purchase o f goods or service to be the sum of 
the cost o f production and the cost o f transaction. Subsequently, it considers how 
different types o f organisational arrangement can affect the costs o f both production and 
transaction. One particularly powerful illustration o f the approach is given by 
consideration o f contracting practices. The issue is at what stage does it make sense for 
an organisation to contract work rather than to undertake that work directly (Lansely 
1994).
‘Contracting’ has been an institutional device in the building industry which 
defines the relationships between the various members o f the project coalition (Bowley 
1966). It therefore provided the context for the organisation o f construction projects 
(Lawrence and Dyer, 1983). ‘Contracting’ is considered to be response to uncertainty 
arising from complexity, given bounded rationality o f the firm (Williamson, 1975). 
Housebuilding generates considerable levels o f uncertainty from the early stages due to 
factors such as the interaction of the building project with existing facilities, regulation 
through urban planning procedures, and the dynamic nature o f the customer’s 
requirements.
This issue can be considered as a ‘governance structure’ o f transactions in 
housebuilding. Here, the governance structure means the specific set of institutional 
arrangements that minimize total costs of conducting the relative transactions and it means 
a most efficient institutional arrangement. ‘Contracting’ has been used as an 
organisational device in the construction stage and it is also related with an issue of 
efficient boundary o f the building firms. It means that when most of transactions relevant 
to housebuilding are governed by the contracting system, building firms can maximise 
the efficiency o f operation. Firms may move from one governance structure to another in 
the process of adaptation to the changing institutional environment.
Even though building firms rely on contractors to obtain the required skills, in 
conditions of bounded rationality, housebuilding firms are responsible for the entire 
project. They are normally the owner of the project. However, sometimes, they become 
the main contractor by a contract with the owner. In this case, the building firms 
complete the project for a fixed sum of money or a fixed price per unit o f work,
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sometimes with cost and time incentives. In any case, however, they do not directly hire 
all the labour trades needed for a project. Building firms are typically hire carpenters, 
and sometimes painters and bricklayers directly; however, other trades are hired under 
contract. Special trade contractors are commonly subcontractors to the building firms, 
furnishing a particular set o f labour skills. Special trade contractors contract for 
plumbing and heating, painting, electrical work, masonry, plastering, roofing, and 
structural steel erection. Special trade contractors serve as resource pools for the building 
firms and are responsible for recruiting, training (especially in non-union construction), 
allocating, and controlling labour resources. In this context, the building firm is known 
as a market trader. It acts as a broker for projects and as an intermediary acquiring 
materials, human resources, equipment and finance to undertake those projects.
Prevalence o f contracting in housebuilding has been found in many studies. 
Grebler (1950) and Maisel (1953)’s examination showed that a complex contracting 
relationship may appear in housebuilding for the 1950-1960 period. Project managers, 
professionals, special trade contractors and self-employed workers (Labour-only 
contractors) are related to each other through some form of contract. Herzog’s study 
(1963) also shows that US housebuilding firms were highly dependent on contracting 
during the 1950s and 1960s.
In fact, full-scale vertical integration o f housebuilding is difficult to manage in 
the given product, technology and market condition. Maisel’s examination (1953) 
explains the difficulty o f vertical integration in housebuilding for the 1950-1960 period. 
Typically the large firms in the USA have their own crews handling rough and finished 
carpentry and general construction labour, whereas they generally assigned all other 
works to other contractors on a competitive bid basis. Nearly three-quarters o f the 
builders among the interviewed firms attempted to integrate one or more o f the building 
functions, but in the majority o f cases their own labourers were unable to do the job as 
efficiently as the trade contractors. Among the 25 percent o f the firms who didn’t try 
integration in the 1950s, a considerable number had already made an attempt at some 
earlier period without success.
It was difficult to find a consistent tendency for housebuilders to integrate 
vertically and thus do away with contracting. Levittown1 is one o f the typically successful
1 In 1947, Levitt acquired 1400 acres of Long Island farmland about 30 miles away from New York 
City and revolutionalised the housebuilding industry, adapting assembly line techniques to the mass 
production of housing.
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examples o f the US large builders’ vertical integration. Levittown was the largest housing 
development ever built by a single builder. Levitt applied vertical integration in the 
housebuilding. However, many other firms realised that by integrating a number o f 
different activities, they were actually losing focus, developing rigidities and finding it 
more difficult to co-ordinate at one time. Its many problems have prompted a strong 
move toward the alternative market-based form.
Eccles (1981 A) has shown that contracting in housebuilding is better suited to 
efficient production than is vertical integration. He emphasised that contracting can be 
explained as a response to uncertainty. He emphasised that most very large 
housebuilding firms reply heavily on contracted labour. Lawrence and Dyre (1983) 
indicate that the use of contracting actually increases with the size o f the firm. A survey 
by the National Association o f Home Builders found that 55.6 % o f freshly formed 
housebuilding firms that produce more than five hundred units per year contracted 100 % 
of their labour in 1976. Large and giant firm contract nearly 80 % of their construction 
labour while small and medium firms contract 57 % and 72 %.
Hillebrandt’s research (1971) showed that contracting in the UK construction 
industry increased from 16.6 % in 1958 to 20.1 % in 1963 as a percentage o f the value o f 
all works done. This trend has continued since then. Leopold (1982) suggested that 
subcontracting has increased substantially since the late 1960s onwards in the UK building 
industry. Data in Housing and Construction Statistics 1970-1980 show that almost half o f 
the output (48%) o f firms was subcontracted in 1980.
Recent studies (Winch 1986, Bresnen et. al, 1986) supports the trend. From a 
sample o f 43 large construction sites, small firms were more likely than large firms to 
employ workers directly rather than use subcontract labour, and to transfer them between 
sites. Ball (1988) explained that virtually all building workers came on site as part o f a 
subcontract, either labour-only contractor or supply-and-fix contractor, or as the 
operative of hired machinery and the large firms depended more on subcontracting.
More recent studies also emphasises the use of labour-only trend to be more 
common in large firms rather than small firms, in the main trades rather than specialist 
trades, and in building rather than civil engineering. Also it is largely confined to skilled 
workers. Labourers in the casual sector o f the labour market tend to be directly employed 
(Winch, 1998). Even though direct labour was still prevalent by the late 1980s in 
Scotland (Gibb, 1999), since 1990 the subcontracting ratio has greatly increased in 
Scottish housebuilding (Munro and Gibb, 1995).
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3.2.2 Changes in the Governance Structure
One of the outstanding attributes o f the modem housebuilding industry is that the 
industry has been led by large firms since 1970s. Ball, Harloe and Martens (1988) 
emphasized the emergence o f the large-scale builder as the most dominant force among 
all the changes which occurred within the housebuilding industry. Large firms still 
continue to expand their scale, either merging with other similar scale firms or taking 
over or acquiring other firms.
In the USA, the importance o f the large builder has been outstanding since the 
1950s (Maisel 1953, Herzog 1963) In the U.K., since the 1970s new forms of 
productive enterprise came to dominate private housing production. (Ball 1986, Cough 
1988, Ball 1996 B). In several European countries, large housebuilding firms in private 
housebuilding have developed since the 1960s. In the Netherlands, Denmark and Sweden, 
large and all-purpose housebuilders have emerged in the industry since the 1960s and 
have been active in all spheres o f housing production (Ball et al, 1988, ch. 5). Despite the 
industry’s scale, however, the governance structure in housebuilding has changed little 
over the centuries (Lawrence and Dyer, 1983).
During the last two decades, more advanced production devices were observed in 
housebuilding. There are a few studies showing the changing pattern o f the governance 
structure in the housebuilding industry. It was observed that ‘contracting’ in modern large 
building firms is different from that prevailing among small builders and building firms. 
As a proof o f the prevalence o f this organisational arrangement, Eccles (1981 B) found 
the ‘quasi-firm’ in housebuilding. Building firms tend to rely on a few subcontractors in 
each trade, to perform long-term associations with those in the skilled trades especially, 
and to employ a high percentage o f ‘labour-only subcontractors’ (workers whose tools 
and equipment are supplied by the general contractor). In turn, these subcontractors 
seldom work for a single employer but rather a small set o f building firms with whom 
they establish long-term flexible relationships. He emphasised that the ‘quasi-firm’ is a 
more efficient organisational device than simple ‘contracting’ in housebuilding industry.
Miles and Snow (1986) have called the situation where project coordinators act 
as brokers o f the services o f skill containers as ‘dynamic networks’. They emphasise that 
the international construction project is a prime example o f elaborate networks designed 
to handle complex situation where all the main elements o f the production process - 
product design, the supply o f components, the manufacture o f the product, and its final
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distribution- are all carried out by separate firms integrated through brokers. In the 
construction context this broker is called the construction manager. The construction 
manager is a project manager who acts, essentially, as a merchant, purchasing in a co­
ordinated manner all the construction services required to fulfil the client’s requirements 
(Winch 1994).
Winch (1996) explained about the intermediate contractual relationships such as 
consortium, joint venture, coalition, and quasi-firms and added that firms may move 
from one governance structure to another in the process o f adaptation to the changing 
institutional environment. He commented that Eccles’ quasi-firm is also common in 
British housebuilding, that is, British speculative housebuilders work with a fairly stable 
network o f subcontractors.
As a similar study, Bartlett and Meusen (1995) showed a new relationship between 
main contractors and subcontractors in UK building industry. Most of the main contractors 
in the housebuilding industry maintained a long-term relationship with their subcontractors. 
The main advantages o f the long-term relationship were that the quality o f work done by 
the subcontractors was known and the adoption o f repeated relationships built up trust and 
reliability. In the study, they encouraged the adoption o f long-term relationships between 
housebuilders and contractors and the technique adopted to sustain such long-term 
relationship were referred to as ‘partnering’.
Barlow (1999) introduced a new concept explaining the relationship between 
building firm and subcontractor; ‘networking relationship’ whereby in-house competence is 
complemented by occasional or regular collaboration with outside contractors. This can 
involve vertical or horizontal collaboration. Vertical collaboration between firms at 
different levels in the production chain can be fundamentally important in generating and 
refining new ideas. Firms may be more decent about engaging in horizontal collaboration 
with potential competitors, although this can help reduce unnecessary duplication of 
research efforts. Successful commercialisation o f technology often requires collaboration 
among horizontal competitors that have different capabilities. Ball (1999) also explained the 
advantages o f the ‘networking relationship or collaboration’ between developers and 
subcontractors as follows: these could include bolstering subcontractors’ training 
programmes, sharing mutual problems and facilitating forward planning and enforcing 
innovation and the development o f skills to cope with it.
A range o f intermediate contractual relationships such as ‘quasi-firm’, 
‘partnering’, and ‘networking or collaboration’ are much more complex than those in the
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neo-classical contracting relationship. The core ideal is that housebuilding firms establish 
ongoing relationships with selected subcontractors and by the fairly stable contracting 
network, building firms achieve several useful organisational goals at once; flexibility 
and productivity. The building firms might shift fixed costs for technical investment to 
variable costs and minimise the transaction costs incurred through employing labour 
which, at times, may be unproductive. This perspective also implies that risk sharing and 
economies o f scale might be other effects found in the intermediate contracting 
relationship between the building firms and subcontractors (Lansely, 1994)
In this section, we learnt ‘contracting’ has long been a prevalent governance 
structure in housebuilding. In the modem housebuilding industry which has been 
dominated by large-scale firms, a more advanced type o f contracting relationship with 
subcontractors has emerged, that is, a change was introduced in governance structure of 
housebuilding. This means that one facet o f behavioural attributes o f large firms 
pursuing efficiency has been observed in housebuilding firms, that is, a more integrated 
relationship between building firms and contractors was observed. The concepts such as 
the emergence o f more appropriated production organisation and the changing pattern of 
them in housebuilding give a good basis to understand the current structure o f the 
Korean housebuilding industry.
3.3 Growth Strategy of Housebuilding Firms
3.3.1 Business Strategies of the Building firms
Many institutional economic theories start their arguments by explaining why 
firms may rationally choose to employ workers rather than perpetually reconstruct with 
staff agencies or why firms will integrate with suppliers or distributors. In the context of 
housebuilding, these theories offer an explanation o f the governance structure in the 
production process. However, there is another point of view. Langlois and Robertson 
(1995) explain in their recent work that corporate strategy has something to do with the 
relationship between firm and market or organisation o f production. They argued that the 
boundary of the firm in a market context may change over time. The firm and relative 
organisations alter their relationships related to contract behaviours as the relative 
circumstances change. It is, therefore, reasonable to think that the building firm’s business
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behaviour and its relationship to contractors (suppliers and customers) might alter over the 
long run. Their argument is that the boundaries of the firms may reduce or expand over time 
according to the strategy building firms are pursuing.
Here, we may consider the business strategy of large building firms. 
Housebuilding firms have grown primarily by acquiring smaller contractors and 
operative builders. Merger and acquisition are the conventional paths to expand their 
business scale. The growth strategy o f building firms is generally divided into two basic 
approaches; generalisation and specialisation.
Specialisation means the building firms focus on some strong specialised 
business. This is a specialisation approach. The strategy compels each firm to allocate 
limited resources to selective and advantageous business areas. For example, some 
building firms focus on residential housing. The firms become successful through the 
specialisation approach in the construction industry. Some o f them are well known for 
the construction and sales o f high-rise condominiums. However, the specialised building 
firms may easily stumble if  the market stops growing. Thus, most of the large building 
firms want to operate various business simultaneously.
The generalisation approach means the firms pursue growth by expanding the 
areas o f construction operation. Most o f the building firms in advanced countries 
operate this approach. As a result, leading building firms operate in the entire rage of 
construction and civil engineering fields from residential houses, office buildings, atomic 
power facilities and underground structures to marine development projects. Today, 
some building firms are further expanding their operations into the engineering and 
urban redevelopment fields. Although the generalisation approach worked well during 
the period o f rapid market expansion, it may cause all the firms to operate in a similar 
way and the industry has become very competitive. Furthermore, it is impossible for any 
building firm to increase its financial and human resources to meet all the diversifying 
market needs. Indeed, it is difficult for large building firms to remain good all-round 
firms in the whole construction market.
In fact, housebuilding firms were traditionally small-scale and they were very 
specialised and concentrated on housebuilding by 1960s. Starting with the emergence of 
large firms in the industry, building firms’ strategy has changed into a generalisation 
approach. By either merging with other similar scale firms or taking over or acquiring 
other firms or by internal expansion strategy, they expanded their business boundaries. 
Since 1960 large building firms were increasingly shifting from housing to non-housing
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construction and vice versa, depending on market conditions. Recently building firms 
showed extensive business areas with the increase o f business scale. New forms of 
productive enterprise dominated private housebuilding.
We may find an example in the UK housebuilding industry. The housebuilding 
industry was transformed from its small-firm characteristic o f the 1960s to high market 
share by large firms. After the intensive housing boom of the beginning o f 1970s, 
volume builders involved in social housebuilding started to enter into speculative 
housebuilding. The shift into housebuilding was easier because enough cash was 
generated from contracting which could be invested in land banks. The merging o f the 
two spheres could have become easier because traditional production management skills 
in contracting can be used in project management in housebuilding. In the mid 1980s, 
private housebuilding experienced another major boom. The sector was becoming an 
increasingly important proportion o f total new building work and an area in which good 
profits could be made. Large construction firms virtually all diversified into the 
housebuilding sector and now nearly all firms have a housebuilding division. Throughout 
the 1980s, concentration in the housebuilding industry continued by mergers between 
large firms, and take-over o f medium sized firms. This helped the building firms to 
minimise risks by diversifying production over more regions and other business 
(Bramley et al, 1995).
A trend o f generalisation can be observed in the US building industry. The 
industry was dominated by small firms by the 1950s. During the suburban development 
period from the 1950s to 1970s, building firms continued to expand their business scale 
in multi-areas, that is, they operated the housebuilding business simultaneously in the 
same or several metropolitan areas. Multi-area activities have become a common rule in 
the US housebuilding industry. Leading builders were engaged in fifty to sixty projects 
in ten or more separate housing markets (Grebler 1973). In 1970s, substantial numbers o f 
builders, especially large builders, reported their new business as an apparent unrelated 
business such as manufacture of forest products and/or other building materials, 
financing, and manufacture o f unrelated goods. As in the UK industry, large building 
firms in the USA have continued to grow into a big business group through merger or 
take-over.
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3.3.2 Diversification Pattern of Building Firms and Motives of the Diversification
One o f the outstanding attributes of the modem housebuilding industry is a trend 
o f diversification. A recent study (Hillebrandt, 1990) explains that large contracting 
firms have diversified out o f contracting into housebuilding and property development in 
the 1980s. The study shows that many contracting firms diversified into related activities 
in the 1980s and recently, some o f them diversified into quite separate industries such as 
materials production, manufacture o f temporary buildings, plant merchandising and so 
on. The growing pattern of the UK housebuilding firms may be classified into several 
groups. The first group consists o f those which have grown by amalgamation or take­
over of a series o f smaller firms in the housebuilding business. The second group 
consists o f those which were previously small or medium sized housebuilders, but 
became big firms in the 1980s, through internal growth. The third group is made up of 
those large contracting firms which have expanded into housebuilding to offset 
deficiencies in the contracting business. The fourth group represents those which were 
large firms in other industries and expanded their business into housebuilding (Ball, 
1988).
A similar pattern can be observed in the US housebuilding industry. During the 
suburban development period from the 1950s to 1970s, building firms continued to 
expand their business scale in multi-areas. Gillies and Mittelbach (1962) observed that 
large building firms in Southern California were increasingly shifting from housing to 
non-housing construction and vice versa, depending on market conditions. Grebler 
(1973) analysed the acquisition process in the US housebuilding industry between 1963 
and 1972 and argued that large building firms have continued to expand business areas 
through merger or take-over.
Here, we may analyse the building firms’ diversification strategy more 
specifically. The business areas of the large building firms can be considered with some 
different dimensions. According to Hasegawa et al (1988), the market in which the large 
building firms operate can be defined in terms o f three axes; product, region and business 
field. Figure 3-3 shows the three dimensions of diversification.
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Figure 3-3 Three dimensions o f market
Revised from Hasegawa and the Shimizu group FS, ‘Built by Japan’,
1988, p.31, Figure 2.1
The first axis means ‘product diversification* within the housebuilding business. 
This parameter is segmented into subcategories such as single detached houses, high rise 
apartment houses for family. It may be segmented into further sub-categories such as 
houses for special demand level, for example, houses for elderly people, houses for 
urban young households, or rental houses etc. The second axis indicates the geographical 
locations o f markets. Limited market areas such as villages, towns and cities in domestic 
regions may be expanded to international markets on the right. Each firm has to decide 
the exact part o f the axis the firm should target. Large building firms can expand the 
market internationally. The third axis extends into the direction o f business 
diversification, beginning with construction businesses and related business such as 
engineering, architectural design and consulting, and real estate management. Business 
diversification attempts by the large building firms are also directed toward the areas not 
closely linked with construction such as sports, leisure, information, leasing and other
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services. The combination o f the three axes provides for many areas o f operation. Each 
firm may extend its operation into any direction.
Considering the case o f large building firms in the US and the UK, the building 
firms are diversified into all three dimensions. They are normally producing all types of 
houses, that is, they show product diversification. They cover a nation-wide market and 
some o f the leading firms are diversified into international regions. We may say that they 
are specialised in the housebulding business covering all types of houses in whole 
domestic regions and sometimes in international regions. They are also diversified into 
other related and unrelated business.
Then now, we may think about motives o f building firms’ diversification, in more 
specific words, benefits and costs o f diversification strategy. There are various views to 
explain why the building firms expand their business areas. A number o f individual points 
can be synthesised by some comprehensive perspectives; market-power view, resource 
view, transaction cost view, and risk avoidance view. Market power view explains that 
market power can give the firms monopoly position to achieve more profit than regular 
profit. Montgomery (1994) emphasised three ways in which a conglomerate may yield 
power such as cross subsidisation, mutual forbearance and reciprocal buying. The 
resource view suggests that a firm’s profit and breadth o f diversification are a function of 
the firm’s resource stock. According to this approach, if  a firm had enough resources, 
they might diversify in order to use the resources efficiently in the market or in the other 
market. That is, unused or sufficient resources may be the rationale for diversification. 
Caves (1971), Gorecki (1975), Teece (1982) also used excess capacity o f productive 
factors as a motive o f diversification.
Firms may diversify to reduce transaction cost, that is, transaction cost may be a 
motive o f the firms’ diversification. This view has mainly developed, focusing on the 
motives of vertical integration and has provided a theoretical base on the motives of 
diversification. The other view is a risk-reducing view that firms’ diversification is 
primarily undertaken to reduce risk associated with firm’s business. Jensen (1986), 
Shleifer and Vishny (1989) and others explained that managers (agents o f firms) pursued 
value-reducing strategies to further their own interests at the expense o f the firms’ 
owners. That is, managers may pursue diversified expansion as a mean o f reducing total 
firm risk, thus improving their personal position.
The UK and US housebuilding firms’ diversification can be explained by various 
points o f view. Through take-over or merger, the building firms expanded their firms’
scale and their business in the related business such as contracting and property 
development and management etc. Ball (1988) investigated the take-over o f UK 
construction and housebuilding firms in the 1970s. The reasons for the take-over may be 
divided into four categories. Three among them are related to land (its cheapness, speed, 
and scale o f development) and the other is an attempt to diversify out o f housebuilding. 
These are explained by the transaction cost view. To enter into the new housing market, 
much time and cost would be taken up in surveying the housing market and searching for 
adequate land and getting planning permission for the site. The acquiring firms could 
reduce transaction costs by take-over of similar firms with land banks. The firms could 
enter into other local housing markets easily and cheaply expand their market shares. 
Building firms can reduce transaction costs by transferring surplus funds o f contracting to 
housebuilding operations.
Punwani (1997) showed that intra-group financing is a main reason to diversify into 
other business in a study o f UK construction group’s portfolio o f business activities. This is 
another example o f transaction cost view explaining the motive o f the building firms’ 
diversification. With high growth in contracting activities, large levels o f surplus funds were 
generated in the construction firms. These funds were either held as cash reserves or 
diverted into ‘cash hungry’ business. Speculative housebuilding required high levels of 
capital investment. The transfer o f surplus funds within construction groups in the form of 
‘inter-divisional loans’ was the principle source of financing for the housebuilding division. 
In this way, the large diversified construction groups removed the financial constraint that 
may have restricted growth in their contracting and housebuilding operations.
Grebler (1973) investigated the wave of acquisition o f US housebuilding firms in 
the latter part of the 1960s. Some of those firms were tempted to acquire building firms 
as cases o f vertical integration, expecting advantages from integration. Some firms’ 
internal expansion into building and real estate activities were motivated by marketing 
considerations. Several firms presented the motive o f diversification as land 
development, because they have long been involved in land transactions and holdings for 
their principal business. The emerging of the marketing function and land development 
function are regarded as a kind o f vertical integration.
Another motive o f the US building firms was the transferability of general 
advanced management principles to the building field. The housebuilding and land 
development during the late 1960s achieved high growth and appeared to be highly 
profitable. Major firms or financial holding firms expected to use their superior
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managerial qualities in the fields noted for backward or indifferent management. The 
modern techniques o f planning, directing organising and controlling business were 
applied to building and real estate firms. By transferability o f advanced management 
principles to building, the firms can heighten resource efficiency. That is, the building 
firms may diversify to utilise their managerial know-how to other business. In this case, 
the know-how may be considered to be the firms’ human resources.
The greater merging o f housebuilding with the rest o f the construction industry 
was significant in European countries. (Ball et al, 1988, ch.5). However, Ball (1988) 
explained that extensive diversification meant less risk o f failure, but it did not mean 
outstanding success in increasing market share relative to competitors o f a similar size, 
based on the experience o f the top five housebuilders’ take-over in the 1970s.
So far, we discussed the business strategies and growing patterns which large- 
scale modem housebuilding firms have pursued, based on relevant studies. The 
Housebuilding industry in advanced countries has developed with long lasting tradition 
and history. The building firms were very specialised and since 1970s and 1980s they 
have become diversified in various businesses in line with world-wide diversification 
trend in whole industry. The relevant studies on diversification motives cast big 
implications to the understanding o f the background o f building firms’ diversification.
3.4 Findings and Discussion
In this chapter, we learnt about the nature of the housebuilding industry and its 
most important attributes of modem housebuilding firms. In terms o f the transaction cost 
approach, housebuilding can be characterised by low asset specificity, low transaction 
frequency, complex sequency and high uncertainty. This would suggest that contracting 
is the most appropriate approach. Traditionally contracting was a prevalent governance 
structure in housebuilding. The building firms normally oversaw the whole process of 
construction while a small number o f special trade subcontractors performed most o f the 
actual work. Indeed, the trend toward increased subcontracting appears to be accelerating 
in the twentieth century.
One o f the outstanding attributes o f the modem housebuilding industry has been 
the growing prevalence of large building firms. Since the 1950s and 1960s, large 
housebuilding firms have dominated the industry in most of the industrialised countries
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and they were very specialised in the housebuilding business. They produced all type o f 
houses and they covered whole domestic regions and sometimes operating 
internationally. Linked with the emergence o f large firms in the industry, there have been 
changes in the production process and production structure o f firms.
Over the past two decades, improved contracting relationships between building 
firms and contractors have been introduced. This means that there have been changes in 
the governance structure in the production process. Improved relationships between 
building firms and contractors were observed in the production process with forms of 
‘quasi-firm’ type, ‘partnering system’, ‘long-term contracting’, ‘vertical and horizontal 
collaboration’. The relationships are considered as an ‘intermediate mode’ between 
‘contracting’ and ‘integrated organisation’. In this relationship, a housebuilding firm is a 
powerful leading firm with a core position in the production process and is often a final 
assembler mobilising a network o f suppliers and distributors. There is a clear hierarchical 
relationship between a range o f subcontractors, but the relationship is continuous.
With the emergence o f large building firms, another outstanding change is the 
extent o f diversification within building firms. First, the building firms diversified their 
market separately. Large-scale modem housebuilding firms generally covered a nation­
wide market. Multi-area business became a common form in the US and UK building 
industry. In recent years, it has further been observed that building firms have expanded 
their business areas into other industries. Housebuilding firms became involved a wide 
range o f products from related businesses such as contracting, engineering, to unrelated 
businesses such as manufacturing building materials, plant merchandising, and property 
management. This means that after achieving specialisation in housebuilding, the 
building firms are pursuing diversification as a further growth strategy.
Multi-production made it possible for the building firms’ flexible operation to 
vary with regenerative demand. The building firms could achieve economies of scale and 
synergy effects from multi-businesses and they could compensate loss from one business 
with profit from another business. It was observed that internal financing was one o f the 
most important motives into unrelated businesses. As a result, diversified large building 
firms could keep an advantageous position in the industry and a powerful relationship 
with the government.
Summarising the evidence, modem large building firms reflect changing trends in 
production patterns; moving from simple contracting relationship to more integrated
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structures with other collaborative firms, and from ‘specialisation in housebuilding’ to 
‘diversified into other business’ in the production structure.
The changing trend in the production pattern can be described in a matrix. Figure 
3-4 shows the changing trend; on the one axis is the change in the production process, on 
the other is the change in the production structure o f building firms. One axis is split by 
fragmented/ integrated structure in the production process and the other is split by 
specialised/ diversified structure in the production structure o f building firms. The trend 
in production pattern which modem housebuilding firms show is expressed as an arrow 
line.
integrated
production
process
fragmented
diversifiedspecialised
production structure
Figure 3-4 A trend in production pattern o f housebuilding firms
The starting point has been that, in order to improve productivity in 
housebuilding, building firms have to generate technical improvement through 
continuous investment in fixed capital and their labour force. However, such investment 
can lead to relatively inflexible production processes. Contracting may be chosen as an 
alternative to technological change so that the building firms can maximise their 
flexibility by contracting. Dependency on contracting results to an increase o f flexibility 
and productivity; however, the production process is revealed as being fragmented.
In Figure 3-4, the change o f governance structure in modern housebuilding is 
shown as an arrow line traced from the ‘fragmented structure’ to the ‘integrated 
structure’ on one axis. Change o f governance structure implies a transition into integrated
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structure in the production process. Emergence o f new contracing relationships such as 
‘quasi-firm type’, ‘partnering system’, ‘long-term contracting’, ‘vertical and horizontal 
collaboration’ makes it possible to reconcile high efficiency with continuing innovation 
effectively through the high involvement of its members. The main building firms 
integrate with an extensive set o f differentiated subcontractors, any portion o f whom can 
be employed on a given project. This structure provides a relatively highly differentiated 
and integrated structure. This structure provides a built-in power balance between central 
group o f building firm as a quasi-firm and peripheral contractors. Each side needs the 
other but is not totally dependent on the other. This can be considered as an issue o f 
efficient governance structure of transactions in housebuilding, in terms o f transaction 
cost theory.
Figure 3-4 also shows a trend in the building firms’ production structure. The 
curved arrow line is moving into the ‘diversified structure’ from the ‘specialised 
structure’. We have shown how the large building firms have dominated the private 
housebuilding sector, that they were originally very specialised in housebuilding, but 
covering a nation-wide market by constructing all types o f houses. Since the 1980s 
nation-wide building firms have become highly diversified into various business areas 
moved away from the specialised structure.
The modem housebuilding firms’ production pattern can be summarised as ‘on 
the one hand, involving integrated structures with other collaborative firms, and on the 
other, diversified structure across various businesses’. Based on this evidence, we may 
investigate the extent to which the ‘ideal’ production pattern observed in modem 
housebuilding firms can be applied to Korean building firms and how the ‘ideal’ production 
pattern is modified by a country’s specific institutional framework.
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Chapter 4 Framework of Research
In this chapter, we develop a research framework based on the lessons learnt from 
previous chapters: In Chapter 1, a general research question was set out; how has the 
Korean housebuilding industry developed in the regulated circumstance ? In chapter 2, 
we learnt how the Korean housebuilding industry had grown, how the Korean 
government has regulated the industry, and how the structure o f the industry has 
changed. In chapter 3, the nature o f the housebuilding industry and the production 
pattern o f the modem housebuilding firms were investigated. This chapter will then bring 
these elements together to clarify the special nature o f the housebuilding industry in 
Korean and develop four main research areas based on the research framework. It will 
discuss the methodology to be used in addressing these research areas.
4.1 Development of Research Questions
Our analysis so far has highlighted certain basic attributes o f the housebuilding 
industry. Basic attributes o f the Korean housebuilding industry are summarised as 
follows. First, the industry has been dominated by large building firms since the mid 
1980s. Second, the large building firms mainly built standardised apartment houses. 
Thus, the Korean housebuilding industry has been characterised as ‘an apartment house 
industry built by large building firms’. A third outstanding attribute was the building 
firms’ diversification. Most o f the Korean housebulding firms performed various 
businesses at the same time and even small firms were operating across various 
businesses simultaneously.
Another outstanding attribute o f the Korean housebuilding industry has been the 
Korean government’s intervention in the private housing sector. The government 
intervened directly at all stages in the private housing sector with various policy 
measures. There were various regulations in the building process such as house price 
regulation, land development regulation, house size regulation, and obligatory building 
ratio o f small-size dwellings etc. House price regulation was one o f the most important 
regulations which directly affected the profit o f building firms. Furthermore, since the 
mid 1980s residential land has been provided and allocated by the government even in
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the private housebuilding sector.
The Korean government’s regulation on private housing sector is totally different 
from the modem US and UK private housing sectors. Instead, it shows some similarities 
with public housing sector in European countries’ public housing sector where the 
industry was operated by a state’s plan. The role of the state is indicated clearly in the 
housing production process. For example, in the Netherlands, the state is involved in the 
land supply, land pricing and infrastructure provision. In Sweden, state control o f land 
transactions puts an effective constraint on housebuilding profit. In those countries, 
housebuilders are mostly concerned only about the building process.
The regulatory circumstance may restrict housebuilding firms’ behaviour. Korean 
housebuilders were originally speculative builders like those in the advanced countries. 
They were involved in five stages o f housebuilding from the planning stage to the sales 
and maintenance stage of the completed dwellings. However, since the 1980s when the 
government initiated the large scale building programme and developed residential land 
and infrastructure, housebuilding firms’ business has been restricted in various ways. 
Housebuilding firms could then participate only in the construction and the sales and 
maintenance stages. This meant that the Korean building firms’ business boundary was 
restricted to the construction and the sales o f completed houses.
The regulatory framework has made other important impact on Korean 
housebuilding firms. The government’s policy encouragement of large-scale construction 
firms to participate in the housebuilding industry brought about a significant change in 
the production structure o f building firms. Those firms which came from the construction 
industry into housebuilding were inherently diversified. However, an important point is 
that small-scale building firms which started their business in housebuilding have also 
diversified into a range o f other businesses. Behaviour such as pursuing diversification 
into other business even before specialising in housebuilding is not considered as a 
desirable one. In particular, the fact that housebuilding firms became highly diverse 
during the short growth period is considered as a peculiar attribute o f the Korean 
housebuilding industry. In itself this implies that the structure o f a country’s 
housebuilding industry and firms’ behaviour in it can be heavily modified by the 
government’s regulatory framework and the policy measures.
We clarified the outstanding attributes of the modem housebuilding industry in 
chapter 3. Large building firms have come to dominate the private housebuilding sector
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and virtually have shown themselves to be very specialised in housebuilding, tending to 
cover a nation-wide market by constructing all types o f houses. With the emergence of 
large building firms in the housebuilding industry, some changing patterns have been 
observed; the one is the integrated relationship with other contractors in the production 
process, the other is diversification in the production structure. The changing pattern was 
expressed as a curved line in Figure 3-4.
An important research question is whether this pattern is applicable to the Korean 
housebuilding industry given the different regulatory circumstance ? In particular, do 
Korean housebuilding firms follow the trend in terms o f the production process and the 
production structure or show other trends ?
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| Figure 4-1 Possible trends in production pattern o f Korean housebuilding firms
| Figure 4-1 suggests possible trends in the production pattern o f the Korean
building firms as dotted lines A and B, based on evidence from chapters 2 and 3. The 
dotted line A reflects the possibility that building firms maintain more integrated 
relationship with other contractors in the production process, diversifying into other 
business. The dotted line B suggests a case which building firms depend on simple 
contracting in the production process, but still pursuing diversification into various 
business on the other hand.
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Based on this general structure, this research aims to investigate the production 
pattern o f the Korean housebuilding firms and to evaluate the efficiency o f the structure. 
One general hypothesis is as follows: Korean building firm s may show different 
attributes in the production process and the production structure from those o f the other 
countries because o f the specifics o f the Korean structure.
With this general framework a range o f relevant research questions can be 
derived including: what is the governance structure observed in the production process of 
Korean housebuilding ? Do the building firms depend on simple ‘contracting’ or show 
‘integrated contracting’ in relation with contractors ? To what extent is the observed 
structure efficient ? Other questions are relevant to production structure of building 
firms: are the building firms specialised or diversified ? If diversified, to what extent 
have the building firms diversified ? What is the pattern o f their diversification ? Is the 
multi-production structure of the firms economically efficient ?
To investigate the above research questions, two kinds o f analyses; descriptive 
analysis and evaluative analysis, will be undertaken. The analysis will be done at project 
level and at firm level. Based on this approach, four main research areas are developed 
and those are addressed in more detail in following section.
4.2 Main Research Areas
4.2.1 Governance Structure in the Korean Housebuilding Business
The first research area is to investigate a prevalent governance structure in the 
Korean building business. Would the integrated contracting structure such as ‘quasi-firm 
type’, ‘partnering system’ be observed in the Korean housebuilding industry ? 
Otherwise, do the Korean building firms simply depend on a ‘contracting’ relationship 
with other contractors ?
The governance structure in the Korean housebuilding business may be explained 
in relation to business uncertainty in the regulated circumstance. Besides uncertainty 
inherent in the production process, the Korean government’s various regulations may 
heighten uncertainty in the business and limit the firms’ profitability. The Korean 
government intervened in the industry with various policy measures. First, the land
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development and allocation regulation may limit the building firms’ business chance. 
Even though the building firms wanted to participate the building project, if  they could 
not get the public land develped and allocated by the government, they could not 
participate in the building business. This is a sort o f entry barrier. The regulation on land 
development and the allocation system may heighten uncertainty in the business. As a 
result, the building firms would not expect profit from land development. This means the 
housebuilders’ profit source is limited only in the building site. Second, Korean 
housebuilders could not expect high profit in the building stage due to the ‘house price 
regulation’. The private building firms have argued that the price regulation reduced 
profit o f the business and caused the deterioration o f the development o f the industry in 
the long run. In the mid 1980s, many firms strongly insisted on the abolishment o f the 
price regulation because they became unable to confine business under the price 
regulation. In fact, there were many firms which ceased business due to the increase of 
input factors’ price.
The enforced uncertainty and limited profit might influence the governance 
structure in the production process. In the circumstance, building firms may avoid 
investing in a specific asset required in the housebuilding business and may emphasise 
‘flexibility’ rather than ‘efficiency’. The government’s various regulations in the 
production process may be a major force pushing the industry towards ‘market 
governance’ o f transactions. A general hypothesis is that ‘contracting’ may be a 
prevalent governance structure in the Korean housebuilding rather than more efficient 
contracting relationship observed in modern housebuilding industry.
4.2.2 Cost Efficiency of the Korean Housebuilding Business
The Korean housebuilding industry is characterised as a standardised apartment 
house industry dominated by large building firms. In the previous section, ‘contracting’ 
was assumed as a transaction governance chosen by the Korean building firms. The 
second research area is to investigate the efficiency o f the housebuilding business by 
analysing its cost structure.
As the advantages of the contracting system, flexibility and minimisation of 
capital commitment are discussed. The building firms can do the works requiring 
machinery and equipment under their own management. This is sometimes done if it
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appears more economical than contracting, but it adds to overhead cost and managerial 
problems. The housebuilding firms may choose ‘contracting’ structure in order to 
maximize flexibility. For the building business, contracting converts the fixed costs 
involved in machinery and equipment into variable costs and thus, reduces investment 
risks. On the other hand, it has been said that extensive emphasis on flexibility disturbs 
the development o f the industry. That is, emphasis on flexibility encourages firms to 
reduce commitment to fixed capital and stifles technological change and commitment to 
human capital. Hence, it encourages the casualisation of the labour force and a refusal to 
invest in training. In the long run, contracting may result in lack o f skilled labours and 
low productivity. These resultant attributes must be reflected in the cost structure.
The current cost structure o f the Korean housebuilding business may show how 
efficiently the Korean housebuilding firms operate their business. From the cost 
structure, we may investigate dependency on contracting, profit level achieved in the 
housebuilding business, most important input factor among various inputs, contracting 
relationship between input factors, and productivity o f the building business.
4.2.3 Diversification: the Building Firms’ Growth Strategy
The third research area is to investigate the Korean housebuilding firms’ 
diversification strategy in detail. The extent o f the Korean housebuilding firms’ 
diversification, the pattern o f the diversification, and the motives of the firms’ business 
diversification are to be investigated.
The modem building firms’ diversification can be summarised as in Figure 4-2. 
This is based on the three dimensional market of the building firms discussed in chapter 
3. The building firms are diversified into all three dimensions. They are normally 
producing all types o f houses, that is, they show product diversification. Furthermore, 
large building firms cover a nation-wide market and some o f the leading firms are 
diversified into international regions. We may say that they are specialised in the 
housebulding business covering all types of houses in whole domestic regions and 
sometimes in international regions. They are also diversified into other related and 
unrelated business. Figure 4-2 shows their case roughly. Some firms may be involved in 
a very focused market, for example, in the high-rise apartment housing market or large- 
scale rental housing market. They may also be involved in the other business only in a
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domestic area. Even though Figure 4-2 cannot show a more specific situation o f each 
building firm, it shows the general business directions of the large building firms in three 
dimenstions.
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Figure 4-2 Business areas of the modern housebuilding firms
Korean housebuilding firms mainly produce apartment houses among various 
types of houses and they focus on Seoul and large cities. In both product and region, the 
Korean housebuilding firms show a narrow, not a generalised pattern. On the other hand, 
they are highly diversified into other business directions.
Table 4-1 Diversification pattern, means and type o f strategy o f the building firms
Industrialised countries Korea
Product All types of houses Apartment houses
Regions National area 
International areas
Seoul, capital regions and 
Some large cities
Business
diversification
Related business first and recently 
Unrelated business
Related business or 
unrelated business
Means of 
diversification
Mergers/ take-over 
Internal extensions
Take-over or 
Internal extensions
Type of strategy Specialisation in the housebuilding 
Recently pursue to diversify into 
other business
Which type ?
Specialisation vs. Generalisation
Table 4-1 summarises the differences in the building firms’ diversification 
pattern, means and type o f strategy between other industrialised countries and Korea. It is
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interesting that the Korean building firms are diversified into various business, even 
though they do not have long business experience in housebuilding. Figure 4-3 shows 
hypothesised Korean housebuilding firms’ business areas and it is quite different from 
Figure 4-2.
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Figure 4-3 Hypothesised business areas o f the Korean housebuilding firms
The different diversification pattern may be motivated by different views. The 
public land allocation system and house sale price regulation may heighten the 
uncertainty o f the business and influence the firms’ diversified structure. In order to 
prepare for the case in which the building firms cannot continue the building business 
due to the land development regulation or the public allocation system, they may 
diversify into ‘counter-cycle business’ or totally unrelated business. I f  the firms could 
not get a satisfactory level o f profit from housebuilding due to the house price regulation, 
they may diversify into other business to compensate for the loss o f business, that is, 
uncertainty and business loss from the regulatory circumstance might be an important 
motive for the diversification. This may be explained by the risk avoidance view.
The Korean housebuilding firms’ diversification may also be related to the nature 
of the building firms. The Korean government encouraged the large contracting firms to 
enter into the business from the beginning of growth. Normally, large firms which have 
enough capital can easily diversify into other business. The firms having enough 
resources might diversify in order to use these resources efficiently in the market or other
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market. This is a resource view o f diversification. The firm’s large scale may be a 
diversification motive. The large capital, whether it is physical capital or human capital, 
could also be a motive for diversification. Financial difficulties in the building firms may 
be considered as a diversification motive. The building business is by nature a cash- 
hungry business and the building firms mainly show a very weak financial structure. 
They depend highly on outside financing. The transactions to get outside finance may 
heighten transaction costs and the building firms may diversify into ‘good cash flow 
business’ such as the restaurant or hotel business. That is, the building firms’ financial 
weakness may be a diversification motive.
4.2.4 Efficiency of the Building Firms’ Multi Production Structure
The building firms’ diversification is considered to be one of their growth 
strategies. The housebuilding firms in the advanced countries grew through take-over 
and merger during the 1970s and 1980s. In Korea, housebuilding firms showed 
diversified structure. However, they showed different patter in diversification. They 
showed narrow production pattern in product and region, but high diversification into 
other business. Even the building firms which recently entered into the housebuilding 
business or have not much experience in building, also pursue the business 
diversification. As a result, Korean building firms commonly showed multi-production 
structure.
In the previous section, it was assumed that the Korean housebulding firms may 
diversify in order to use firms’ existing resources more efficiently and to reduce 
transaction costs. If  the diversification was initiated by various efficiency motives, the 
efficiency must be reflected in the production structure.
The fourth research area is the analysis o f the efficiency o f the Korean building 
firms’ multi-production structure as the result o f the business diversification. There is no 
empirical study estimating the economies o f scale of scope in the construction and 
housebuilding industry. This is the first analysis to estimate the efficiency o f the multi­
production structure of the building industry. From the estimation, we may estimate 
economies o f scale and economies o f scope. Most of the Korean building firms want to 
expand their scale because the Korean government treated large firms distinctively from 
small firms with various policy measures. In the circumstance, optimal scale o f the
firms’ business and desirable direction of diversification need to be examined. The 
efficiency measures may give some information about these. All analyses can be carried 
out by estimating cost function o f the multi-product firms.
4.3 Research Methodology
This research can be carried out as a comparative study. However, we could not 
find adequate similarities between the Korean housebuilding industry and those o f the 
other countries. We could not compare the detail attributes such as industry’s growth 
pattern, outcomes, economic, demographic, and social situation, and policy system with 
those o f any other countries. Thus, this research is solely based on the Korean 
housebuilding industry and focus is on the investigation o f the specialities of the building 
firms’ behaviour. To proceed to the four research areas, two kinds o f methods will be 
used; first, a descriptive analysis using the interview survey method and secondary data 
sources; second, the empirical approach using secondary data.
The first research area is to investigate how the housebuilding firms operate their 
business. Focus will be given to examine the prevalent governance structure and the 
determinants o f the Korean housebuilding industry in the current circumstances. It is 
hypothesised that ‘contracting’ may be a prevalent governance structure in the 
production process and the government’s various regulations in the production process 
may be a major force pushing the industry towards the market governance of 
transactions.
For the first research area, we need to investigate the whole process of the 
housebuilding business. For this, it is necessary to get information through an in-depth 
case study. A series o f interviews were carried out through two time points in 1996. The 
total number o f firms included in the interview was 24 (Appendix 2). The interviews 
were carried out with semi-structured questionnaires (Appendix 3) and the interviewees 
were either senior managers in charge o f the housebuilding business or president of the 
sample firms. In designated firms, most o f the interviewees were senior managers in the 
housebuilding division and in small firms or registered firms, the interview was 
performed with presidents.
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Through the interview method, we surveyed the business objectives and the 
business strategies o f the building firms. Governance structure in the production process 
was examined, that is, how the decision-making was organised such as land acquisition 
and development methods, labour purchasing, and materials purchasing in the production 
process was investigated. We also examined whether ‘vertically integrated structure’ or 
‘quasi-firm type structure’ was observed in the Korean housebuilding industry or not. 
Contract type and nature o f the contract with other specialists were observed.
The second research area is to examine efficiency o f the housebuilding business. 
The following questions will be examined; how much profit has achieved in the 
housebuilding business? What is the most important input factor among various inputs ? 
Does the ‘contracting cost’ appear substitutable to other input factors ? Can any 
productivity be observed in the Korean housebuilding business pursuing ‘flexibility’ ? 
To answer these questions, statistical analysis using secondary data will be used. First, 
we need to estimate a cost function o f the housebuilding business. Fortunately it was 
possible to get cost data o f housebuilding projects in each building firm. The cost data 
are taken from ‘the cost statement o f the completed building works’ available from ‘the 
Korea Construction Firm Association’. The data used for the analysis are project-base 
data, not firm-base data and pooled time-series data from 1986 till 1994. The total 
number o f samples are 823 projects and the data consists o f building project data from 
designated firms and registered firms.
The Translog Cost Function will be estimated with the cost share equations as a 
multivariate regression system and then, several efficiency measures will be derived 
from the estimated cost function. The model consists of aggregate cost o f ‘apartment 
house building’ as a dependent variable, total sales as an output variable and five input 
factors and time trend as independent variables. The difference from the other studies is 
that this analysis is performed by extending the range of input factors and by examining 
in more detail the productivity effects of changing technology. Attention will be 
concentrated on the role o f contracting by reviewing the substitution and complementary 
relationship with other input factors.
The third research area is to examine diversification details at the firm level. For 
this, we need a historical approach on the housebuilding firms and a series o f statistical 
analyses. First, using secondary data, to what extent the building firms are diversified 
will be investigated. The patterns of diversification are examined through four time
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points between 1980 and 1995. Such diversification details are taken from the building 
firms’ ‘the Annual Business Report’ published by ‘The Korean Stock Exchange’. More 
than 140 firms are included in the sample. Second, financial analysis o f the building 
firms will be carried out for three time points (1985, 1990 1995) and an attempt will be 
made to find a relationship between diversity and performance. Lastly, through setting up 
a diversification model o f the Korean housebuilding firms, motives of the diversification 
will be investigated. In order to find out the motives o f the firm’s diversification, a 
Korean housebuilding firms’ diversification index will be developed considering 
specialities o f the Korean industry. Market power variables, resource variables, 
transaction cost variables, a variable explaining uncertainty or risk, profitability and 
growth variables are considered as explanatory variable o f diversification motive. The 
numbers o f sample firms in total is 353 (151 designated firms and 202 registered firms). 
A multivariate regression model will be used and the estimation will be carried out for 
different types o f firms, type I firms and type II firms. In order to find out the motives of 
different types o f diversification, the above process will be followed separately in two 
parts, related diversification and unrelated diversification.
The fourth research area is to analyse cost efficiency of the building firms’ multi­
production structure which is the result o f the diversification strategy. First, cost function 
o f the multi-product firms will be estimated. The estimation model is a multivariate 
Translog Cost function. For the estimation, cross-sectional data are used and the data are 
taken from ‘the income statement’ of the housebuilding firms’ annual business reports 
published by ‘the Korea Stock Exchange’. The sample included is a total o f 318 firms’ 
cost data. The period for the analysis is limited from 1993 till 1995 as output data from 
separate businesses are available only for recent three years. The estimates are performed 
by using the SAS statistical package (6.08 version). Second, from the estimated cost 
function, economies o f scale, economies of scope, and cost complementarity between 
products will be derived. The estimations also indicate desirable direction of 
diversification and optimum scale o f the housebuilding firm in the current situation.
Figure 4-4 summarises four research areas, contents of analysis and methodology 
in a flow chart. Appendix 2 shows contents of research, data source and research 
methodology more specifically.
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Chapter 5 The Organisation of the Korean Housebuilding Business
5.1 Introduction: Interview Survey Method
The current Korean housebuilding industry is characterised by ‘the apartment 
house industry’ built by designated and registered firms. Another outstanding attribute is 
that the government has greatly intervened in the industry. It was assumed that in the 
limited business circumstance, ‘contracting’ may be a prevalent governance structure in 
the whole production process. It has been a general trend that the contracting system is a 
prevalent organisational structure in the building site and the contracting ratio has 
increased. Increase of flexibility and minimisation of capital commitment are frequently 
commented on as main reasons for the contracting system.
In this chapter, we examined how the Korean building firms have operated the 
housebuilding business in regulated circumstances. First, business objectives and 
strategies o f Korean housebuilding firms were investigated. Second, in regulated 
circumstances, it was examined how the building firms have purchased residential land, 
building materials, and necessary skilled labours. Contracting relationships between 
subcontractors throughout the production process were examined. Focus was given to the 
investigation on the governance structure of transaction with subcontractors, that is, 
whether the improved contracting relationship with other contractors such as ‘quasi-firm 
type’, ‘partnering relationship’, or ‘collaborating relationship’ is observed in the 
production process are investigated.
For the analysis, it was difficult to use only secondary data. We needed to 
investigate the whole process of the housebuilding business, therefore, an in-depth 
interview method was used. A series of interviews were carried out through two time 
points; the first interview was carried out during four months from April till July in 1996, 
the second was done for the three months from October till December in 1996. The total 
number o f firms included in the interview was 24 (10 designated firms, 12 registered 
firms and 2 small private builders). For details about the firms, see Appendix 3. The 
firms were basically chosen by random sampling among 115 designated firms and about 
4000 registered firms. First, 15 designated firms and 15 registered firms were chosen and 
then, we tried to contact them. Taking into consideration their responses and
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accessibility, 22 building firms were finally interviewed. To find out some o f the 
differences between large building firms and small builders, two independent small 
builders were included.
The interviews were carried out with semi-structured questionnaires (Appendix 
4). Through the interview, the building firms’ business objectives, strategies to meet the 
objectives and transaction governance in the production process were investigated. That 
is, we scrutinised how the decision-making had been carried out on land acquisition and 
development, labour purchasing, and material purchasing. We also examined whether 
vertical integrated structure or quasi-firm type structure was observed or not in the 
Korean housebuilding business. Contracting type and nature o f the contract with other 
specialists were observed. Interviewees were basically senior managers in charge of the 
housebuilding business or presidents o f the sample firms. In the designated firms, most 
o f the interviewees were senior managers in the housebuilding division whereas in the 
small firms and some o f the registered firms, presidents responded to the interview.
5.2 Objectives and Strategy of the Housebuilding Business
Through the interviews, it was observed that most o f the building firms were 
operating the business based on Seoul and the capital region. Only four among the 22 
firms were operating their business in local cities and had a regional firm image. Four 
firms had international branches in the past, but now they are not involved in overseas 
works, concentrating on domestic housebuilding. All firms were building mainly 
apartment houses. Some of them tried to build row houses in central Seoul on small 
scale, but the output was not consistent. We may say that the Korean housebuilding firms 
are building mainly apartment houses among various types o f houses and their housing 
market is limited to the domestic area, especially in Seoul and capital regions.
5.2.1 Business Objectives
The interviewees were asked about objectives o f the housebuilding business. In 
the first interview, there were some difficulties in surveying the objectives. There was 
confusion between the concept of objectives, strategy and planning. The managers stated
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their mission in the business instead o f their objectives and answered in an abstract way, 
such as ‘to be a national and international building firm’ and ‘to achieve high 
performance and growth’. Therefore, the objectives o f business were given in ten 
categories and they were asked to choose two objectives, taking priority into 
consideration. Time was limited to the recent 5 years (since 1990). Table 5-1 shows the 
objectives given in the replies and they were classified into three broad categories.
About 50 percent of objectives were related to business size and nearly 40 percent 
were social objectives emphasising firms’ image, reputation and quality o f performance. 
Only 11.36 percent o f objectives were financial objectives such as profit maximisation 
and high growth. Most o f the large firms and designated firms represented their 
objectives with more stress on ‘quality o f performance’, rarely using the word 
‘maximisation’ in the interview. They emphasised a proper balance between financial 
objectives and social objectives such as ‘acceptable return on shareholders’ asset’, 
‘continuous growth’, ‘good relationship with other workforce’ and ‘reputation’. Small 
and registered firms generally emphasised financial objectives and business size 
objectives such as ‘profit maximisation’, ‘high growth’ and ‘increase of market share’ 
etc.
Table 5-1 Objectives o f the business
Three categories Objectives No.of response (%)
Financial objectives (1) profit maximisation 3 ( 6.81)
11.36%(2) high growth 2 ( 4.55)
Business size (3) sales maximisation 5 (11.36)
49.99%
(4) increase of market share 2 ( 4.55)
(5) extension of business areas 6 ( 13.63)
(6) continuous growth 9 (20.45)
Social objectives (7) acceptable return 2 ( 4.54)
38.65%
(8) quality of performance 11(25.00)
(9) honesty and high reputation in 
the business
2 ( 4.55)
(10) good relationship with other 
workforce, modernisation of 
production etc.
2 (4.55 )
Total Total 44 (100 )
Each of the 22 interviewees responded to two objectives.
The interviewees consistently responded that the objectives of business have 
changed over time and emphasised their objectives were influenced by changes of 
government policies and market conditions. In the 1980s when house prices and land
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development were regulated, their objectives were more focused on ‘sales 
maximisation’, ‘extension of business area’ and ‘continuing growth’, rather than 
financial objectives such as ‘high growth’ and ‘profit maximisation’. Since 1993 when 
the mass construction plan was completed, most firms emphasised social objectives such 
as ‘production of high quality o f houses’, ‘modernisation o f production’, acceptable 
return’ etc.
5.2.2 Business Strategies
As the means to meet the objectives, we asked about business strategies. The 
firms interviewed were operating several strategies at the same time. An open question 
was given to the interviewees to describe their two major strategies. The business 
strategies were classified into five strategies as shown in Table 5-2.
Table 5-2 Business strategies o f interviewed firms
Three categories Strategies Priority 1 (%) Priority 2 (%)
Differentiation (l)production of high quality houses 9 (40.91) 7(31.82)
(2) development of various types of 
houses
1 ( 4.55) 2 ( 9.09)
Cost-reduction (3) cost reduction 4 (18.18) 7(31.82)
Focus (4) mass production of standardised 
houses/rental houses
3 ( 13.64) 1 ( 4.55)
(5) niche market strategy 5 (22.72) 5 (22.72)
Total 22 (100.00) 22 (100.00)
The five strategies were divided into three categories based on Porter’s basic 
strategy. Production o f high-quality houses was chosen as a first major strategy. It is one 
of the differentiation strategies. They thought production o f high quality houses by 
strong and solid construction and by using high-quality materials is the best strategy to 
achieve their objectives. Most o f the large firms emphasised the firms’ image that they 
were producing high quality, safe and high-tech modem houses. Actually some firms 
among them emphasised especially ‘secure construction in the production process’ and 
‘usage o f high quality materials in the building process’. A manager in H firm stressed 
that in 1994 the firm produced high-quality, high-cost apartment houses using their own
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prefabricated frames and high-cost finishing furniture in large-scale apartment buildings. 
He said that even though the building cost was higher than the regulated sale price, the 
firm decided to continue the strategy. Some interviewees answered that they are pursuing 
a differentiation strategy by ‘development of distinctive design houses’ and ‘production 
o f new style houses’.
Focus strategy was the second major strategy. Three firms among the 22 chose 
focus strategy by ‘mass production of standardised houses for labourers or rental houses 
for middle class’. Five firms chose ‘niche market strategy’ such as garden-town 
development in suburban areas for high income households, one-room apartment 
buildings so-called ‘city vilF for urban single households. One o f them had a plan for 
silver town development in near urban area equipped with high-technical medical 
facilities, sports and convenient facilities. It was observed that most of the registered 
firms and small firms were pursuing focus strategies. However, they mainly focused on 
labour household and urban middle-income groups rather than high-income groups. One 
o f them focused on rental households and produced only rental houses from the 
beginning of their business.
Cost reduction was one o f the strategies the firms were pursuing. Only four firms 
chose cost reduction as their business strategy. It is natural that the firms pursue cost 
minimisation in order to increase their profits in house price regulation. Cost reduction 
can be achieved in various ways. It is achieved by reducing unit-costs through large scale 
operation. The large scale operation made it possible for the firms to purchase materials in 
direct-transaction with manufacturers and in carload lots and to maintain large inventories. 
The large- scale operation made it possible to keep more an efficient relationship with other 
labour forces. Large firms are in an advantageous situation to keep large-scale operation. As 
a result, the large firms can reduce total costs and get higher profits than small firms. Cost 
reduction also may be achieved by product innovation such as prefabricated factory 
engineering, development o f pre-assembled and pre-fitted systems. However, it is only 
possible by long-term investment in new technology and new materials. Without such 
long sustained effort and investment, cost reduction may be easily reflected in low 
quality houses.
Most o f the interviewees said that cost reduction was the most important strategy 
in the 1980s. Particularly before 1988 when house prices were ceiled in a constant level, 
cost reduction effort was vital. However, since 1989 when the adjusted construction cost
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system was introduced and the price rise of input factors were reflected in house prices, 
their interest has changed to differentiation strategy such as ‘production o f high quality 
houses’ and ‘development of new style houses’. However, cost reduction strategy has 
still been as a second priority strategy as shown in Table 19.
We observed some changes in Korean housebuilding firms’ business objectives 
and strategies. In 1980s their objectives were focused on ‘business size’ such as ‘sales 
maximisation’ and ‘extension o f business area’. ‘Cost reduction’ was chosen as the most 
popular strategy. However, in the 1990s, social objectives were emphasised and 
‘differentiation strategy’ and ‘focus strategy’ have been mostly chosen by the building 
firms. Most o f the interviewees explained that housebuilding is not a profitable business 
any more due to various regulations and changing market conditions. They have already 
become involved in other business in order to compensate for the loss from 
housebuilding. Most o f the firms have plans to extend their business area and divert into 
other business. Surprisingly, even small firms not having enough experience in 
housebuilding were operating other businesses and have a plan to expand further.
5.3 Contracting in the Production Process
5.3.1 Contracting in the Korean Housebuilding Industry
It is known that ‘contracting’ is a prevalent organisation structure in the 
construction and the housebuilding industry. In the Korean housebuilding industry, it was 
observed that the dependency on contracting was gradually increasing. During the 
interview period, a survey on the dependency on contracting in the housebuilding 
process was performed in Korea Research Institute for Human Settlements (KRIHS). 
The survey showed interesting facts. Contracting has been performed not only in the 
construction stage, but also in the other stages. They divided the housebuilding process 
into six stages from the land development stage to the repair and maintenance stage as 
shown in Table 5-3. The ratio indicates the proportion o f the contracting costs to total 
costs at each stage. The data were provided by the support of each department in charge 
o f the functions in the building firms.
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Table 5-3 Contracting ratios in the housebuilding process (Unit: %)
Average Large firms Medium firms Small firms
Land Development 8.3 6.6 2.6 18.3
Design 100 100 100 100
Construction 81.0 86.8 80.4 78.6
Material Purchasing 16.0 7.5 8.8 28.3
Marketing & Sales 18.0 10.9 7.4 35.8
After Service, Repair & 
Maintenance
15.8 17.7 11.6 16.7
Source: KRIHS Survey 1996.
Contracting ratios were different at each stage. It is noteworthy that the 
contracting ratio in the design stage is the highest. The reason for this is explained by a 
building regulation. According to ‘the Building Act’, design function has to be 
performed by an independent specialised architect or architect firms. The contracting 
ratio in the construction stage was the second highest and large firms showed a higher 
contracting ratio. The contracting ratios in materials purchasing, marketing and sales, and 
after-service, repair and maintenance stages were about 15 percent. Contracting in land 
development was about 8 percent. In the four stages, small firms showed commonly 
higher contracting ratios than large firms. We may think the reason to be that small firms 
usually don’t retain such manpowers performing marketing and advertising functions and 
heavy equipment for land development. In material purchasing, as small firms cannot 
expect cost reduction through ‘direct buying’ and ‘carload-lots purchasing’ like large 
firms, they choose contracting.
Another result shows depending ratio on contracting in housebuilding. The cost 
data were collected from ‘The Korean Construction Firm Association’. Table 5-4 shows 
the trend of contracting costs to total building costs in apartment building. The total cost 
reflects real ‘building cost’ spent in the construction stage and land cost was not included 
in the cost. In apartment house building, the contracting ratios were shown as 29.70 
percent to total cost in 1986 and it increased to 46.88 percent in 1994. The larger firms 
show higher contracting ratios than medium and small firms. More detailed analysis on 
cost structure will follow in Chapter 6.
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Table 5-4 Contracting ratio to total cost (Unit: %)
1986 1987 1988 1990 1992 1994
Large firms 30.23 34.85 36.45 42.19 47.67 49.15
Med/small firms 28.58 30.12 27.52 33.58 34.60 44.10
Average 29.70 32.73 32.44 38.47 42.33 46.88
Source: The Korea Construction Firm Association
The two results showed how much the Korean housebuilding firms depend on 
contracting by contracting ratio to total cost. Obviously a very high contracting ratio was 
observed in the construction stage. In land development, material purchasing, marketing 
and sales, and after service stages, the building firms showed a rather high contracting ratio. 
In this case, small firms showed a higher ratio than large firms. The reason was assumed to 
be that small firms were not able to retain all kinds o f manpower within firms. However, 
these are based only on cost data. More detailed and specific surveys were carried out by 
the interview method. The following sections show how the Korean building firms operate 
each function throughout the production process.
5.3.2 Land Acquisition and Development
Successful land acquisition was known as the most important factor in the 
success o f building projects in the circumstances in which the development o f residential 
land by private firms has been highly restricted. Land acquisition is closely related to the 
firms’ financial situation. Even after purchasing land, firms need additional money to 
develop the land into available status. Furthermore, if building firms wanted to buy a plot 
of land and the site was not designated as a residential area, the firms have to follow all 
converting procedures o f the land site from its previous to its new use. Nobody can 
predict how long it will take for the converting process.
In Korea, before 1980 the government were not involved in land development 
and there were land developers designated by the government. Housebuilders either 
developed residential land by themselves or purchased the developed land from the land 
developers. However, in the 1980s when the government intervened in land 
development, a change took place in the building process. Land developers either 
stopped their business or diverted into other related businesses such as housebuilding or 
property management.
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The objective o f public land development was to reclaim profits realised in the 
conversion process and to return it to the social welfare provision. The fact that a 
building firm purchased public land means that the government performs all the 
functions related to the development and the firm does not need to undergo the 
conversion process and various permission procedures by itself. However, it was not a 
voluntary choice by the firms considering the cost and benefit o f the development. The 
government’s regulation led to changing patterns of the production structure. Since 1993 
when private land development in the semi-agricultural area and semi-forest areas was 
partly allowed, some building firms have developed land by themselves; however, they 
still found difficulties in getting adequate land.
It is meaningful to investigate how the changing pattern in land development 
affects the firms’ behaviour or the structure o f production. According to interviews, 
Korean housebuilding firms normally purchased private land and developed by 
themselves before 1980s. Since the beginning o f the 1980s when the government started 
to become involved in land development, the firms’ land purchasing and development 
chance has been restricted. Since the mid 1980s most of the building firms have 
depended on public land. Most of the firms answered that they wanted to buy public land 
because they could avoid all the complex and long-lasting administrative procedures. 
However, the acquisition of public land was not always advantageous. The publicly 
developed land was provided at a rather high price and the building firms have to wait a 
long time to use the land. Furthermore, firms have to pay the price for the land in 
advance even before the development process starts. Normally the firms which were not 
able to afford the high land price, had to borrow money in any form. The high interest 
rate o f the borrowed money was another burden for them.
However, all the firms which wanted to buy the public land could not always do 
so, as the government was involved in the allocation procedure. It was observed that 
registered firms relied more on development o f private land. The reason for this was 
found in the regulatory framework. The Korean government treated large building firms 
distinctively in the allocation o f public land. The government gave more chance to the 
designated firms than registered firms in the allocation process o f public land. In this 
situation, the registered firms had to find private land.
During the interview, a survey for land banking was also carried out. Most o f the 
designated firms retained a larger scale o f residential land than small firms or registered
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firms. The common thing was that due to the shortage o f residential land in Seoul and the 
capital regions, they mostly retained land in other cities. The designated firms retained 
700,000 m2-l,600,000 m2 land on average in 1995. This represents about 2-3 year land 
banks at the 1995 housing start level. However, as housing demand was still 
concentrated in Seoul and the capital region, they did not have any specific building plan 
in the local areas. Among registered firms, a large firm, K retained a similar level of land 
as designated firms (about 800,000 m2), but other small firms kept 100,000-200,000 m2 
residential land in local areas.
The recent deregulation that ‘the semi-agriculture and forest areas’ around large 
cities were allowed to be developed as residential land gave important meanings to the 
building firms. The building firms can have higher a possibility o f buying and 
developing the private land. Actually since 1993, some large firms among those 
interviewed have developed residential land in near capital regions. However, there 
exists another bottleneck. According to interview, most o f the local governments request 
the installation o f infrastructure facilities around the project area as the condition to 
permit the development. It is a kind o f entry barrier to the land development and building 
business and became a very big burden to most of the medium and small building firms.
Among the interviewed firms, actually four firms have been unable to continue 
their business just because they have been unable to find adequate land since 1993. The 
firms wanted to buy public land, but they were excluded in the allocation process and 
they could not find any alternative land. On the other hand, there was a successful firm, 
using land banking strategy. The firm developed private land on a small scale, mainly in 
suburban Seoul. The manager emphasised ‘well located land’ more than anything else. 
Success o f this firm’s land bank strategy can only be possible by the firms’ good 
financial situation. In fact, the firm achieved progressive growth in recent years and its 
good financial situation made it possible to purchase more residential land. Some 
interviewees pointed out that most o f their debts occurred when they bought land. In 
order not to lose the chance to buy land, they borrowed money in spite o f the high 
interest rate.
Interviewees gave a consistent opinion about the base o f decision making when 
they purchased land. The decision has been changed as the relevant policy changed. 
Before 1988 when the housing price was controlled at a constant level, housebuilding 
firms wanted to buy ‘low cost land’ as much as possible. At that time, as demand for
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housing exceeded supply, the completed apartment houses were all sold out regardless of 
location and size. It was natural that they wanted to buy ‘low cost land’ and lower the 
total cost. However, the situation has changed since 1989. The land price could be 
reflected in the housing price by the ‘adjusted construction cost system’. I f  they bought 
high cost land, it might be reflected in the price of the house. ‘Good location’ became a 
more important factor than ‘low cost’. If the location was not good, the completed houses 
sometimes would not be sold, even though prices were relatively lower than those of 
well-located houses. The housebuilding firms wanted to find good located land first of 
all, and then tried to reduce the unit cost o f land by adjusting the whole coverage ratio of 
the project.
In the process o f interview, it was found that land development regulation was 
one o f the strongest interrupting factors in the business. To overcome the limitation, 
building firms were performing an alternative strategy. That is, building firms were 
carrying out the housebuilding business in a ‘contract type’ method. This means that 
there is another developer, which could be central government, local government, other 
government organisations or other private building firms. The reason was definitely 
because they could not obtain adequate land to build on. In this case, the housebuilding 
firms have a contract relationship with the developer only for the construction of the on­
site work. Planning function, land purchase and development function, and other 
functions are performed by the main developer. When the firms perform the 
housebuilding business in this type, they only pursue efficiency o f the construction 
process and efficient management technique on-site as a contractor.
Most of the large firms were carrying out the building project by two methods; 
‘development type’ and ‘contract type’. As large firms usually have a high name value 
and better financial situation, they were able to maintain the balance between 
‘development type’ business and ‘contract type’ business. In the case that they did not 
have any residential land for housebuilding, they applied the contracting process. As a 
result, they were able to keep stability o f total sales. They might apply the bidding 
process at any time and they could continue the housebuilding business by ‘contract 
type’. On the other hand, medium and small firms depended more on ‘development type’ 
business. This was purely because the government operated ‘public allocation system of 
developed land’ distinctively between large and small firms. The government allocated a 
larger amount of land to the designated or large firms than to the registered or small. The
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limitation o f using public land and land shortage led the small firms to seek other land 
desperately. However, the private land they developed was not always profitable or 
adequate to their business. If  they did not buy adequate land, they could not continue the 
business and finally bankrupted. Their business depends totally upon the acquisition of 
residential land and the business cycle.
Table 5-5 Operating type of the housebuilding business (Unit: %)
Average Large firms Medium firms Small firms
Development type 65.5 42.8 52.7 72.7
Contract type 34.5 57.2 47.3 27.3
Source: KRIHS survey, 1996.
The KRIHS survey (1996) supported the fact. Table 5-5 shows the operating type of 
the housebuilding business. It explained the fact that large firms showed a higher ratio in 
contracting type as follows; most of the large firms had experience in the contracting 
business before entering the housebuilding industry and they were able to utilise their 
know-how and management skills acquired in the construction industry in the contract type 
of housebuilding business. On the other hand, the medium and small firms having no 
experience in contracting business showed higher dependency on the development type 
work.
We may summarise land acquisition and development of the building firms as 
follows. Korean housebuilding firms have depended on publicly developed land since the 
mid 1980s when the government became highly involved in land development. However, 
since 1993 deregulation in the ‘semi-agriculture and semi-forest areas’ around large 
cities gave important meanings to the building firms. Building firms can participate in 
small scale (less than 30,000m2) development. However, they have to install the 
necessary infrastructure facilities in the project area as the condition for permitting the 
development. This policy gave another burden to most o f the medium and small building 
firms. In these circumstances, the building firms became gradually involved in ‘contract 
type’ business of housebuilding. This means that the building firms are only involved in 
the construction stage by contracting relationship with a main developer. If  they could 
not participate in the contracting type of housebuilding, furthermore, could not find 
adequate residential land, they might finally give up the housebuilding business.
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5.3.3 Labour Purchasing
High dependency on contracting was observed as a prevalent attribute in labour 
purchasing. Throughout the production process, labour purchasing was observed in 
complex relationship with various participants. A housebuilding firm, the designated or 
registered firms, is a developer of the building project. Various specialised building firms 
(specialised subcontractors), material dealers and manufacturers, and on-site craftsmen 
are involved in the project. Specialised building firms and labour-only-contractors 
usually perform practical on-site works requiring specific skills. The specialised building 
firms are classified as 23 categories according to ‘the Construction Business Law’1. The 
labour-only-contractors are independent contractors, however, they do not belong to any 
formal contractor. They perform some specialised building works such as brick laying, 
wood work, concrete work, and plaster work. Usually they are temporarily recruited by 
the housebuilding firms or specialised building firms under the contract with the 
housebuilding firms and/or the specialised building firms.
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Figure 5-1 Five types o f contracting relationship
1 decorating, earth work, plaster and plumbing, stone and masonry, painting, brick laying, scaffolding, 
doors and windows instalment, roof and sheet metal, reinforced concrete, metal work, utility service, 
water supply and sewerage, boring and grouting, railroad and rail track, paving work, underwater work, 
landscaping and plating, landscaping and facilities installing, building assembly work, steel frame work, 
lift installation work, greenhouse provision work.
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Figure 5-1 shows various types of contracting found in the Korean housebuilding 
industry (KRIHS 1992). The contracting relationship among the housebuilding firms, 
specialised building firms, and other labourers is classified into five types as shown in 
Figure 5-2.
(A) is a case that a housebuilding firm contracts out some parts o f the building 
works to the labour-only-contractor on a temporal contract. In this case, the labour-only- 
contractor employs craftsmen and odd-job men on a daily basis. (B) shows a higher level 
o f contracting. The housebuilding firms contract out to a labour-only-contractor first, 
then the labour-only-contractor subcontracts to several labour-only-contractors in several 
local regions. This is the case that the building project is large-scale or the site works are 
performed on several sites. (C) is a traditional labour contract type. A housebuilding firm 
contracts out some works to a specialised building firm and then the specialised building 
firm subcontracts out some parts o f the works to labour-only-contractors. (A) (B) (C) 
show the contracting relationships with the labour-only-contractors. The relationships 
may develop in more complex and various types by scale o f the project.
(D) shows the case in which a housebuilding firm has a relationship with a 
specialised building firm only. The specialised building firms perform on-site work with 
their own technicians. This case is commonly found in performing the equipment­
intensive and material-intensive works such as electric, facilities, window work etc. (E) 
shows the traditional material contracting type that a housebuilding firm contracts out the 
purchasing of materials to a material manufacturer. Several types o f contracting 
relationship may be used in one building site and the level o f the contracting may be 
higher than 4-5 stages.
If  the building scale is small, simple and first level contracting relationship is 
revealed. For small builders who build less than 20 dwellings per project, contracting 
was found only with labour-only-contractors and material manufacturers as shown in 
Figure 5-2. Sometimes, the material manufacturers may perform the building works with 
their own craftsmen. This is called ‘supply-fix-contract’.
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Figure 5-2 Contracting type in small builder
As the building scale becomes large, the contracting relationship becomes 
complex and multi-level contracting is revealed. Figure 5-3 shows an example o f the 
traditional contracting structure in the large-scale apartment building.
main officespecialised building firmhousebuildingfirm
generalforeman technicalmanagersuper­intendent
site staff on-site
A O ®  0 0chief odd-job labour-only-contractor chief craftsmanworkman man craftsman
 ► ---------------------contracting relationship direct employment
Figure 5-3 Traditional contracting type in housebuilding
Source: revised from The Construction Labour Market in Korea, KRIHS, 1992. P. 12.
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Housebuilding firms may include a general foreman, superintendent and technical 
manager as their own employees. The general foreman supervises the whole building 
project from planning stage to sales stage. The superintendent and technical manager are 
managers on the building site. They have rights of management and control o f the whole 
site works. When the scale o f the building project is large, the firms may temporarily 
employ a chief workman and odd-job man on the building site. They carry out 
miscellaneous works such as delivery o f the building materials and cleaning works etc.
The specialised building firms usually employ site staff and specialised 
technicians. The site staff are usually regular members of the firm and their role is to 
control and supervise the contracted work on site. Technicians are usually specialists in 
electric, facilities installation and other site work. The specialised building firms may 
employ labour-only contractors as temporary labour force in case their own employees 
can not perform the whole work.
The labour-only-contractors are temporarily recruited by the housebuilding firms 
or specialised building firms. Labour-only-contractors carry out mainly labour intensive 
works such as excavation, reinforced concreting, plastering, concrete blocking, brick 
laying work. If  they have long experience and competence in the site work and the ability 
to enlist building labourers, they may employ their own skilled or semiskilled craftsmen. 
However, this is not a firm type and this is a type of interlocking network among 
independent simple labourers.
During the interview, contracting ratios were surveyed by types o f the works. The 
contract type and the contracting ratio in each work may be different by firms. Table 5-6 
shows the contracting ratio in each type of works in construction stage. The ratios 
indicate proportions of contracting costs to total costs in each work. For example, they 
mean that Korean building firms contracted 72 percent o f work in the foundation work 
and they performed the residual 28 percent o f works by themselves. Contracting ratios 
were shown as high in each type of work. In particular the labour intensive works such as 
foundation work, excavation, brick laying, plaster, tiling work are usually carried out by 
‘labour-only-contract’, whereas the material intensive works such as window, glazing, 
furniture, heat insulation, electric facilities, lift, painting and landscaping works were 
usually carried out by ‘ supply-fix-contract’.
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Table 5-6 Contracting ratio by type of site work ___________  (Unit: %)
Subcontracting
ratio
Supply-fix-
contract
Labour-only-
contract
Foundation work (and Piling work) 72.1 V
Excavation work 71.9 V
Reinforcing concrete work 
(steel work)
67.0 V
Brick laying and stone work 81.2 V
Plaster and water proof work 84.7 V
Internal work(heat insulation, 
window, glazing, furniture)
80.6 V
Painting and colouring work 90.9 V
Landscaping 85.7 V
Source: interview survey in 1996.
In the late 1980s (1989-1990), a large firm (B firm) in Korea tried to employ 
labour-only-contractors as their own employees in order to maintain the balance of 
supply and demand o f labour, to improve their skill, and to secure the labourers. That is, 
the firms tried ‘the in-house production’ type in the building stage. At that time, it was 
very difficult to find skilled building labourers at the adequate time and at the adequate 
price. However, after 2 years, their effort proved to be a failure. The firms were not able 
to afford to pay their fixed salary, which was not relevant to their completed workload. 
This is a good example of indicating that ‘contracting’ is a more efficient production 
system in housebuilding.
During the interview, it was observed that there were outstanding differences in 
the reason for contracting. Most registered firms and small firms replied that they 
depended on contracting because it was the cheapest method by using a competitive 
tendering procedure. They were able to reduce construction costs in the bidding process. 
However, large and designated firms commented on the specialisation o f building work, 
controllability o f unstable work load and reduction o f overhead costs as the reason for 
contracting.
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5.3.4 Materials Purchasing
A great number o f materials are necessary for housebuilding. As the major 
materials, cement, remicon, aggregates, reinforcing bars, concrete steel, plywood, wood, 
windows, sanitary fixtures, cement bricks are considered and there are hundreds more 
materials necessary. The materials costs consist o f about 35 percent of the total costs. 
Economic purchase of building materials may be a factor in reducing the total cost and 
usage o f high-cost, high-quality materials is directly reflected in the quality o f the house. 
Materials purchasing is regarded as an important process in housebuilding. According to 
the interviews, the method o f purchasing materials was performed in three ways; ‘market 
purchasing’, ‘contracting’ and ‘vertical integration’.
First, market purchasing means that housebuilding firms buy their materials 
directly from the manufacturers or retailers. Medium and small firms usually purchased 
the materials themselves from agencies or retailers on the project basis and frequently 
whenever the site work requires. This was because their workload was not as stable as 
large firms. The site staff on the building site was usually in charge o f purchasing 
materials per project and by region. The manager o f medium and small firms commented 
on the difficulties o f materials purchasing, especially when some materials were lacking. 
They actually experienced difficulty in buying some materials, especially in 1989 and 
1990 when housebuilding works were at a peak.
It was observed that the large firms mainly bought their materials from material 
manufacturers. Large firms have operated ‘partnering systems’ with several material 
manufacturers, that is, they have networked with material manufacturers. Through the 
partnering system, large firms purchase materials from the manufacturers directly and the 
transaction was performed on a regular, and normally long-term, basis. They usually set 
an ‘annual purchasing plan’ and steadily transacted by the plan. The purchase was 
normally carried out in the purchasing division at head office, taking into consideration 
the firms’ whole building process. When the firms needed more materials than the 
material collaborators could supply for them, they purchased the additional materials 
from other manufacturers or agencies or retailers. This partnering system is considered as 
an intermediary type between market structure and in-house production.
Among the firms interviewed, three large building firms (Hyundai, Chunggu, 
Hanyang) were using a peculiar materials purchasing method, that is, they depended on 
so-called ‘Materials Purchasing Centres’ for purchasing materials. The Centre is
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controlled by the group’s head office. In the Huyndai business group, there are three 
construction firms (Hyundai Construction Company, Hyundai Sanup Development, and 
Korea Ssanup Development). They are all involved in the construction and 
housebuilding businesses. The Centre makes materials purchasing plan at the business 
group-level and annually. Most o f the materials are purchased by the Centre (90 % in 
case o f Hyundai sanup development, 80 % in case o f Korea sanup development). The 
Chunggu and Hanyang corporation also have independent ‘materials purchasing 
division’ at the business group level. They depended on the purchasing division for the 
purchase o f various materials. The materials purchasing centre and division transact 
directly with the materials manufacturers. They can gain some advantages such as 
economy of scale from mass purchasing and direct purchasing, stability and rapidity in 
purchasing materials, and acquisition o f high quality materials.
A second method o f purchasing materials was the ‘contracting method’. The 
contracting method means that the purchasing is performed by other firms or 
subcontractors. This is known as ‘supply-fix-contract’ method in which both purchasing 
o f materials required in the building work and carrying out the works are included in the 
contract. For example, internal building works such as heating, insulation, furniture and 
glazing, and especially the works having high depending ratio on materials are carried 
out by ‘the supply-fix-contract’.
A large firm tried the ‘contracting’ method to purchase materials. C firm tried to 
buy most of its materials through ‘contracting’ in 1992 and 1993. The manager said that 
they could reduce the housebuilding cost by as much as 150,000 won per pyong (about 
20 % of total cost) by using this method. Another H firm showed the same situation. 
Since 1992, they increased the ratio of ‘supply-fix-contract’ in the building process. 
When they contracted with specialised building firms, materials purchase was included 
in the contract. The subcontractor purchased materials required in the building work, as 
well as carrying out the building work. However, a manager in one other firm 
interviewed strongly commented that reduced materials cost by the ‘supply-fix-contract’ 
meant low quality o f materials. The problems o f using low quality materials appeared in 
competed houses. He emphasised that as materials costs can be reflected in house price 
in ‘the adjusted construction cost system’, more secure construction and production of 
high quality houses may be competitive advantages o f the building firms.
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During the interview, it was found that some large firms showed vertical 
integrated structure in purchasing materials. The vertical integration is considered as a 
third method of purchasing materials. ‘Backward integration’ in the housebuilding 
industry was observed, that is, some housebuilding firms were participating in the 
manufacturing of the building materials. Six large building firms among 22 interviewed 
firms were involved in materials manufacturing. Details o f materials produced by the 
firms are summarised as Table 5-7.
Table 5-7 Building materials produced by housebuilding firms or within same business 
group _________________ _______________________________________________
Within firm Within same business group
Hyundai
Sanup
Heavy equipment 
PC panels
Concrete steel, Furniture, Aluminium window, Steel 
pipe, Lift, Boiler, Remicon, Home Automation
Daewoo Plywood
Steel
heavy equipment
Chunggu PC panels -
Kyaeryong Aggregates
Remicon
-
Korea
Sanup
Remicon
Ascon
Aggregates
Concrete steel, Furniture, Aluminium window, Steel 
pipe, Lift, Boiler, Remicon, Home Automation
Shinho Steel
Aggregate
Home automation, Steel
Source: interview survey in 1996
The materials that the building firms were producing are those such as remicon, 
ascon, aggregates and prefabricated materials. ‘Hyundai sanup’ produced heavy 
equipment and P.C. panels within the firm and several materials such as cement, steel, 
furniture, aluminium etc. were produced within the same business group. Some large 
firms such as Chunggu and Hanyang were operating a factory to produce pre-fabricated 
materials in order to reduce the housebuilding cost in the long term. To produce the pre­
fabricated materials, a large amount o f initial investment is needed. However, it was 
proved that the pre-fabricated materials were not yet popular in Korea due to drawbacks 
in soundproofing and less sophisticated finishing skills etc. The firms producing pre­
fabricated materials were not able to achieve good performance yet. We found common 
attributes of the firms which participated in the production o f building materials. The 
first is that they are all large-scale firms and their financial conditions are better than 
small firms. The second is that they have long business experience in the production o f 
the building materials or they started their business in the manufacturing o f materials (in 
Korea sanup, Shinho, Kyaeryong).
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In the process o f materials purchasing, different patterns were observed between 
large firms and small/medium firms. Large firms developed various methods of 
purchasing materials. Most of them were operating a ‘partnering system’ with materials 
manufacturers based on continuous transaction. Some of them (three firms o f twenty 
two) were achieving ‘cost reduction’ from centralised and mass purchasing methods at 
the business group level. Six large firms o f them were involved in the production of 
materials, that is, they showed ‘vertical integrated structure’. On the other hand, most of 
the small and medium firms were purchasing materials by the ‘market structure’. They 
usually purchased the materials themselves from agencies or retailers on the project 
basis. However, according to the type o f building works and the nature o f the materials, 
they sometimes depended on supply-fix-contract as well.
5.4 Transaction Governance in the Housebuilding Business
Throughout the production process, high dependency on contracting was 
observed, that is, contracting was observed as a prevalent governance structure in Korean 
housebuilding. However, contracting relationships with other building firms or other 
contractors was different from those o f the UK and US building firms, that is, more 
advanced contracting structures were not observed in Korean housebuilding.
Actually, the Korean government has sought to improve the relationship between 
the developers and specialised contractors by an institutional system. Since 1986, the 
government has encouraged the building firms to co-operate with small, specialised firms 
in a partner-relationship. The ‘partnering system’ is a kind of production structure in 
which the firms keep contract with specialised building firms on a long-term basis for 
specific building works. This system is based on the view that housebuilding firms 
support their contractors in financial and technical respects and that contractors perform 
the site work for the housebuilding firm and their relationship is based on ‘trust’ between 
firms. This is a similar concept with ‘quasi-firm type’, ‘partnering system’, ‘networking 
system’ and ‘collaborators’ observed in advanced countries.
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To develop the partnering system, the government has pursued various 
institutional efforts2. The partnering relationship between the firms and contractors is 
basically possible by continuous contract relationship. Once the scale of the firms’ sales 
reaches some level, it is easier to adopt ‘the partnering system’. Most of the large 
housebuilding firms were operating the partnering system with the specialised 
contractors in each building works. According to the KRIHS survey (KRIHS, 1996), 73.5 
percent o f large housebuilding firms and 47.9 percent o f medium firms adopted the 
system. However, the building firms still used many labour-only-contractors as the site 
labourers, besides their collaborators. The transaction with the labour-only-contractors 
has been kept in project basis or temporarily.
During the interview, it was investigated whether the contracting relationship 
with the housebuilding firms and contractors is similar with the advanced structure such 
as ‘quasi-firm type’, ‘partnering system’, ‘networking system’ and ‘collaborators’ 
observed in advanced countries. All firms among the interviewed firms answered that 
they were operating the partnering system with their contractors. Most o f the building 
firms followed the institutional frame and had their collaborators. To investigate the 
relationship with contractors in more detail, several questions were asked such as 
selection standard for ‘collaborators’ (selected contractors), the transaction period, 
pricing method, and extent o f supporting.
As the standard to solicit ‘collaborators’, the large firms usually considered the 
contractors’ high performance, work experience and management skills in order, whereas 
the medium and small firms considered the number o f technicians and retained 
equipment. This explains why the medium and small firms were using their collaborators 
to compensate for their weakness in skilled labours and building equipment. The 
transaction periods with their collaborators were also different. Four large firms kept the 
relationship with the same collaborators for about 10 years, whereas most of the other 
firms kept 3-5 years in average. The interviewees said that they tried to change their
2 The government included a clause about the partnership of subcontracting in ‘the Construction Business 
Law’ in 1984. It was enacted as ‘the Promotion Act of Partnering System of Contracting’ in 1986. The 
objective was to establish a co-operative relationship between large building firms and contractors. The 
Korean government recommended various advantages of this system in the provision. Since October 1995, 
the Ministry of Construction and Transportation has organised ‘the Committee for Promotion of the 
Partnering System’ and made efforts to consolidate such a system. The objectives are to evaluate the 
performance of ‘the partnering system of subcontracting’ and to choose excellent performers and to 
subsidise some grants to them. However, this is not an obligatory, only an advisory system.
100
collaborators every 2-3 years in order to search for better contractors. The transaction 
period was closely related to their scale o f the firms and business period.
The pricing method showed some differences between firms. The pricing method 
in the contracting procedure could be classified into four groups; ‘private contracting’, 
‘estimated cost or average cost’, ‘competitive bidding among nominated bidders’ and 
‘lowest tendering method’. Only three large firms having long relationships with their 
collaborators were mainly using ‘the private contracting’ and ‘estimated cost or average 
cost’. However, other firms, especially small firms, mainly depended on ‘lowest 
tendering method’. They wanted to reduce costs as much as possible in the pricing 
procedure. This indicates that their relationship with collaborators was not as mature as 
in the case o f large firms. It was found that the longer the transaction period with 
contractors was, the more they gave some advantages to their collaborators by securing 
their work load and by guaranteeing some profit in the pricing process.
Large housebuilding firms have supported their collaborators by providing 
business training, and offering favourable terms o f payment (usually undelayed payment 
and cash payment). However, this is not considered to be enough level as an investment 
for their collaborators. Most o f the other firms did not support their collaborators except 
in providing good conditions o f payment terms. It is known that the relationship between 
the building firms and the small contractors in Japan is famous for the ‘trust’ 
relationship. The prime firms are strongly networked with contractors. They have a 
comprehensive investment plan for their collaborators and the level of investment to 
them is very high.
During the interviews, a movement was found that large housebuilding firms 
have reduced the number of their collaborators but heightened the level o f support for 
them. It was known that housebuilding firms tried to reduce the number of collaborators 
in order to develop the partnering system at a more satisfactory level. The large firms 
wanted to keep a strong relationship only with the most reliable firms, as transaction with 
too many contractors resulted in an increase in the administrative cost. They pursued a 
genuine ‘trust relationship’ based on high investment and quick and frequent 
communication between firms.
We may summarise building firms’ relationship with contractors as follows: most 
o f the building firms were networked with specialised building firms or contractors. 
However, considering the relationship between firms and specialised contractors, the
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partnering system has still been operated at an introductory level. It is not working yet as 
the original meaning itself, based on strong ‘trust’ and ‘co-operation. Some large firms 
contributed to the development o f the system by investment for the collaborators, 
distinctive treatment in pricing, and long-lasting transaction. However, most other firms 
did not invest in their collaborator, because the collaborators may show opportunistic 
behaviour after obtaining some training and transferring o f technical know-how from the 
main firms. Continuous and long-lasting transaction makes it possible to develop the 
relationship into a mutual trust stage. Their relationship was not developed into a ‘trust’ 
relationship. We could not find ‘quasi-firm’ type, ‘partnering system’, ‘long-term 
contracting’, or ‘vertical and horizontal collaboration’ with specialised contractors as 
found in the advanced countries. It was also observed that small firms did not try to 
invest for their contractors, as they could not guarantee the business’s continuity. We 
may consider the relationship between building firms and on-site specialised labours as 
traditional ‘contracting’ relationship in the market, not ‘partnering relationship’.
5.5 Findings and Discussion
In this chapter, we examined how the Korean housebuilding firms operated their 
business, focusing on some major decision making in the production process. Through 
the interview survey method, we investigated how the important decision making on 
objectives o f the business, business strategy to achieve the objectives, and purchasing 
land, labour and materials were operated.
It was observed that the objectives of housebuilding firms and the strategies to 
meet the objectives have changed as time went on, responding to the demand situation 
and government regulation. Since 1977 prices for newly built apartment houses have 
been regulated within a ceiling price. In the mid 1980s, demand for housing was high 
and demand for apartments was somehow guaranteed. Many firms entered into the 
housebuilding industry and their objectives were focused on ‘profit maximisation’ and 
‘high growth’. ‘Cost reduction’ was a key strategy in order to compensate for the loss o f 
profit due to the ceiling price. However, since 1992, after achieving mass construction o f 
houses, demand for housing has continuously decreased and the regulation for house 
prices also changed. The objectives of the business were changed into those which more
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emphasised ‘quality o f performance’, ‘firm’s image’, ‘continuity o f business’, and 
‘extension o f business’. The building firms’ strategies were also changed into 
‘differentiation strategy’ and ‘focus strategy’. Building firms segmented their market, 
based on income level and household characteristics. More emphasis was given to 
specific demand market and development o f differentiated, high-quality and design- 
specific houses. It was also observed that most firms wanted large-scale operation and 
extended firms’ scale in order to achieve economy o f scale. Only competitive building 
firms could survive during the highly volatile period after 1992 when take-over and 
bankruptcy were prevalent in the housebuilding industry.
It was observed that most of the Korean building firms depended highly on 
‘contracting’ in the whole building process. Interviewees pointed out that changing 
policies in the housebuilding industry generated ‘enforced uncertainty’, besides the 
natural uncertainty observed in the building process. The perceived high extent of 
uncertainty gave birth to the ‘contracting’ type structure in the production process. The 
uncertain business situation led the building firms to pursue ‘flexibility’ rather than 
‘efficiency’ or anything else. Most o f the interviewees replied that housing demand was 
changed with the change of the government’s policy and building firms were responsive 
to meet the demand. In particular, land development regulation and the public allocation 
system of land were important factors pushing most o f the firms to ‘contracting type’ 
business. Due to the regulations, Korean housebuilding firms’ profit was limited to 
building profit on site and their business was highly influenced by the chance to purchase 
public land. The firms not gaining public land were not able to keep the housebuilding 
business.
In the uncertain situation, housebuilding firms did not want to invest both in the 
product and the production process. More advanced ‘integrated’ structure such as ‘quasi­
firm type’, ‘partnering system’, ‘networking system’ and ‘collaborators’ were not 
observed, even though the Korean government put efforts to settle down ‘partnering 
system’ between building firms and contractors in the production process. The building 
firms did not want to invest in the training o f their own employees and did not try to 
improve the relationship with their contractors. Building firms showed very opportunistic 
behaviour in relation to contractors. They changed specialised contractors every two 
years as they wanted new, more reliable contractors. They also showed very competitive 
relationship with contractors in the contracting process. Some of the large leading firms
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showed a different relationship; long-term relationship with the same specialised 
contractors or material manufacturers and ‘vertical integrated structure’ in materials 
manufacturing. However, these cases were exceptional and limited to a small number of 
large building firms. ‘Contracting’ has been established as a transaction governance 
throughout the development process.
Interviewees pointed out that uncertainty in the housebuilding business enforced 
building firms to divert or diversify into other businesses. It was a surprising result that 
building firms were pursuing diversification, even before not reaching specialisation in 
housebuilding. The building firms’ diversity is similar to the large building firms in
advanced countries. However, the pattern and motive o f the diversification may be
different (Further investigation will be followed in chpater 7 and 8).
Throughout the interviews, we could confirm that the Korean government’s 
intervention in the housebuilding industry influenced production structure and the
building firms’ behaviour. The result gave some implications on the Korean
housebuilding industry. The contracting system might contribute to rapid growth of the 
Korean housebuilding industry for a short period. However, we may have some doubts 
whether the structure has contributed to the development o f the industry in the longer 
term. Contracting was observed as a prevalent transaction governance in the production 
process and competitive and opportunistic relations with contractors may bring about 
some negative effects on the industry. Interviewees have also commented that managers 
of building firms did not want to invest in housebuilding. They did not want to invest in 
training their own employees and in the long run, this will lead to a shortage of skilled 
labour in the construction industry. The building firms showed opportunistic behaviour 
in relation to the contractors and they did not invest for a more stable and mature relation 
with the contractors. The aggregate negative effects may delay the development o f the 
building industry.
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Chapter 6 Cost Efficiency of the Korean Housebuilding Business
6.1 Introduction
The objective o f this chapter is to investigate how building firms have operated 
the housebuilding business. It was found that ‘contracting’ was a prevalent governance 
structure in housebuilding. It was also found that building firms depend on ‘contracting’ 
to reduce uncertainty and to maximise flexibility in the building process and the structure 
may be reflected in the cost function. Cost analysis was focused on the relationship 
between contracting cost and other input factors.
It was hypothesised that ‘contracting cost’ may appear substitutable for the other 
input factors. To test the hypothesis, first, it was necessary to estimate the cost function 
of the Korean housebuilding business. From the estimated function, we may derive 
various efficiency measures such as substitution elasticities, price elasticity o f input 
demand, returns to scale and productivity. The difference from the other studies is that 
first, contracting cost was considered as an independent factor. As part of this extension, 
five input factors o f production such as materials, labour, overhead, equipment and 
contracting costs are considered. It is noticeable that contracting cost is considered as an 
independent factor. Attention was concentrated on the role o f contracting by reviewing 
substitutive or complementary relationship between input factors. Second, the effects of 
changing technology on productivity were examined in more detail in this analysis.
6.2 Estimation Model
6.2.1 Basic M odel: Translog Cost Function
We assumed that the housebuilding industry could be characterised by a twice 
differentiable production function relating the output o f housing services Y to several 
factor inputs. We considered five input factors; materials M , labour L, contracting S, 
overhead O and equipment P. Here T is time trend representing non-neutral
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technological change and accounting for technological shifts in the production function 
as suggested by Baltagi and Griffin (1988).
Y=Y(M , L, S, O, P, T) ( i )
If  firms minimise costs, the production technology is reflected by the cost function. It
can be represented by a cost function of the firms by the Shephard Duality Theorem 
(Shephard, 1953).
Here C  is total cost and Pm, Pi, Ps, Po, and Pp are the prices o f material, labour, 
contracting, overhead, and equipment respectively. From the general representations, n- 
factor second-order approximations to arbitrary analytic functions can be specified.
As the theoretical model, the generalised translog-production technology 
originally developed by Christensen, Jorgensen and Lau (1973) was used. The reasons 
for using the Translog cost function are that the function does not constrain restrictions 
to be homothetic or homogeneous, unlike the other cost functions such as Cobb-Douglas 
and CES (Constant Elasticity o f Substitution) cost function. It also does not impose 
restrictions on the elasticities of substitution. The translog cost function is known as the 
most flexible and improved function to allow these restrictions to be tested. Therefore, 
from the Translog cost function, we may estimate ‘returns to scale’, ‘elasticities of 
substitution or complementarity’ between input factors, and other productivity measures.
The specific translog function is of the following type (Brox, 1993 p3).
C=C(Pm, Pi, Ps, Pa, Pp, Y, T) (2)
ln(C) = a 0 + a y ln(7) + £  a , ln P, a a ln P <ln P i  + “ o- Z ln r  ln P>
(3)
+ ^ a yy(lnY)2+a,T+aly\nYT + X a l, in p lT+^a„T2
2 ,=i 2i ]
subject to
n n n n
Z“i=1- Z«,=°. ai, =a,i,2 X =0>and S«„=°. (4)
;=1 1=1
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Here i and j  denote the aggregate inputs, M, L, S, O and P. The restrictions, specified by 
equation (4) are imposed so that the dual cost function satisfied the properties o f neo­
classical production theory. These restrictions suggested that equation (3) is nonnegative, 
real valued, strictly positive for nonzero levels o f output and linearly homogeneous and 
concave with respect to the input price for each level o f output.
The cost-minimising share equations are derived by applying Shephard’s lemma 
to equation (3) (Diewart, 1971). That is, after differentiating equation (3) with respect to 
the logarithm o f prices, the share equations become
n
S, = a, +  ^ a „ l i p ,  + a ly\nY  + a „ T , (5)
J=1
where S, represents the share of factor z (i=M, L, S, O and P  in total cost which sum to 
unity). Using the estimation results of the cost function and share equations, we can 
estimate various factor elasticities and productivity indices.
6.2.2 Elasticities and Productivities
This analysis pursues the investigation o f important input factors in the 
housebuilding business and examines how the input factors are affected by the changes 
in the other factor price and the scale o f the building project. Another objective is to 
examine the efficiency and productivity o f the Korean housebuilding project under the 
sales price regulation. Three sets o f elasticities and two sets o f productivity indices are 
derived from the model equations (3), (4), and (5):
Elasticity
The elasticity measures give some answers to find important input factors in the 
housebuilding business and relationship between input factors when input factor’s price 
changes and input factor’s use changes, and when the scale of business changes.
□ the Allen’s own and cross partial elasticities of substitution, Sy, are given by equation 
(6)
$ j =  (a y  +  Si ( S i - \ ) ) / S t ,  if i=j, and
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Sij =  ( c f y  +  Si Sj ) / &1S/, if i^j. (6)
The elasticities of substitution (<%) mean the percentage change in the use of the input 
factor when other input factors increase by one percent.
□ the own and cross price elasticities o f factor demand, %, are given by equation (7).
$rSjjSi if  /=/, and
£v~&jSj if  irf- (7)
The price elasticities of factor demand (ey) mean the percentage change in the use of the 
factor when each factor’s price increases by one percent with output held constant. Own 
price elasticities o f factor demand (eit)  shows the percent decline in the use o f a factor 
when its price increases by one percent with output held constant. Global concavity of 
the cost function requires that all Allen’s own partial elasticities o f substitution (Si,) and 
consequently, all own price elasticities o f factor demand (eu), are negative at all data 
points1.
□ the price elasticities of factor demand with respect to output, rjiy, are given by 
equation (8).
%  = ^ r  + « r + a yylnF + S “ .rlnA  + a J  (8)
1=1
Pindyck (1979) explained that these elasticities ( 7jiy) mean price change of factor demand 
with respect to output. Lopez and Tung (1982, p l29) classified the input factors as 
inferior ( 7jjy<0), normal (0 < ^< 1 ), or superior ( 77^ 1), based on the values o f the 
elasticities. If rfiy is greater than one, the factor is considered to be a superior factor, if rjiy 
is greater than zero and less than one, as a normal factor, and if rjiy is less than zero, as an 
inferior factor. Brox (1993) explained that the price elasticity o f factor demand (rjiy) 
provided two kinds o f information. First, they indicate the manner by which an 
anticipated change in output will affect input demand for given relative prices and
1 For details on the properties of such flexible function forms, see Guilkey et al (1983), Diewart and
Wales (1987)
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technology. Second, they provide evidence on the nature o f the inputs in question as 
classified by Lopez and Tug (1982).
Productivity
The scale of the Korean housebuilding project has grown rapidly during the mid 
1980s. Relevant questions are; how did the expansion o f the scale o f project affect the 
price responsiveness o f the housebuilding industry ? Did the larger scale operation lead 
to a greater flexibility in the housebuilding industry ? Did the input factors demand curve 
become more elastic as the production scale expanded ? These questions were rarely 
considered in the Korean housebuilding study. It could be answered by various 
productivity measures such as elasticity of total cost with respect to output and the 
elasticity o f total cost diminution suggested by Brox (1993 pp.4-5).
□ the elasticity o f total cost with respect to output, Scy is given by equation (9).
dln_C _ h ^  + y ,  h _  ^
01n Y ^ ty r  i ty v /
This index means the change in total cost of the housebuilding project as the output 
grows. It indicates the presence o f economy o f scale. While this index considers total 
factor efficiency, it is interesting to consider the factor-specific efficiency effect.
Berndt and Khaled (1979, p i240) defined the specific factor efficiency as follows;
□ The specific factor’s price elasticity o f demand (specific factor efficiency),
Sin (Y /X t) , /e  , im
(10)
The specific factors’ price elasticity of demand (% ) means the degree of price 
responsiveness o f a factor demand when the scale of the project changes by one percent. 
niy is defined as the elasticity o f specific factor efficiency and it is known that if niy is 
less than zero, it means the factor becomes more responsive to price change with 
increase o f scale of the project. Lopez and Tug (1982) explained that the specific factors’
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price elasticity o f demand (% ) is simply equal to one minus the price elasticity o f factor 
demand (7]iy) given equation (8) when the restrictions implied by a generalised Leontief 
cost function are considered. (%  = i-rjiy)
As another productivity measure, the elasticity o f total cost diminution may be 
considered.
□ the elasticity of total cost diminution (ect) is given by equation (11).
r)ln C n
ea = - —  = ~{at + a n In T + £ a „  In p, + a v In Y) (11)
uln T j~\
This elasticity (ect) shows the degree of technical progress in the housebuilding project 
with respect to time. Elasticity o f specific factor cost diminution are shown in equation 
( 12).
□ elasticity o f specific factor cost diminution, 7rit,
dln(7 / X f) /e
-  = Ba -a„ is ,  (12)
din T
6.3 Data
6.3.1 Data Sources
In this analysis, only apartment houses were considered. Due to the heterogeneity 
of the product, it is difficult to compare costs o f all type o f houses. Apartment houses are 
relatively standardised and most o f the designated and registered firms have built 
apartment houses since the mid 1980s. Furthermore, it is easier to get cost data of 
apartment housebuilding from a qualified association, whereas it is difficult to get 
reliable cost data o f single detached houses from small independent builders. Data 
included in this analysis were limited to the apartment building.
According to ‘the Construction Business Act Article 29’, all the registered 
construction firms have an obligation to report their cost data to ‘the Korea Construction 
Firm Association’ if the contract amount is more than 100 million won. The report aims
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to continuously provide basic statistical data to the construction firms. The basic 
statistics provide valuable information about the structure o f costs and trend o f each 
input costs and can be used for more efficient cost management and cost reduction. The 
contents o f the survey are detail cost items; materials cost, labour cost, subcontracting 
cost, overhead cost, equipment cost, total construction cost, and contract amount etc. 
which occurred during the construction period. The data are classified by construction 
type such as 24 civil engineering, 21 architecture, 3 special construction. ‘The Korea 
Construction Firm Association’ aggregates the costs by type o f construction and 
publishes ‘Analyses of Cost Items in Complete W orks’ annually. The Korea 
Construction Firm Association does not show specified analysis, for example, by types 
o f houses. It publishes only the overall figures o f the cost structure.
With the help o f the association, from the raw data, only apartment housebuilding 
data among residential buildings were collected for this analysis. Actually, this is a first 
detail analysis on cost structure o f housebuilding in Korea. The data consists o f detail 
costs o f apartment building that designated firms and registered firms built, therefore, 
they are project-base data, not firm-base data. The total number o f samples was 823 
projects as shown in Table 6-1.
Table 6-1 The number of samples
1986 1987 1988 1990 1992 1994 Total
Designated firms’ 
Housebuilding project
84 67 66 76 94 86 473
Registered firms’ 
Housebuilding project
39 64 54 57 68 68 350
Number of samples 123 131 120 133 162 154 823
The nature o f the data source may be limiting factors on the scope o f analysis. 
For example, the cost data did not allow an urban/rural split and high/low floor split of 
analysis. All the data were limited to the high-rise apartment projects in urban areas. 
Land cost was not included in the total cost, even though the land cost was a big portion 
of it. However, this point can be regarded as an advantage in the analysis, because land 
cost is quite different by region and area. The total cost in this study indicates pure 
expenditure required in the building site. Therefore, we can evaluate pure productivity o f 
the housebuilding project with this cost data.
i l l
6.3.2 Used Variables
The model utilised the aggregate cost o f ‘apartment housebuilding’ as a 
dependent variable and total sales as an output variable. Five input factors (i.e. materials, 
labour, contracting, overheads and equipment) and time trend were used as independent 
variables.
Materials costs are the expenditures for the building materials used to perform the 
on-site building works. Labour cost includes not only wages for on-site labourers such as 
superintendent, technical managers, chief workman and odd-job man, but also office 
employees’ wages. Superintendents and technical managers are regular employees like 
the head office’s employees, whereas chief workman and odd-job man are temporarily 
employed during the project period and/or by the project regions.
Contracting cost means expenditure the firms have to pay when the firms contract 
out some parts o f the building works to other firms or to other specialised builders. 
Contracting is carried out by two methods; ‘labour-only-contract’ and ‘supply-fix 
contract’. ‘Labour-only-contract’ means that the firms contract out some parts o f the 
building works to the other firms, whereas ‘supply-fix contract’ means that not only 
performing the works but also purchasing o f materials needed in the building work are 
included in the contracting. For example, if the building firms purchased materials, the 
cost would be included in the material cost. However, if the firm contracted out 
purchasing o f some materials and/or performing the works to the other firms through 
supply-fix-contract, the material cost would be included in the contracting costs. 
Therefore, contracting cost may include labour costs and, sometimes, material costs 
related to the works performed by the contractors.
Overhead cost means indirect cost relevant to the building project. It includes all 
supporting costs to perform the building works such as light and heating, water, site 
transportation, and other maintenance costs related to the building project such as taxes, 
insurance, advertising, depreciation, travelling and fees payable etc.
Equipment cost means that cost for using some equipment and facilities required 
to perform the building work. If the firm retained the equipment and facilities as a capital 
of the firms, the depreciation cost as a fixed cost may be included in it, whereas if  the 
firms borrowed the equipment in any way, the leasing cost or the rent is included in it.
All the data were based on each building project. The scale of each project is 
shown differently. For analysis we need to standardise the project data. It is reasonable to
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standardise the data by total building area. However, the building area was not available 
in the raw data. As an alternative, the duration of project was used to standardise them. 
The data were standardised with the duration of project period. Therefore, all the costs 
mean average costs required per month in each project. Table 6-2 shows average values 
o f used variables for this analysis. It indicates average duration of project, total sales, 
cost structure o f the apartment house building project per one month, and profits to total 
sales.
Table 6-2 Cost structure in apartment house building (unit: 1000 won, %)
Average 1986 1987 1988 1990 1992 1994
Numb
Durati
(Mont
er of Samples 
on of Project 
is)
804
17.75
123
13.74
120
16.03
120
14.42
132
18.51
159
20.18
150
21.87
Cost Materials (1) 
(%)
157,299
36.82
172,761
42.19
148,346
37.12
132,005
36.82
142,307
35.45
178,472
36.12
162,804
34.58
Labour(2)
(%)
57,781
13.53
70,867
17.31
57,787
14.46
63,208
17.63
58,028
14.46
56,910
11.52
43,315
9.20
Contracting (3) 
(%)
169,608
39.70
127,986
31.26
139,417
34.88
121,721
33.95
161,979
40.35
220,600
44.65
219,193
46.56
Overheads (4) 
(%)
36,400
8.52
30,614
7.48
48,654
12.17
35,013
9.77
32,441
8.08
32,119
6.50
40,500
8.60
Equipment (5) 
(%)
6,113
1.43
7,217
1.76
5,488
1.37
6,579
1.84
6,642
1.65
5,982
1.21
5,002
1.06
Total costs (6) 
(%)
427,201
100
409,444
100
399,692
100
358,526
100
401,396
100
494,083
100
470,814
100
Total sales (7) A 475,574 486,210 410,590 406,094 466,943 550,401 502,887
Profit (8) B 48,373 76,765 10,898 47,568 65,547 56,318 32,073
Ratio of Profit to 
Sales (%) (B/A) 10.17 15.79 2.65 11.71 14.04 10.23 6.38
First, when we consider the scale o f projects by total sales, we may find a trend. 
Before 1988, the average sales of a project decreased, whereas it increased between 1988 
and 1992 and decreased again in 1994. We can find the reason for this in the housing 
policy at that time. The reason that the project scale has increased may be due to the 
government’s mass production policy o f housing. The period in which the project scale 
increased is consistent with ‘the construction programme for two million dwellings’ 
period (1988-1992). In fact, the mass construction programme encouraged housebuilding 
firms to participate in the housebuilding project by adopting ‘the adjusted construction 
cost system’ (1989), ‘public land development’ (1989) and other policy measures. When 
we consider the scale o f housebuilding projects by the duration o f project, it also shows a
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continuous increasing trend (except in case o f 1988). The duration o f each project 
increased from 13.74 months in 1986 to 21.87 months in 1994. Figure 6-1 shows the 
trends in a graph. It is outstanding that the scale o f the housebuilding project has 
continuously increased since 1988.
600 550
486 467500 --
- 20
411 406 87
14.42
400
- 15
16.03300
13.74
200
100
92
total sale 
period
year
Figure 6-1 Average scale o f building project.
Second, when we consider the cost structure o f the projects, proportions of 
materials cost and contracting cost are rather big (almost 80 percent of total cost). We 
may see the trend o f each cost in Figure 6-2.
1.76 1.37 1.84 1.65 1.21 1.06
■ ■  equipment 
34 51 ■  overhead 
□  contract in 
H labour 
gg] material
year
Figure 6-2 Cost structure in the housebuilding project
As time went by, the proportions of material and labour cost decreased and the 
proportion of contracting cost increased. The proportions of overhead cost and
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equipment cost showed an inconsistent trend. In particular, the increasing rate of 
contracting was shown as quite high (31.26 %->46.56 %).
Ratios o f profit to total sales show different figures in each year. Till 1988, profit 
ratios were very changeable. Since 1988 when the regulated house price was adjusted, 
profit ratios increased into 14.04 % in 1990. However, after then, it continuously 
decreased. It is difficult to find the reasons. According to the firms’ interview, housing 
demand has decreased, particularly since 1990, and has changed. Unsold apartment 
houses increased. The housebuilding firms have to compete with ‘quality’. 
Housebuilding firms could differentiate their products (the standardised apartment 
houses) only by secure construction and by using high quality materials. Firms cannot 
avoid increasing cost to build high quality houses. Figure 9 showed an increase of 
material cost and contracting cost since 1990.
6.3.3 Estimation Method
Table 6-3 shows operational definition o f used variable.
Table 6-3 Operational definition of used variables
Variables Operational definition
Dependent variable TC: total cost Total cost per project
Output variables y: housebuilding sales Total sales per project
(proxy for total building area per project)
Input factor variables wl: materials factor 
w2: labour factor 
w3: contracting factor 
w4: overheads factor 
w5: equipment factor
w l: materials factor price per project 
w2: labour factor price per project 
w3: contracting factor price per project 
w4: overheads factor price per project 
w5: equipment factor price per project
Time trend t: time trend 86:1 87:2 88:3 
90:5 92:7 94:9
For estimation of the Translog cost function, the data were transformed. First, all 
cost expenditures were discounted by GNP deflator in order to control the structural 
changes o f each input factor’s price, based on year 1990. Second, variables were 
transformed into ratio variables by dividing the value by the sample mean. When we use 
nominal monetary data, the problem of multicollinearity may occur. If  high 
multicollinearity was observed in the model, the estimated coefficient would be unstable. 
The elasticities and productivities estimated from the model may be different according 
to the variables chosen in the model. Once we used ratio variables by dividing raw data
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by sample mean, the problem of multicollinearity may be resolved. In the model, if  the 
values which are less than mean value were transformed into logarithmic value, they 
would be negative, therefore they show low correlation with the square value o f the 
variables.
Using the variables, we estimated a cost function o f the housebuilding business 
and cost share equations. The translog cost function has to be estimated with the cost 
share equations as a multiple regression system. In this case, current endogenous 
variables in the equation (3) are used as regressors in other equations (5) o f the system. 
Therefore, OLS estimates are biased and inconsistent, because a critical assumption of 
OLS is that the regressors are not correlated with the residual.
It is known that the Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) estimation method is 
useful when we believe that error terms are contemporaneously correlated across 
equations. The SUR estimation method uses the estimates of the covariance o f residuals 
across equations in an attempt to improve the efficiency o f estimates2. The ‘syslin’ 
procedure in SAS statistical programme was used in estimating parameters in the system 
of equations composed with equation (3), (4), and (5).
As the full set o f share equations must sum to unity, the variance-covariance 
matrix for the full system would be singular. Christensen, Jorgensen and Lau (1973) 
explained that only n-1 share equations should be estimated and the parameters o f the 
omitted equation may be calculated using the restrictions implied by the model. It is also 
known that the estimates are invariant to the choice o f equation omitted. The omitted 
equation in this study is the cost-share equation o f contracting cost.
The data used for the analysis were pooled time-series data from 1986 till 1994. 
During the analysis period, the mass construction plan period from 1988 to 1992 was 
included. It is thought that during this mass construction period there must be an 
outstanding difference for the business o f the building firms and it might be reflected in 
the production function and cost function of building firms. To test whether there is a 
difference in the structure o f costs during the period, the period was divided into two 
periods based on the year 1989; period I (before 1989) and period II (since 1989). 
Actually since 1989, the regulated sale price has been adjusted reflecting a price rise of 
input factors. It was considered that the effects o f the policy change would be reflected in 
the cost structure. Besides, data were collected from designated firms and registered
2 SAS Users’ Guide, 5th Edition.
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firms. The designated firms are on a large scale than the registered firms and there may 
be some difference in the cost structure between designated firms and registered firms.
To test whether there are structural changes between the two periods, and 
between two types o f firm, a Chow test was carried out. Test equation is as follows under 
the hypothesis that there is no structural change in the cost structure between two periods 
and between two types of firms.
d _ n x + n 2 - 2 k  SSRt -  (SSR, +SSR2) 
k (SSR, +SSR2)
Here, n2 are numbers o f observations in period I and period II and in designated firms 
and registered firms, k is the number of variables for estimation. SSRt, SSRj. SSR2 are the 
sum of error term o f the estimated model in each case. They are shown in Table 6-4.
Table 6-4 Calculation of decision value for chow-test
Period Type of firms
ni, Period I 281 Designated firms 435
n2 Period II 404 Registered firms 250
k 36 36
SSRj SSRj=1589 SSRt =2661
ssr2 SSR2= 2216 SSR2= 1351
SSRt SSRt= 3757 SSRt = 2151
F value F(36,613)=1.455 F(36,613)=1.455
d 0.215 1.106
If  we calculated the value d , d  was 0.215 for two periods and 1.106 for type of 
firms. They are all less than the decision value 1.455 o f F distribution (36,613). 
Therefore, the hypothesis that there is no structural change between two periods and 
there is no difference in cost structure between designated firms and registered firms is 
accepted. It means there is no problem in analysing the pooled time series data from 
1986 to 1994 and data from designated firms and registered firms. Actually the estimates 
were not much different from those of the total sample as expected.
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6.4 Estimation Results
All the results were reported in Appendix 5, as the estimates o f cost function are 
not the main concern in this analysis. Using the restrictions imposed on the model, 36 
parameters were estimated for the translog model. The estimations o f the model by the 
SUR technique were statistically significant. Adjusted R2 , meaning explaining degree of 
explanatory variables are shown as rather high (0.9927). F-values showing the adequacy 
of the model are shown as statistically significant. Among 36 coefficients, 28 were found 
to be statistically significant at 1% probability level. The goodness o f fit (the associated 
standard errors and T values o f these estimates) were satisfactory.
There is another method to test the adequacy o f the model. Durbin-Watson 
statistic (D-W) shows whether the error terms are mutually independent and normally 
distributed. The D-W value can be calculated by run test and Shapiro-Wilk test on error 
terms. If D-W value is near 2, it means error terms are normal distributed and the model 
is adequate as there is no relationship between residuals. If  the D-W value is near to 0, it 
means there is a positive relation between residuals and if the D-W value is near to 4, it 
means there is negative relation between residuals. Therefore, if the D-W value is near 0 
or 4, it means that the model is not adequate as there is a relationship between residuals.
D-W value o f this model was shown as 1.668 and it says that the model was 
estimated properly. We can say the estimation model used in this analysis is adequate. In 
order to draw further inferences from the estimated parameters, the procedure to 
calculate several indices (elasticities and productivities) were followed.
6.4.1 Elasticities
A llen’s elasticities o f  substitution (Sy)
The Allen partial elasticities o f substitution were reported in Table 28. Guilkey, Lovel 
and Sickles (1983) pointed out that global concavity o f the cost function requires that 
Allen’s own elasticities of substitution (£„) and all own price elasticities o f demand (£„) 
should be negative at all data points. At simple means they were estimated to be negative 
as shown in Table 6-5 and Table 6-6. Therefore, we can say the estimation model used in 
this analysis is adequate.
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Table 6-5 The elasticities o f substitution
Substitution Elasticities
Materials Labour Contracting Overhead Equipment
Materials
Labour
Contracting
Overhead
Equipment
-0.15367**
(0.02595)
0.01123**
(0.00329)
0.08018**
(0.00646)
0.00018
(0.00069)
0.00043**
(0.00000)
-0.05762
(0.36241)
0.03020
(0.06390)
-0.00035
(0.00516)
0.00013
(0.00009)
-0.24378**
(0.04013)
0.00551**
(0.00040)
0.00026**
(0.00004)
-0.35529
(0.33714)
-0.00009
(0.00016)
-0.00669 
(0.4463 1)
( ): standard errors. ** : significant at 1 % leve .
Elasticities o f substitution (<%) were observed between each pair inputs. We can 
see that most of the elasticities are positive implying that these inputs are substitutes not 
complements, with the exception of between overheads and labour (-0.00035) and 
between equipment and overheads (-0.00009).
While it is difficult to compare these results to those o f other studies due to the 
different set o f inputs analysed, these results show that the elasticities o f substitution 
between input factors in the Korean housebuilding sector appear low. Among various 
input factors, the substitutability with contracting was examined and found to be 
relatively high, especially between subcontracting and materials and between contracting 
and labour. It can be explained that when it is difficult to purchase some materials due to 
the over-demand o f the materials or price increase of the materials, the firms contract out 
the works requiring the materials to the other firms (by supply-fix-contract type). When 
it is difficult to find on-site skilled labourers, they contract out the work with the labour- 
only-contractors. The estimated results show that contracting is a comparatively good 
substitute for materials (0.08018) and low substitute for equipment (0.00026). Labour is 
a good substitute for contracting (0.03020) and for materials (0.01123) but complements 
for overheads (-0.00035, but not significant). The degrees o f substitutability between the 
other inputs were generally weak.
The price elasticities of demand for inputs (fy)
This elasticity means that the percentage changes in the use o f a factor when its 
price increases a percentage. The elasticities were estimated as price inelastic. These
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elasticities are consistent with findings in other studies that factor demands in the 
residential sector are generally price inelastic. However, the elasticities were estimated as 
lower than those obtained by other studies3. This means input factor demand in the 
Korean housebuilding business is very price inelastic.
Table 6-6 Input-price elasticities
Demand o f input Input-Price (+)
Materials Labour Contracting Overheads Equipment
Materials
Labour
Contracting
Overhead
Equipment
-0.04481**
(0.00176)
0.00345**
(0.00051)
0.02366**
(0.00095)
-0.00004
(0.00008)
0.00016**
(0.00001)
0.00448** 
(0.00 122) 
-0.00287 
(0.00263)
0.00452**
(0.00067)
-0.00005
(0.00006)
0.00004**
(0.00000)
0.09822**
(0.00368)
0.01529
(0.02943)
-0.07868**
(0.00236)
0.00233**
(0.00015)
0.00008**
(0.00000)
0.00010
(0.00009)
0.00024
(0.00063)
0.00077**
(0.00008)
-0.00273
(0.00160)
0.00001**
(0.00000)
0.00001**
(0.00000)
0.00000
(0.00000)
0.00000-
(0.00000)
0.00000
(0.00000)
-0.00731**
(0.00048)
( ): standard errors. ** : significant at 1 % level.
With respect to the cross-price effects, first, most input factors display 
substitutable relationship. Exceptionally, cost complementarities were observed between 
overheads and materials (-0.00004) and between overhead and labour (-0.00005) but not 
significant.
Generally, the magnitudes of the coefficients indicate small effects. It is 
noticeable that the substitutability between contracting and labour, and between 
contractor and materials were shown as rather high. In particular, an increase in the price 
o f materials significantly affects increase in the demand o f labour (0.00345) and in the 
demand o f contracting (0.02366). It implies that when the price o f material increases, the 
firm may substitute the use o f materials into labour and contracting. Similarly, an 
increase in the price of labour significantly affects the increase in the demand of 
materials (0.00448) and in the demand of contracting (0.00452). It implies that if the 
price o f labour increased, contracting and cost-efficient material would be substitutable
3 Materials Labour
MacDonald (1981) -0.380 -0.830
Stover (1986) -0.035 -0.028
Hutchinson (1990) -0.404 -0.717
Brox (1993) -0.064 -0.814
This study -0.045 -0.003
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for labour. Similarly, if the price of contracting increased, cost-effective material and 
labour would be substitutable for the contracting (0.09822, 0.01529 each). The 
substitution elasticities between the other factors were estimated as low.
Price elasticities of factor demand (rjiy )
Using equation (8), we calculated the price elasticities o f factor demand to output 
as shown in Table 6-7. The elasticities of each input factor were estimated as rather 
weak, but all statistically significant. It is outstanding that elasticities of overheads and 
equipment were shown as comparatively high. Price elasticities of materials, labour and 
overhead factors’ demand were positive (0.00316, 0.00858, 0.02555). On the other hand, 
those for contracting and equipment were found to be significantly less than one (- 
0.00333, -0.02807).
These results suggest that materials, labour and overheads are normal inputs in 
the housebuilding business. This means that as output expands, the demands for 
materials, labour and overheads expand by less than the proportional expansion of 
output. It is noteworthy that demands for contracting and equipment tend to decrease, as 
output expands.
Table 6-7 Output elasticity
Input factors Output elasticities
Materials 0.00316**
(0.00001)
Labour 0.00858*
(0.00261)
Contracting -0.00335**
(0.00061)
Overheads 0.02555** 
(0.006 17)
Equipment -0.02807**
(0.00136)
( ): standard errors.
** : significant at 1 % level, *: significant at 5 % level
This argument could be explained in terms o f the nature o f the input factors as 
pointed out by Lopez and Tung. This implies that materials, labour and overheads are 
normal factors (0< T]iy< 1) in the Korean housebuilding sector, and contracting and 
equipment are characterised as inferior inputs factors (^ < 0 ) . This result suggests the
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importance o f other factors in the Korean housebuilding sector. That is, any increase in 
output would be accomplished through expansion o f the use of other factors. We may 
think land and financial factors to be the superior factors which are not included in this 
analysis. If  the land factor was included in this analysis, it might be characterised as a 
superior input factor. However, it is just a hypothesis; additional analysis needs to be 
followed to prove this.
6.4.2 Productivities
Elasticity of Total Cost to Output (%, %)
As a productivity measure, the elasticity o f total cost to output (% ) was estimated 
as less than unity (0.00218). This means that as the output level increases, the total cost 
o f housebuilding does not increase as much as output (%<1). This indicates the presence 
o f economy o f scale in the housebuilding business. The elasticity o f total cost to output 
may show ‘increasing returns to scale’. It means that it is more profitable for 
housebuilding firms to carry out housebuilding projects on as large a scale as possible in 
this cost structure. Apartment housebuilding is a typical standardised house type and it is 
somehow possible to expect economy of scale in large-scale project.
Table 6-8 Elasticities of total cost and input factor cost to output
Elasticity o f 
total cost to
OUtpUt (Scv)
E asticities of sipecific factor efficiency (/r,v)
Materials Labours Contracting Overhead Equipment
0.00217**
(0.00007)
0.99684**
(0.00010)
0.99141**
(0.00260)
1.00334**
(0.00061)
0.97444**
(0.00617)
1.02807**
(0.01364)
( ): standard errors.
** : significant at 1 % level, *: significant at 5 % level
Table 6-8 also shows the specific factors’ price elasticities o f demand (% ). The 
elasticities mean change of i factor demand with respect to i factor price as total output 
grows4. When this measure is negative (niy <0 ), it means the factor becomes more 
responsive to price change. If  an input was a superior factor (ijiy >1 ) as shown in 
equation (8), then it still became more responsive to price change, that is, its factor
4 Bemdt, E.R. and Khaled, M.S. (1979), pp. 1241-1242.
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efficiency would be more negative. Whereas, if  an input was a normal or inferior factor 
(0< rjjy <1 or tjiy < 0 ) , then it still became less responsive to price changes for that factor, 
implying higher factor efficiency. All the estimates were significantly different from zero 
and not different from one significantly. This finding means that the prices o f specific 
input factors do not respond proportionately to output level and it means all the specific 
input factors show cost efficiency.
Elasticities o f Total Cost Diminution (Ea, 7Tu)
Table 6-9 reports another productivity measure; the elasticities of total cost diminution 
and specific factor cost diminution by equations (11) and (12). First o f all, the elasticity 
of total cost to time (ect) indicates the degree o f technical progress with respect to time. 
The decision base is zero (0). I f  elasticity is positive, it means there is cost diminution 
over time. The elasticity o f total cost diminution (sct) was shown as negative, but nearly 
zero (-0.00742). It actually means that there has been no cost diminution over time. It 
means there is no technical progress over time in the Korean housebuilding industry.
Table 6-9 Elasticities o f productivity
Elasticity o f total 
cost diminution ect
Elasticities o f specific factor cost diminution (%)
Materials Labours Contracting Overheads Equipment
-0.00742**
(0.00016)
0.00326**
(0.00056)
-0.02011**
(0.00516)
-0.01549**
(0.00088)
0.02097**
(0.00749)
- 0.02067** 
(0.00598)
( ): standard errors.
** : significant at 1 % level, *: significant at 5 % level
Table 6-9 also shows elasticities o f specific factor cost diminution (%). The 
decision base is also zero (0). All the elasticities were estimated as significant. It shows 
that materials cost and overheads cost have slightly decreased over time, whereas labour 
cost, contracting cost and construction equipment cost have slightly increased over time. 
This means that technical change in the Korean housebuilding sector has been 
progressed in material- and overhead-saving trends (0.00326, 0.02097) and labour- 
contracting- and equipment-using trends (-0.02011, -0.0154, -0.02097).
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6.5 Findings and Discussion
The cost analysis showed the Korean housebuilding firms’ behaviour in the 
regulated circumstances. It was very difficult to get adequate data especially ‘total 
building areas’ as an output variable. Alternatively, ‘total sales’ was used as an output 
variable. The estimation results may differ by type of data used in the analysis. Even 
though it is difficult to compare this result with others not only because there are few 
analyses but also because o f different set of data included, it is meaningful in a view that 
this was a first analysis to examine the cost structure of the Korean housebuilding project 
and to estimate various efficiency and productivity measures from that.
Despite the weakness o f data, the estimation model used in this analysis was 
found to be adequate. The fact that Allen’s own elasticities o f substitution (<$,) and own- 
price elasticities o f demand for inputs (&,-,) were all estimated to be negative indicates 
adequacy o f the model. The estimation results o f the model were statistically significant 
and the goodness o f fit (the associated standard errors and T values o f these estimates) 
were satisfactory. From the cost function, three sets o f elasticity and two sets of 
productivity measures in the Korean housebuilding sector were estimated.
These results gave important meaning to the understanding o f the Korean 
housebuilding business and the firms’ behaviour in the regulated circumstance. The main 
findings are summarised as follows. First, dependency on contracting has increased 
gradually and contracting cost consisted o f the highest proportion to total cost since 
1990. Second, substitution elasticities and price elasticities o f demand between input 
factors are very inelastic. The results are consistent with the findings in other countries; 
however, the extents o f the elasticities were observed to be smaller than those. Most 
input factors displayed a substitutive relationship. Substitution elasticities between 
contracting and labour, and between contracting and material were comparatively high. 
Therefore, the hypothesis that ‘contracting’ may appear substitutable for the other input 
factors was accepted. This means that when it is difficult to purchase some material and 
to find skilled labour on site, the firms tend to depend on contracting by ‘supply-fix- 
contract type’ or ‘labour-only contract type’. The result shows that the building firms are 
using contracting as a flexible alternative. The price elasticities o f demand were 
estimated as ‘price inelastic’.
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Third, it was examined that in the Korean housebuilding business, labour, 
materials and overheads were normal factors and contracting and plant were inferior 
factors. This means when output expands, the demands o f materials, labour and 
overheads expand by less than the proportional expansion o f output, but the demand for 
contracting and equipment decreases. It can be interpreted that among those input 
factors, materials, labour and overheads input are more important factors than 
contracting and equipment inputs. The result suggests the importance o f the other factors 
in housebuilding.
The fourth finding was low productivity in the Korean housebuilding sector. 
Inelasticity o f total cost diminution indicates the fact. The specific factor cost diminution 
showed that technical change in the Korean housebuilding sector has been progressed 
very slowly only in material-saving and overhead-saving trends, but not labour-, 
contracting-, and equipment-saving trends. It tells us technical change in the Korean 
housebuilding project has been slowly carried out mainly in material and overhead sides. 
This is supported by the results o f the interview survey that some large building firms 
produce some materials within the firms and make some effort to reduce material cost by 
‘networked purchasing with manufacturers’ and ‘centralised purchasing within business 
group level’. The above results can be considered by the circumstance that house price is 
regulated. In price regulation, firms do not invest in building equipment and building 
plant requiring large amounts of capital. Rather than that, firms control the cost of 
building by contracting alternative. They do not invest for R&D and innovative 
organisation. They tend to contract out the works requiring high technique and 
professional know-how. Technical change in the Korean housebuilding project has been 
slowly carried out only in material and overhead cost sides. This was supported by the 
productivity measure which was estimated as negative total cost diminution.
The fifth finding was that ‘increasing returns to scale’ were observed in the 
Korean housebuilding sector. It is an outstanding attribute that there is economy of scale 
in standardised apartment housebuilding. Normally Korean building firms have built 
high-rise apartment houses (about 15-25 floors) on a large scale (at average 300-400 
dwellings per project). This result tells us that even though Korean building firms could 
not expect high profit from land development (due to land development regulation), they 
might achieve some profit in large-scale standardised apartment building. This attribute 
may be the main force leading to mass production o f the standardised houses in 1980s. It
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must have been an important motive for a large number of firms to enter into the industry 
in the mid 1980s and a motive to develop the housebuilding industry quantitatively.
It was also observed that in the housebuilding projects, the proportions o f labour 
cost, contracting cost, and construction equipment cost increased as time went on. The 
results suggest that the Korean housebuilding business has become more labour- 
intensive and dependency on contracting and construction equipment has become higher. 
At this stage, it is necessary for building firms do their best to develop a more efficient 
contracting system and a more improved labour training system.
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Chapter 7 The Strategic Behaviour of Housebuilding Firms
Diversification is a pronounced trend in most o f the advanced economies and 
large conglomerates are also prominent in many developing economies. While the 
average level of diversification may have increased or decreased in recent decades, 
multi-product businesses still remain a dominant feature in the world-wide economy. The 
Korean housebuilding industry has grown rapidly since 1980 and large construction 
firms have emerged in the industry. Considering the nature of building firms, it is natural 
that the housebuilding firms show diversified production structure. However, it is an 
interesting fact that the firms which have short business experience in housebuilding and 
are not large enough to extend their business are diversified into various businesses. In 
this chapter, strategic behaviours o f Korean housebuilding firms are to be examined, 
focused on the diversification strategy. First, the areas in which Korean housebuilding 
firms have diversified, and the extent o f diversification, were investigated. The extent of 
vertical integration was also investigated as a diversification strategy. Second, the 
patterns of diversification were examined over the period between 1980 and 1995. 
Lastly, the relationship between the firms’ diversity and performance was investigated.
7.1 Diversification: a Strategy of the Firms
7.1.1 Diversification of the Housebuilding Firms
The housebuilding industry is classified in the construction industry by the 
Korean Standard Industry Classification (KSIC)1. However, the nature and process of the 
business is quite different from the contracting as reviewed in previous chapter 3. The 
housebuilding business requires various managerial functions from the planning stage, 
building stage, to the sales and marketing stage. Market, demander and distribution 
process of housebuilding are also quite different from those of the contracting business. 
Most of the construction firms are involved in the housebuilding business
1 This system is a numerical system developed by the government for classifying all types of economic activity within the Korean economy. This system is based on establishment classifications according to its primary activity.
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simultaneously, however, they regard the housebuilding business as an independent 
business.
According to interviews carried out in 1996, only one firm among 22 replied as 
they were concentrating their activities on housebuilding. Though the firm also had an 
interest in property management and contracting, its concentration on the core business 
of housebuilding was a deliberate decision. The other firms were involved in related and 
unrelated businesses such as property management, materials production, manufacture of 
pre-fabricated building materials, building equipment rental, building material 
merchandising, technical advice, hotel and leisure town management, broadcasting and 
so on. O f course, they have kept the largest part of their activities in the housebuilding 
business. Large firms among those interviewed were more diversified in unrelated 
business. Even a medium sized firm (Woolim) which started in the housebuilding 
business in 1992 showed diversified production structure. The firm was involved in the 
restaurant business and property management, beside the original housebuilding 
business. It started the other business one year later than the housebuilding business.
In the interview, the reasons for the building firms’ diversification into related or 
unrelated businesses were surveyed. The first reason was to increase profit and then grow 
further. The second reason was connected with improving the security o f the firm. Most 
o f the interviewees commented about ‘uncertainty’ found in the housebuilding business 
and ‘limited profit’. Uncertainty in the land acquisition stage and uncertainty in the 
permission process and in the contracting process was a pushing motive for 
diversification. The limited profit in housebuilding also made them search for new 
business areas to secure the firms’ financial situation. That is, they decided to operate 
other businesses simultaneously to compensate for loss or limited profit from the 
housebuilding business. The third reason was to reduce financial burden. Some managers 
mentioned that the housebuilding business was a typical cash-hungry business and 
financial difficulty is a main motive to diversify into ‘good-cash flow’ business. An 
interviewee commented that a quarter o f his firm’s profits came from interest on cash 
available during the contract period o f the construction business. The reason many 
housebuilding firms diversified into the contracting business may be due to this. The 
fourth reason was related with those to increase efficiency. One method o f achieving 
increased efficiency was by controlling the source of supply o f materials to avoid erratic 
or long delivery times, high prices or poor quality. Backward integration may be a form
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of this method. Seven firms out of the 24 firms interviewed were involved in building 
materials manufacturing such as cement, ready-mixed concrete, reinforcing steel, 
furniture etc. The last reason was a general desire for aggrandisement. Two interviewees 
replied that diversification was a trend in the Korean industry and they followed leading 
large firms’ diversification strategy.
Nearly all firms were seeking further opportunities for diversification. They 
wanted to find new business areas where they could utilise their know-how and where 
the business cycle was different from housebuilding cycles. Indeed the construction and 
housebuilding businesses suffer from fluctuations in demand. One way in which firms 
have created a more stable business situation is by securing the demand for a new 
product over several years by long-term contracts to purchase. Another way of 
overcoming the problem o f economic cycles is to spread their business around the world 
so that at least the ups and downs of national cycles do not necessarily coincide. 
However, if  they are not large enough, it is nearly impossible to create new demand for a 
new product and to invest new products, furthermore, to expand their market into 
international regions.
A recent study (KRJHS, 1996) supports this trend. They found on average 74.1 
percent o f housebuilding firms were operating other businesses besides housebuilding 
and 36.2 percent of them were operating a totally unrelated business. Large firms showed 
a higher involvement ratio in unrelated business than medium and small firms. From the 
survey, 51.8 percent of the sample firms had a specific future plan to diversify into 
unrelated business. They pointed out decrease of sales and profit in the housebuilding 
business as the main reason to diversify into the other business.
7.1.2 Conceptualisation of the Firms’ Diversity
One of the objectives in this chapter is to examine the extent and the patterns of 
diversification o f housebuilding firms. Here, a diversified firm is defined simply as a 
firm involved in more than two businesses at two-digit level according to KSIC code. A 
number of conceptual and empirical studies focused on the measurement of diversity. 
Commonly used product-count measures o f diversification are based on the Standard 
Industrial Classification (SIC) system. The argument in support of product-count 
measure has been drawn from the objectivity o f the measurement method. When a firm is
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involved in various SIC codes, any researcher could objectively compute a product-count 
measure o f diversification. Hence, measurement reliability for the product-count measure 
should be high. The product-count measures range from simple counts o f the number of 
SIC codes in which a firm participates, to weighted average measures that consider the 
importance o f each SIC involvement to the particular firm. On the other hand, the SIC 
system has some weakness. According to the criteria for classifying the industry, market 
or production process, relevant products could be classified in disparate categories and 
the distance between SIC numbers cannot be interpreted as a measure o f relation 
(Montgomery 1982).
Rumelt (1974) developed a pioneering approach to categorise the extent and type 
of diversification of firms that is based on the relatedness of products, markets and 
technologies. His categorical measure of diversification was developed in response to the 
weakness inherent in the SIC system. He examined the levels of economic performance 
associated with nine different categories of diversification that he had identified. 
According to his scheme, once a firm attains a diversity status, the firm becomes 
vertically integrated or related-diversified or unrelated-diversified. His scheme 
represented a significant conceptual leap over the traditional diversity measures based on 
product count that were widely used in industrial organisation economics. However, the 
lack o f objectivity has been frequently discussed as the disadvantage o f his approach. 
Varadarajan and Ramanujam (1987) pointed out that Rumelt’s measure was time- 
consuming, as it assembled data from numerous fragmentary sources like annual reports 
and other publications. Thus the measurement of diversification o f firms remains a 
controversial and unsettled area.
Ramanujam and Varadarajan (1989) excellently reviewed the measures of 
diversity. Figure 7-1 shows the variety of approaches used in a lot o f literatures. 
Basically, studies of diversification have focused on the extent, direction and mode of 
diversification. Studies rooted in the industrial organisation economics paradigm have 
generally been concerned mainly with the extent o f diversification and have used 
objective measures based on SIC counts to capture this aspect o f diversification. In many 
studies, diversification is treated as a continuous variable. On the other hand, particularly 
within the strategic management discipline, categorical variables are developed using 
somewhat arbitrary cut-off points. While some studies employed only two categories 
(Bettis 1981), other studies group firms into multiple categories. Some researchers
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(Jacquemin & Berry 1979) have used multiple continuous measures in an attempt to 
capture both the extent and direction o f diversification. Other studies start with multiple 
continuous measures but subsequently transform them into categorical measures in order 
to develop a parsimonious set of diversification categories, typically using the median or 
a point of discontinuity along their continuous measures as cut-off points. Studies by 
Palepu (1985) and Varadarajan (1986) illustrate these approaches.
Extent and Direction ModeAspect of diversification
Approach to Measurement
Level ofMeasurement Binary Multi Continuo Binary Multi Binary Three Continuous Categories Categories Categories
Objective Subjective Objective
B D G H
Approach Illustrative ExampleA Conglomerates vs. Non-Conglomerates (E.G. Beanie, 1980)B Broad and Narrow Spectrum (E.G. Varadanyan, 1986)C Herfindahl and Berry Indices (E.G. Jacquemin & Berry, 1979)D Product Diversity and Market Diversity (E. G. Ward, 1976) Diversifiers vs. Non-Diversifiers (E.G. Macdogall & Round, 1984)E Relatedness-Based Measures (E.G. Rumelt, 1974; Nathanson, 1985)F Internal vs. Acquisitive Diversifiers (Pins, 1977)G Internal Growth, Acquisitions-Based Growth, Mixed Mode (E.G. Lainont & Anderson, 1985)H Diversifying Acquisition Ratio (Pitts, 1978)
Figure 7-1 Approach to the measurement of firm diversity 
Source: Ramanujam and Varadarajan (1989) p. 538.
Strategic management studies o f diversification have generally followed 
Rumelt’s study (1974). In many studies, Rumelt’s classification was adopted after a 
subjective reclassification by the researchers to confirm the appropriateness or current 
validity o f Rumelt’s original classification. Montgomery (1982) demonstrated that use of 
either Rumelt’s approach or the traditional measures based on SIC codes produces 
similar classification. However, Nathanson (1985) casts some doubts on the managerial 
relevance o f Rumelt’s approach and challenged the adequacy and managerial usefulness 
of Rumelt’s classification scheme. Furthermore, he proposed a classification scheme of 
his own.
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Other variations o f the subjective approach to measure the diversity are also 
evident in studies of diversification. McDougall and Round (1984) created a binary 
scheme to classify firms as ‘d iversifies’ and ‘non-diversifiers’ using managers’ 
perceptions. Ward (1976) also relied on managerial perceptions, but used the notion o f 
‘difficulty o f entry’ and distinguished between ‘product diversity’ and ‘market diversity’.
7.2 Diversification Status of Korean Housebuilding Firms
To examine the diversification status o f Korean housebuilding firms, a survey 
was performed based on Korean Standard Industry Classification (KSIC) code. Even 
though the simple product-count measure has some weaknesses that cannot reflect the 
ratio o f the business, their simplicity and their immediate interpretability may be an 
advantage of the measure. Bianco (1995) explained the validity o f using the simple 
measures o f diversification as follows. The simple measure may be a poor measure when 
it is used for describing diversification across a wide range o f firms. However, when the 
measure is used for making finer distributions among groups o f diversified firms, it may 
give significant differences among indices.
From ‘The Annual Reports’ o f housebuilding firms published in Korea Stock 
Exchange, the areas in which the firms were diversified were examined. All businesses 
that the firms performed in each year were classified according to the KSIC code. 
Changes o f the extent and the pattern of diversification were also investigated. The 
survey period was between 1980 and 1995 and diversification status of the firms was 
investigated at four time points (1980, 1985, 1990, 1995).
The number of sample firms was 143 in total. The sample firms were divided into 
two groups in order to examine the differences between different type of firms. Type I 
firms are defined as those whose main business is construction and which also involved 
in the housebuilding business. Type II firms are those which started their business in 
housebuilding and their main business is also housebuilding.
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Table 7-1 The characteristics of type I firms and type II firms (1995)
Type I firms (79) Type II firms (64)
No. of employees 1,101 264
Business period (years) 28.56 13.55
Scale of total sales (million won) 388,727 121,284
Scale of capital (million won) 88,601 19,364
Designated firms 
Registered firms
64 (81.01%) 
15(18.99%)
24 (37.5%) 
40 (62.5%)
Table 7-1 shows the number and characteristics o f each type o f firm. There were 
some differences between types o f firms. Type I firms showed a larger scale in the 
number o f employees, total sales, and capital and a longer business period. About 80 
percent o f these were designated firms. On the other hand, type II firms appeared smaller 
in the number o f employees, total sales, and capital and they showed a shorter business 
period. Only 37.5 percent of type II firms were designated firms.
7.2.1 Business Areas of Building Firms
Table 7-2 shows the areas in which the building firms were involved at 2-digit 
and 4-digit levels. The firms were involved in a total o f 10 businesses at 2-digit level; 
besides the construction industry, forestry, mining, manufacturing, wholesale and retail 
trade, hotel and restaurant management, transport, financial intermediates, real estate, 
renting and management, and other social and personal service business.
The number o f businesses that the sample firms performed was a total o f 50 at 4- 
digit level. The forestry and logging industry (D l) includes ‘timber tracts conservation 
activities’ which plants trees and conserves forestry for producing timber and ‘logging 
activity’ from forestry. A total o f 7 firms were involved in the forestry and logging 
business. In the mining industry, ‘quarrying of crushed and broken stone, sand, gravel, 
and clay for construction materials’ was included. Manufacturing products which firms 
produced could be itemised into about 15 categories; from leather products like luggage, 
handbag to furniture (D3-D17). Among them, the firms which produce handbag, shoes, 
pulp and paperboard were those which started their business in manufacturing and they 
entered into the housebuilding area later. Among the products, paper and paper board 
(D7), refractory ceramic products (D9), structural non-refractoiy clay and ceramic
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Table 7-2 The number o f businesses in which housebuilding firms are involved (1995)
2-digitbusiness 4-digit business Total sample (143) Type I firms(79)Type II Firms(64)Forestry Forestry and logging (Dl) 7(4.9%) 4(5.1) 3(4.7)Mining Quarry of stone, sand and clay (D2) 1(0.7%) 1(1.3) 0Manu- Manufacturing of luggage, handbags and the like (D3) 2(1.4%) 0 2(3.1)Facturing Manufacturing of foot wear, shoe making (D4) 1(0.7%) 0 1(1.6)Sawmilling and planting of wood (D5) 6(4.2%) 4(5.1) 2(3.1)Pulp, paper and paperboard (D6) 1(0.7%) 1(1.3) 0Other articles of paper and paperboard (D7) 2(1.4%) 2(2.5) 0Refined petroleum products (D8) 6(4.2%) 5(6.3) 1(1.6)Refractory ceramic products (D9) 1(0.7%) 1(1.3) 0Structural non-refractory clay and ceramic products (DIO) 3(2.1%) 2(2.5) 1(1.6)Ceramic, lime and plaster (Dll) 12(8.4%) 7(8.9) 5(7.8)Articles of concrete, cement and plaster (D12) 35(24.5%) 23(29.1) 12(18.8)Non-metallic mineral products (D13) 35(24.5%) 27(34.8) 8(12.5)Basic iron and steel (D14) 15(10.5%) 13(16.4) 2(3.1)Steel rolling, drawing and extruding, steel pipe (D15) 1(0.7%) 0 1(1.6)Primary smelting and refining of non-ferrous metals (D16) 1(0.7%) 1(1.3) 0Furniture (D17) 1(0.7%) 1(1.3) 0Con­ Site preparation (D18) 49(34.3%) 27(34.2) 22(34.4)struction Building of complete construction (D19) 142(99.3%) 79(100) 65(98.4)Heavy construction (D20) 139(97.2%) 78(98.7) 61(95.3)Building construction related special structure (D21) 9(6.3%) 5(6.3) 4(6.3)Building installation (D22) 130(90.9%) 76(96.2) 54(84.4)Building completion (D23) 42(29.4%) 32(40.5) 10(15.6)Renting of construction or demolition equipment with operator (D24) 3(2.1%) 1(1.3) 2(3.1)Wholesale Wholesale of motor vehicles (D25) 3(2.1%) 2(2.5) 1(1.6)and Retail sale of motor vehicles (D26) 1(0.7%) 1(1.3) 0retail trade Maintenance and repairs of motor vehicles (D27) 12(8.4%) 10(12.7) 2(3.1)Sale of motor vehicle part and accessories (D28) 4(2.8%) 2(2.5) 2(3.1)Wholesale on a fee or contract base (D29) 1(0.7%) 1(1.3) 0Wholesale of textiles, clothing and footwear (D30) Wholesale of construction material hardware, 1(0.7%) 1(1.3) 0Plumbing and heating equipment and suppliers (D31) 23(16.1%) 14(17.7) 9(14.1)Foreign trade (D32) 31(21.7%) 21(26.6) 10(15.6)Supermarket (D33) 13(9.1%) 9(11.4) 4(6.3)Other non-specialised retail trade/department store (D34) 2(1.4%) 0 2(3.1)Hotel & Hotels (D35) 21(14.7%) 14(17.7) 7(10.9)Restaurant Restaurants (D36) 4(2.8%) 3(3.8) 1(1.6)Transport Passenger and freight transport by road (D37) 6(4.2%) 4(5.1) 2(3.1)Transport via pipeline (D38) 1(0.7%) 0 1(1.6)Storage and warehousing (D39) 8(5.6%) 4(5.1) 4(6.3)Financial Other credit granting (D40) 4(2.8%) 4(5.1) 0Institutes Financial intermediation investment company (D41) 3(2.1%) 0 3(4.7)Real estate Rental of real estate (D42) 101(70.6%) 52(65.8) 49(76.6)renting and Subdividing real estate (D43) 16(11.2%) 9(11.4) 7(11.9)business Real estate business as a fee or contract basis (D44) 40(28.0%) 26(32.9) 14(21.9)Renting of construction and civil engineering machinery & equipment (D45) Research and experimental development on natural science 36(25.2%) 28(35.4) 8(12.5)And engineering (D46) Architectural, engineering activities 2(1.4%) 1(1.3) 1(1.6)And related technical consultancy (D47) 32(22.4%) 23(29.1) 9(14.1)Personal supply service (D48) 1(0.7%) 1(1.3) 0Advertising (D49) 4(2.8%) 4(5.1) 0Other business Radio and television business activities (D50) 1(0.7%) 1(1.3) 0
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products (DIO), ceramic, lime and plaster (D ll) , articles o f concrete, cement and plaster 
(D12), non-metallic mineral product (D13), basic iron and steel (D14), and steel pipe 
(D15) may be used as construction materials. Type I firms were mainly involved in the 
manufacturing of construction materials and some of the type II firms also participated in 
the manufacturing o f cement and plaster, non-metallic mineral, steel and steel pipe.
The construction industry may be sub-divided into 7 sections. Site preparation 
activity (D18) includes the wrecking and demolition o f unnecessary building or structure 
on the construction site and excavation and land levelling etc. Building o f complete 
construction (D19) includes construction of residential building, office and commercial 
building and industrial buildings. The housebuilding business is included in this 
category. Heavy construction (D20) means construction of highways, streets, bridges, 
tunnels, railways, waterways, dams and water supply facilities, and street pavement 
works. Building construction related special structure (D21) includes pile driving and 
related construction foundation works, boring grouting, water well drilling works, 
scaffolding and frame works, steel frame works, steel reinforcing and reinforced concrete 
work. Building installation (D22) means plumbing, heating and related works, electrical 
work, water proofing, soundproofing and fire proofing works. Building completion 
(D23) such as painting, landscaping and related service activity and renting of 
construction or demolition equipment with operator (D24) are also classified in the 
construction industry. Most of the building firms, whether type I firms or type II firms, 
were involved in the building of complete construction (D19) and heavy construction 
(D20). About 30 percent of the building firms were involved in the site preparation 
activity (D18) and building completion works (D23).
Among the wholesale and retail trade, type I firms were mainly involved in 
wholesale and retail sale o f motor vehicles (D25, D26), maintenance and repair o f motor 
vehicles (D27), and sale of motor article parts and accessories (D28). Both types of firms 
were involved in wholesale o f construction material and equipment (D31), foreign trade 
(D32), supermarket operating (D33). It was noteworthy that type II firms were operating 
supermarkets (D33) and department stores (D34). It was outstanding that hotel and 
restaurant businesses (D35, D36) and financial institutes business (D40, D41) were also 
included in their business.
In the transport business, passenger and freight transport by road (D37), freight 
transport (D38), and storage and warehouse business (D39) were included. Most of the
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firms which were involved in the transport business are those which started their 
business in that industry and diversified into the housebuilding business in mid 1980s. In 
real estate renting and management, building firms showed a high involvement ratio in 
rental of real estate (D42), subdividing and sale o f real estate (D43), real estate business 
as a contract basis (D44), renting of construction and civil engineering machinery and 
equipment (D45), and construction-related technical consultancy (D47).
It is noteworthy that Korean housebuilding firms are involved in totally unrelated 
businesses such as forestry and logging, sales o f motor vehicles, hotel and restaurant 
business, broadcasting, and financial institutions. In the construction section, there is no 
big difference between these two types o f firms. Type I firms - having larger capital - 
were more involved in unrelated businesses such as manufacturing, wholesale and retail 
o f motor vehicles, hotel and restaurant business. Type I firms were also participating in 
labour supply (D48), advertising (D49) and broadcasting business (D50), even though 
the number of firms which participated in the business were small. It was outstanding 
that type II firms show a high ratio in transportation, financial institutions, and 
supermarkets and department stores.
7.2.2 Extent of the Diversification
So far, we have briefly reviewed the business areas in which the Korean 
housebuilding firms diversified. The extent o f diversification in the Korean 
housebuilding firms was considered. Considering availability o f data in this study, the 
extent o f diversification was measured by the number o f businesses and sales share of 
each business in which the firms were involved.
Number of businesses
Table 7-3 presents the average number o f business the sample firms were 
involved in at 2-digit and 4-digit level. 2-digit industry is a broader classification than 4- 
digit. A high number at 2-digit level means that the firms are more diversified into either 
unrelated business or less closely related business, whereas a high number at 4-digit level 
means that firms are more diversified into related business. In 1980, the average business 
number at 2-digit level was 2.58 and it increased into 4.75 in 1995 (about 1.8 times 
increase). The average business number at 4-digit level also increased more than two
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times (3 .16->7.18). It is noteworthy that the maximum number at 2-digit and 4-digit level 
were 11 and 20 in 1995. This means some building firms were involved in about 20 
businesses at the same time in 1995.
Table 7-3 Average number of business at 2-digit and 4-digit level
1980 1985 1990 1995
Number of 
sample firms
106 122 142 143
2-digit Mean 2.58 3.41 4.40 4.75
Sta. dev. 1.08 1.41 1.91 2.04
Max. 7.00 8.00 10.00 11.00
Min. 1.00 2.00 2.00 2.00
4-digit Mean 3.16 4.92 6.53 7.18
Sta. dev. 2.07 2.67 3.19 3.27
Max. 14.0 15.00 19.00 20.00
Min. 0.00 1.00 1.00 2.00
Figure 7-2 shows the increasing trend o f the number of businesses at 2-digit and 
4-digit level. Figure 7-3 shows the level o f increase in each period. The number of 
businesses involved shows a higher increase in 1980s than 1990s. At 4-digit level, firms 
showed the highest increase between 1980 and 1985. At 2-digit level, firms showed 
highest increase between 1985 and 1990. We may summarise that the extent of 
diversification of the Korean housebuilding industry has increased since 1980; however, 
the increase level has decreased since 1990.
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Figure 7-2 Average number of business Figure 7-3 Level o f increase in each period
Considering Figure 7-2 and Figure 7-3, we may think that the increase in the 
number o f businesses is higher at 4-digit level than at 2-digit level. However, if we 
considered the total business number at each digit level, we may find that the level o f 
increase at 2-digit level is higher than the one at 4-digit level.
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Figure 7-4 Average increasing level
Figure 7-4 shows the average increasing level in each period. At 2-digit level, 
0.83, 0.99 and 0.35 among 10 businesses increased in each period, whereas at 4-digit 
level, 1.76, 1.61 and 0.65 business among 50 businesses increased in each period. The 
figure 13 shows that the average increasing level at 2-digit level is higher than the one at 
4-digit level and it means the building firms were more diversified into unrelated or less 
closely related business areas.
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Figure 7-5 Level o f increase in the number Figure 7-6 Level o f increase in the number 
o f businesses at 2-digit level o f businesses at 4-digit level
Figure 7-5 and Figure 7-6 show the level o f  increase in the number o f businesses 
by types o f firms. At 2-digit level, two types of firms showed the highest increase during 
the period between 1985 and 1990 and since 1985 type II firms showed a higher increase 
than type I firms. At 4-digit level, type I firms showed the highest increase between 1980 
and 1990, whereas type II firms showed the highest increase between 1990 and 1995. It 
is also noteworthy that at both digit levels, the increase levels have decreased commonly 
since 1990, and after 1990 the increasing level o f type II firms was higher than that of 
type I firms.
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Table 7-4 shows the evidence of an increasing trend in the number of businesses 
from another view point. The proportion o f the firms performing less than 3 businesses 
outstandingly declined from 69.8 % in 1980 to 9.0 % in 1995. On the other hand, the 
proportion of firms performing more than 9 businesses increased from 0.9 % in 1980 to 
21 % in 1995. The proportion of firms which performed 6 to 9 businesses increased 
steadily from 4.7 % in 1980 to 30.1 % in 1995.
Table 7-4 Distribution o f number of businesses at 4-digit level
1980 1985 1990 1995
Sample firms 106 122 142 143
No. of 4-digit <= 3 
3< No. of 4-digit <= 6 
6< No. of 4-digit <=9 
9< No. of 4-digit <=12 
12< No. of 4-digit
74 (69.8 %) 
26 (24.5 %) 
5 ( 4.7 %)
0 ( 0 %) 
1 ( 0.9 %)
39 (32.0 %) 
57 (46.7 %) 
16 (13.1 %)
9 ( 7.4 %) 
1( 1.8%)
20 (14.1 %)
63 (44.3 %) 
37 (26.1 %) 
15 (10.6 %) 
7 ( 4.9 %)
13 ( 9.0% ) 
57 (39.9 %) 
43 (30.1 %) 
19 (13.3 %) 
11 (7.7 %)
Summarising the above, the extent o f diversification in the Korean housebuilding 
industry has increased since 1980 and the level o f increase has decreased. Generally type 
I firms showed a slightly higher increase than type II firms at 2-digit level. Type II firms 
showed the highest increase since 1985 at 4-digit level. Considering the above results 
and the fact the Korean housebuilding firms started to grow in the beginning o f the 
1980s, we found an important point that the Korean building firms have diversified from 
the beginning stage of growth. After the high growth period (1988-1992), the 
housebuilding business has been stagnant and the extent of diversification has also 
decreased. We may say that Korean housebuilding firms have been actively diversified 
through in high growth period, 1980s.
Sales Share of Business
We may examine the extent o f diversification by sales share o f each business. 
However, we had some limitations in raw data. We were not able to get separate sales 
share in each business at 2-digit level and 4-digit level. We could only distinguish firms’ 
total sales into three large sections; construction, housebuilding and other businesses.
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Table 7-5 shows the sales share and number o f different businesses in each o f the three 
sections.
The sales shares were different by type of firms. In the case o f type I firms, the 
shares o f the housebuilding business were about 25 % in average and have decreased 
since 1990 (-^20.74 %). The number o f housebuilding business is only one unit in 4- 
digit level. They were more involved in the construction business and the sales share was 
highest at about 60-70 %. The number of construction businesses was between 2.58 and 
2.97. In the case o f other businesses, the sales shares decreased (10.98->7.38 ), but the 
number of businesses increased from 2.53 in 1985 to 4.27 in 1995. It is noteworthy that 
numbers of other businesses were more than those of construction business.
Table 7-5 Sales share in each business
Type I firms Type II firms
Year 1985 1990 1995 1985 1990 1995
Housebuilding
business
Number 1 1 1 1 1 1
Sales share (%) 22.40 28.92 20.74 57.65 56.71 63.02
Construction
business
Number 2.58 2.97 2.77 2.56 2.41 2.39
Sales share (%) 66.69 61.67 71.87 33.67 34.24 26.83
Other business Number 2.53 4.94 4.27 1.82 2.84 2.75
Sales share (%) 10.90 8.40 7.38 9.02 9.06 10.15
Type II firms showed the highest sales share in the housebuilding business 
(between 57 % and 63 %). The numbers of construction business kept constant at about 
2.5. The sales shares o f the construction business were shown at about 30 %, but this 
share has decreased to 26.83 % since 1990. Contrary to type I firms, the sales shares of 
other businesses increased from 9.02 % to 10.15 % and the number o f businesses also 
increased (1.82->2.25). Here, we may divide the sales share in other businesses into 4 
groups as in Table 7-6.
Table 7-6 Sales distribution in other business by types of firms (unit: %)
Type I firms Type II firms
1985 1990 1995 1985 1990 1995
Average sales share 0.1090 0.0840 0.0738 0.0902 0.0906 0.1015
less than 5% 67.5 53.1 68.4 42.1 35.4 51.6
5 -less than 10% 10.0 15.6 10.1 17.5 31.7 10.9
10-less than 30% 15.0 28.1 13.9 33.3 28.1 23.4
more than 30 % 7.5 3.1 7.6 7.2 4.9 14.1
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In case of type I firms, the proportion of the firms having more than 30 % of sales 
share in other business was about 7.5 % in 1985. 28.1 percent o f firms showed 10-30 % 
sales shared in other business in 1990 and 7.6 % o f the firms showed more than 30 % 
sales share in other business in 1995. In the case of type II firms, about 40 % of the firms 
showed more than 10 % sales share in other businesses in 1985 and 14.1 % o f the firms 
showed more than 30 % sales share in other businesses in 1995. The proportion o f firms 
having more than 30 % sales share in other businesses was higher (14.1 %) in type II 
firms than in type I firms (7.6 %) in 1995.
Summarising the above, the housebuilding business is the most important 
business in both types o f firm, considering the unit sales share. Type I firms show an 
increasing trend in construction business but decreasing trend in housebuilding and other 
business, whereas type II firms showed increasing trends in housebuilding and other 
business but decreasing trend in the construction business. On average, the sales share in 
the other businesses were rather low at about 10 %, but the number of businesses 
increased every year. Type I firms showed smaller shares o f other business in each year, 
but larger numbers o f the businesses than those of type II firms. This means type I firms 
(those whose main business is construction) were involved in a large number o f other 
businesses but the sales shares were smaller than those of type II firms (those whose 
main business is housebuilding). Type II firms showed larger sales share and an 
increasing trend in unrelated business.
7.2.3 Vertical Integration
As we saw in a previous section, Korean housebuilding firms were commonly 
diversified into various industries. Among the businesses in which they were involved, 
manufacturing o f construction materials such as bricks, tiles, cement, ready mixed 
concrete, plaster, concrete roofing tiles, asphalt products and basic iron, and supply of 
land and building labours may be included in ‘backward integrated business’. Sales and 
rental o f residential and non-residential buildings, real estate, real estate appraisal and 
management, and advertising may be classified into ‘forward integrated business’. 
‘Backward vertical integration’ is justified by the need to overcome a failure o f existing 
suppliers to meet the firm’s demand at the time required, in the right quantity, at the right 
quality, and at a reasonable price.
141
It was very difficult to investigate the degree o f vertical integration of 
housebuilding firms. Even though they were producing building materials, all products 
were not consumed by their own firms. Therefore, we were not able to define the 
businesses exactly as ‘backward vertical integration’. Sometimes they consumed all 
materials within the firm, sometimes some o f them were sold by other consumers. With 
data used in this analysis, we were not able to distinguish the products’ usage between 
‘using within the firms’ and ‘selling out in market’.
According to H firm interviewed in 1996, the firms extended the business into 
production of building materials such as ready-mixed concrete, ascon, and aggregates. 
They usually consumed the materials as much as they needed within the firm and then 
sold the remaining materials in the market. At the beginning of material production, they 
consumed all the materials within the firm. As they produced more materials, they were 
able to sell them in the market or to the other firms. K firm (interviewed in June 1996) 
gave a different story in that they started their business in manufacturing o f building 
materials such as ascon, remicon and cortar. After 5 years, they expanded their 
businesses into a ‘housebuilding business’ and further diversified into the general 
construction business. They have still produced some .materials and they sell the 
materials in market as well.
As a forward integrated business, the building firms were involved in ‘sales and 
rental of buildings’ and ‘real estate management’. They sold the buildings they built by 
themselves and sometimes they had bought adequate buildings in market and resell or let 
to the other consumers. We cannot distinguish between selling, letting and managing o f 
‘the buildings built by them’ and ‘the buildings purchased from the market’. This is one 
of the limitations in this data. Each firm only provided the lists o f their business. We 
were only able to examine how many firms are participating in ‘the forward and 
backward integration areas’. Tables 7-7 shows the involvement ratios in the backward 
and forward integration business areas.
Manufacturing o f paper and paperboard (D7) includes producing wall paper and 
papers lacquered with bean oil. Refractory ceramic products (D9) mean refractory bricks 
and similar products. Structural non-refractory clay and ceramic products (DIO) includes 
ceramic bricks, clay roofing tiles and similar products. Articles o f concrete, cement and 
plaster (D12) includes non-refractory mortars, ready-mix concrete, plaster products, 
cellulose fibre-cement products, concrete roofing tiles, bricks and blocks, and auto
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Table 7-7 Involvement ratio of backward and forward integration business (1995)
Section Four-digit business Total sample 
(143)
Type I 
firms (77)
T ypell 
firms (64)
Backward
integration
Manufacturing of articles of paper and paperboard (D7) 
-wall paper and papers lacquered with bean oil
2 ( 1.4%) 2 ( 2.5) 0
Refractory ceramic products (D9) 1 ( 0.7%) 1 ( 1.3) 0
Structural non-refractory clay and ceramic products (DIO) 
-ceramic building materials such as bricks and similar 
products
-clay roofing tiles and related products 
-clay tiles and similar products
3 ( 2.1%) 2 ( 2.5) 1 ( 1-6)
Cement, lime and plaster (D11) 12 ( 8.4%) 7 ( 8.9) 5 ( 7.8)
Articles of concrete, cement and plaster (D12)
-non-refractory mortars
-ready-mix concrete
-plaster products
-cellulose fiber-cement products
-concrete roofing tiles, bricks and blocks
-auto claved light weight concrete products
35 (24.5%) 23 (29.1) 12 (18.8)
Non-metallic mineral product (D13)
-asbestos products 
-abrasive articles 
-asphalt products
-mineral wools and their similar products
35 (24.5%) 27 (34.8) 8 (12.5)
Basic iron and steel (D14) 15 (10.5%) 13 (16.4) 2(3 .1 )
Steel rolling, drawing and extruding steel pipe (D15) 
-hot & cold rolling, drawing and extruding steel pipe 
-steel wire, tubes and pipes of cast iron or cast steel 
-steel pipe and tube
1 ( 0.7%) 0 1 (1-6)
Site preparation (D18)
-wrecking and demolition works 
-excavation and land levelling
49 (34.3%) 27 (34.2) 22 (34.4)
Labour recruitment and provision of personnel (D48) 
-personal supply service
1 (0.7%) 1 (1-3) 0
Forward
integration
Storage and warehousing (D39)
-general warehousing 
-refrigerated warehousing 
-dangerous warehousing 
-farm products warehousing
8 (5.6%) 4 (5 .1 ) 4 (6 .3 )
Rental of real estate (D42)
-rental of residential and non-residential buildings
101 (70.6%) 52 (65.8) 49 (76.6)
Subdividing real estate(D43)
-sales of residential and non-residential building 
-land development and sales
16(11.2%) 9(11.4) 7(10.9)
Real estate business as a fee or contract basis(D44)
-real estate appraisal
-real estate managing
-real estate agency and brokerage
40 (28.0%) 26 (32.9) 14(21.9)
Advertising business(D49)
-advertising agency 
-advertising preparation 
-outdoor advertising
4 (2.8%) 4 (5.1) 0
claved light weight concrete products. Non-metallic mineral products (D13) include 
asbestos products, abrasive articles, asphalt products, mineral wools and their similar 
products. Manufacturing o f steel rolling, drawing and extruding steel pipe (D15) includes
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hot and cold rolling drawing and extruding steel pipe, steel wire, tubes and pipes of cast 
iron or cast steel, steel pipe and tubes.
Among the materials, building firms were producing mainly cement, plaster, 
ready-mixed-concrete, ascon, bricks and asphalt. They showed a high involvement ratio 
o f between 10 and 25 percent in products D12, D13, D14. Site preparation (D18) 
includes ‘wrecking and demolition works’ and ‘excavation and land levelling’. About 35 
percent o f sample firms participated in this business. Labour recruitment and provision 
o f personnel (D48) means supply o f building labourers. Among backward integration 
areas, type I firms show higher involvement ratios than type II firms.
In the forward integration area, five businesses were included. Storage and 
warehousing (D39) includes general warehousing, refrigerated warehousing, dangerous 
warehousing, farm products warehousing. Most firms were involved in ‘the general 
warehousing’ built by themselves. Rental of real estate (D42) means rental o f residential 
and non-residential buildings. Real estate business (D44) means real estate agency and 
brokerage, real estate appraisal, and real estate management. They usually let buildings 
they built themselves, however, the other buildings were also included. In the case of 
subdividing real estate (D43), only the buildings they built themselves were included. 
About 70 percent o f the firms were involved in rental of real estate (D42) and 28 percent 
o f the firms were involved in real estate business (as a fee or contract base, D44). Only
11.2 percent o f the firms were involved in the sales o f their own building (D43). In the 
case of storage and warehousing (D39) and advertising business (D49), the ratios were 
rather low at 5.6 % and 2.8 % each.
Table 7-8 shows the change of the involvement ratios in backward and forward 
integrated areas. Building firms started to produce some materials such as concrete, 
cement, plaster, non-metalic mineral product, and steel since 1980. The involvement 
ratio shows a gradual increase between 1980 and 1990 and since 1990 there has been no 
big increase. The ratios in forward integrated areas showed a continuous increase by 
1995.
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Table 7-8 Change o f the involvement ratios in backward and forward integration
Section Four-digit industries 1980
(106)
1985
(122)
1990
(142)
1995
(143)
Backward
Integration
-manufacturing of articles of paper and 
paperboard(D7)
0 1(0.8) 1(0.7) 2(1.4)
-refractory ceramic products (D9) 
-structural non-refractory clay and
0 1(0.8) 1(0.7) 1(0.7)
ceramic products(D10) 1(0.9) 2(1.6) 3(2.1) 3(2.1)
-ceramic, lime and plaster (D ll)  
-articles of concrete, cement and
3(2.8) 9(7.4) 12(8.4) 12(8.4)
plaster(D12) 10(9.4) 21(17.2) 33(23.1) 35(24.5)
-non-metallic mineral product (D13) 6(5.7) 18(14.8) 29(20.3) 35(24.5)
-basic iron and steel (D14)
-steel rolling, drawing and extruding,
4(3.8) 8(6.6) 14(9.8) 15(10.5)
steel pipe (D15) 0 0 0 1(0.7)
-site preparation (D18) 13(12.3) 32(25.4) 43(30.1) 49(34.3)
-personnel supply service(D48) 0 0 0 1(0.7)
Forward -rental of real estate(D42) 10(9.4) 49(40.2) 95(66.4) 101(70.6)
Integration -subdividing real estate(D43) 
-real estate business as a fee or
1(0.9) 9(7.4) 15(10.5) 16(11.2)
contract basis(D44) 5(4.7) 14(11.5) 37(25.9) 40(28.0)
-storage and warehousing(D39) 2(1.9) 2(1.6) 8(5.6) 8(5.6)
-advertising business(D49) 1(0.9) 2(1.6) 3(2.1) 4(2.8)
The extent o f involvement in the vertically integrated business areas was 
examined. Table 7-9 shows the average number of vertical integration businesses which 
the firms were operating in 1995. On average, they were involved in 2.64 businesses in 
the vertically integrated areas; 1.56 in the forward integration areas, 1.77 in the backward 
integration areas. It is noteworthy that some o f the firms were operating 9 businesses in 
the vertical integration areas.
Table 7-9 Average number of ventical integration business
No. of vertical 
integrated business
No. of forward integrated 
business
No. of backward 
integrated business
Means 2.64 1.56 1.77
Std.Dev. 1.54 0.63 0.97
Max. 9.00 4.00 6.00
Min. 1.00 1.00 1.00
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Table 7-10 shows trends of the number in the integration business areas. The 
extent o f increase in the forward integration areas is very low at between 0.06 and 0.09 
and it shows a decrease after 1990. The extent o f the increase in the backward integration 
areas is rather high in 1985, but it shows a very low increase after then. This implies that 
most of entry into forward and backward integration areas was started before 1980 and 
since then, the increase has decreased.
Table 7-10 Trends of involvement in each integration business
1980 1985 1990 1995
Vertical Integration 1.75 2.17(+0.42) 2.64(+0.47) 2.64( 0 )
Forward Integration 1.46 1.52(+0.06) 1.61(+0.09) 1.56(-0.05 )
Backward Integration 1.54 1.72(+0.18) 1.74(+0.02) 1.77(+0.03)
( ): increase
Vertical integration can be included in the related diversification in a broad 
concept. According to Williamson, vertical integration is more likely when there is a 
high degree o f uncertainty in the firm’s environment and when transactions recur 
frequently so that transaction costs would be high. Here, a question may be asked; why 
do the building firms pursue vertically integration businesses, whereas others pursue 
other unrelated businesses ?
Table 7-11 The extent o f diversification by A and B type o f firms
1980 1985 1990 1995
Type o f firms A B A B A B A B
No. o f Vertical integration 1.75 0 2.17 0 2.64 0 2.64 0
No. o f  Related businesses 3.00 2.11 3.74 2.60 3.62 3.12 3.66 3.19
No. o f  Unrelated businesses 0.18 0.28 0.63 0.16 1.31 0.41 1.43 0.71
A firms: the firms involved in vertical integration business
B firms: the firms not involved in vertical integration business
Table 7-11 shows interesting results. The numbers mean the average numbers of 
related and unrelated business which they were operating at 4-digit level. A firms 
indicate those involved in vertical integration areas and B firms are those not involved in 
the areas. This table was made to examine whether there are differences in the extent of 
diversification between A firms and B firms. A firms show consistently higher numbers 
not only in related business but also in unrelated business areas, than B type firms. Table 
43 indicates that the firms involved in vertical integration shows a consistently higher 
extent of both related and unrelated diversification.
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7.3 Diversification Pattern
7.3.1 Measuring Diversity
To investigate the diversification pattern o f building firms, we need to measure 
the firms’ diversity first. Here, Varadarajan and Ramanujam’s basic scheme was 
adopted. This scheme treats broad spectrum diversity (BSD) and narrow spectrum 
diversity (NSD) as the two dimensions o f a four-cell matrix. The narrow spectrum 
diversification (NSD) is defined as expansion outside o f 4-digit KSIC industry but within 
2-digit KSIC industry. The broad spectrum diversity (BSD) refers to expansion into a 
different 2-digit KSIC industry. Broad spectrum diversity is the number o f 2-digit SIC 
categories in which a firm concurrently operates. Narrow spectrum diversity is the 
number o f 4-digit categories in which a firm concurrently operates. As a firm may be 
active in many or few 4-digit levels for a given 2-digit category, they modified the NSD 
measure, designating the average number o f 4-digit SIC codes per 2-digit SIC code in 
which a firm is active. Mean narrow spectrum diversity is the number o f 4-digit SIC 
categories in which a firm operates divided by the number o f 2-digit SIC categories in 
which it operates.
Broad
Low Cell A:
Finns with very low 
diversity
Cell B:
Related
Diversified Firms
spectrum High Cell C: Cell D:
diversity Unrelated- Firms with
(BSD) Diversified Firms very high diversity
Low High
Mean narrow spectrum diversity (MNSD)
Figure 7-7 Two dimensional conceptualisation of diversification in firms 
Source: Varadarajan and Ramanujam (1987) p. 383.
Figure 7-7 shows the resulting four-cell matrix, in which each cell represents the 
totality o f a firm’s past diversification activities in various 2-and 4-digit SIC categories. 
This measure distinguished between two distinctive patterns o f diversification-narrow 
spectrum diversification (NSD) and broad spectrum diversity (BSD). Many studies 
generally consider narrow spectrum diversification-within 2-digit industries-as 
‘diversification into areas closely related to a firm’s primary activities’. On the other 
hand, they view broad spectrum diversification-across 2-digit industries-as
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‘diversification into areas either unrelated to or less closely related to a firm’s primary 
activities’ (e.g. Jacquemin and Berry, 1979; Palepu, 1985; Wood, 1971). This 
conceptualisation also provides the inner logic of the SIC coding scheme itself. Although 
both firms concurrently operate in an equal number o f 4-digit SIC categories, one firm 
can be viewed as being diversified into closely related areas, another firm as diversified 
into unrelated or less related areas.
Varadarajan and Ramanujam (1987) explained that the proposed categorisation 
schemes have similarities to other extant conceptualisation o f diversity. Firms in cell A 
have their counterparts in Rumelt’s (1974) scheme as ‘either single or dominant business 
firms’. Cell B firms, which display a high degree o f mean narrow spectrum diversity but 
a low level o f broad spectrum diversity, are most likely to correspond to Rumelt’s 
‘related diversified firms’. Cell C firms, which are broadly diversified at the two-digit 
level but reveal a low degree of diversification in any particular two-digit industry, have 
their counterparts in Rumelt’s ‘unrelated diversification category’. Cell D firms lack a 
strict correspondence in Rumelt’s typology and are best viewed as highly diversified 
firms that are neither predominantly related diversified nor predominantly unrelated 
diversified. An advantage o f this proposed matrix is that it does not require data on 
revenues or sales o f business segments, but still provides insights into both the degree of 
diversification (high/low), and its direction (predominantly related/predominantly 
unrelated).
7.3.2 Diversification Pattern
Using the four-cell matrix measure, firms’ diversity was examined. The firms 
classified in cell A mean those with very low diversity. Cell B firms are those related 
diversified firms and cell C firms are unrelated diversified firms and cell D firms are 
those with very high diversity. Table 7-12 shows the diversification pattern o f Korean 
housebuilding firms by this categorical measure. As cut-off points to divide each 
dimension, mean values of BSD (means=4.75 s.d.=2.04) and MNSD (means=1.53 
s.d.=0.31) were used. In 1995 the largest proportion o f sample firms (about 32 %) was 
included in Cell A- very low diversified firms. The second largest group was the 
unrelated diversified firms as 28 % of total sample firms. The related diversified firms 
were about 22 % and 18 % of total firms are included in the very high diversified firms 
category.
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Table 7-12 Diversification Patterns in 1995
Cell A:
Firms with very 
low diversity
Cell B:
Related
Diversified firms
Cell C: 
Unrelated 
diversified firms
Cell D:
Firms with very 
high diversity
Number 
o f firms
low M NSD-low  
BSD
high M NSD  
-low BSD
low MNSD  
-high BSD
high MNSD  
-high BSD
Total 45 32 40 26 143
firms (%) (31.5) (22.4) (28.0) (18.2)
type I 19 16 22 22 79
firms (%) (24.1) (20.3) (22.9) (27.9)
type II 26 16 18 4 64
firms (%) (40.6) (25.0) (28.1) (6.3)
Table 7-12 also shows the differences in the diversification pattern between two 
types o f firms. Among type I firms, cell D firms showed the highest proportion. The 
proportion of cell A firms with very low diversity was second highest (24 % o f the total 
sample). Distribution among four cells was rather equal. Among type II firms, cell A 
firms showed the highest proportion (40.6 %) and cell D firms showed the lowest 
proportion (6.3 %). There was no big difference in the proportion of cell B firms and cell 
C firms.
Change o f Diversification Pattern
Table 7-13 and Figure 7-8 shows changes o f diversification pattern since 1980. 
In 1980 most o f the firms (82.1%) were included in cell A-firms with very low diversity, 
single business firms. However, the proportion decreased steadily. Related diversified 
firms (cell B) increased greatly between 1980 and 1985 and the increasing level has 
decreased since 1985. Unrelated diversified firms (cell C) have outstandingly increased 
since 1985 and have continued to increase. Firms with very high diversity (cell D) also 
show a steady increase since 1980.
Table 7-13 Changes o f diversification patterns in the Korean housebuilding firms
Cell A:
Firms with very 
Low diversity
Cell B:
Related
diversified Firms
Cell C: 
Unrelated 
diversified firms
Cell D:
Firms with very 
high diversity
Total
population
firms
1980 87 12 5 2 106
No.(%) (82.1) (113 ) (4.7) (1 9 )
1985 48 28 7 14 96
No.(%) (49.5) (28.9) (7.2) (14.4)
1990 37 25 28 24 114
No.(%) (32.5) (21.9) (24.6) (21.1)
1995 45 32 40 26 143
No.(%) (31.5) (22.4) (28.0) (18.2)
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Figure 7-8 Changes o f diversification pattern in the Korean housebuilding firms
There is no big difference in the changing pattern between type I firms and type II 
firms. In type I firms, cell B firms (related diversified firms) highly increased between 
1980 and 1985 (11.11 %  - *  35 %). Siice 1985, cell C firms (unrelated diversified firms) 
have increased (7.5 % -> 21,88 %, 27.85 %). Cell D firms outstandingly increased 
between 1985 and 1990 (-+ 43.75%) md after then the level of increase has decreased to 
27.85 % .  In 1995, the proportions of each cell kept a rather equal level.
2.47
1980 1985 19)0 1995
Figure 7-9 Change of diversification oattern in Type I Firms
To examine the differences in firms’ s:ale, the type I firms were divided into two groups; 
large firms and small firms. Among type I firms, large firms showed higher diversity 
than small firms; however, the patterns are similar as shown in Figure 7-10 and Figure 7- 
11 .
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Figure 7-10 Type I firms (large)
Figure 7-11 Type I firms (small)
We may summarise changing patterns in case o f type I firms as follows; first, 
single business and related diversification were prevalent till 1985. Second, since 1985, 
diversification into unrelated business area has increased. Third, large firms show higher 
diversity than small firms, however, their patterns were similar. Fourth, large firms and 
small firms show the highest diversity in 1990 and the extent decreased in 1995.
Figure 7-12 shows the case o f type II firms. In type II firms, the proportions of 
cell A firms was always highest in each year. Since 1980, cell B firms (related diversified 
firms) remained at a level o f about 25%. Since 1985, cell C firms (unrelated diversified 
firms) have outstandingly increased (7 %  -*■ 25%, 28%). The proportion o f cell D firms 
was rather low (6- 14%), compared to those of type I firms (in Figure 8).
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Figure 7-12 Change of diversification pattern in Type II Firms
It is noteworthy that type II firms showed a quite different pattern between large 
and small firms (Figure 7-13 and Figure 7-14). In the case of large firms, cell B, cell C 
and cell D firms increased at the same time since 1980 and the diversity is highest in 
1995. The diversity in 1995 was higher than those o f large type I firms.
Figure 7-13 Type II firms (large)
Figure 7-14 shows the case of small firms. Among type II firms, the small firms 
showed a steady increase in related business first and unrelated business since 1990. Cell 
A firms still showed the highest proportion in each year, whereas cell D firms showed 
the smallest portion.
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1980 1985 1990 1995
Figure 7-14. Type II firms (small)
Summarising the above result, most of the Korean housebuilding firms were 
diversified both into related and unrelated businesses. The extent and the pattern of 
diversification were found to be different between different types of firms and different 
sizes o f firms. In the case of type I firms, cell D firms were still highest and the other 
firms were keeping a rather equal ratio. Whereas in the case o f type II firms, the 
proportion o f cell A firms was still the highest and that o f cell D firms was the lowest. 
Among type I firms, large firms showed a higher diversity than small firms but their 
patterns of diversification were similar. Both of them show higher diversity in 1990 and 
the extent of diversity decreased in 1995. However, in the case of type II firms, there 
were some differences in the diversification pattern between two sizes o f  firms. The large 
firms showed a sudden increase of diversity since 1980 and they showed highest 
diversity in 1995. The extent was higher than that of large firms in type I firms, whereas, 
small firms showed still the lowest diversity.
7.4 Relationship between the Firms’ Diversity and Performance
In this section, the relationship between the firms’ diversity and performance 
were investigated. Five ratio measures were examined to consider the Korean 
housebuilding firms’ performance; measures o f business scale, measures of profitability, 
measures o f turnover, measures o f stability or liquidity, measures o f growth. As the 
diversity measure, the four-cell matrix measure described in the previous section was 
used. A continuous dependent variable (performance variables) was measured by the 
categorical variables (four-cell diversity firms). ANOVA was used to explain the
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relationship between diversity and performance. As the data in each cell are unbalanced, 
that is, the number o f samples in each cell is different, General Linear Model (GLM) was 
used for analysis o f variance (ANOVA). The results inform us whether there are any 
differences in performance among different diversity-groups. The sample firms were the 
same as those used in the previous section. However, we could not get the firms’ 
financial data in 1980 and therefore, the relationship was analysed only at three time 
points (1985, 1990,1995).
7.4.1 Measures of Business Scale
As measures o f business scale, total capital, equity capital and total sales and net 
profit were considered. The scale and trends were shown in Table 7-14 and Figure 7-15. 
Among the measures, total capital, equity capital and total sales have showed a steady 
increase since 1985. The average increase rates per year were between 9.5 and 13.1 % .
Table 7-14 Business Scale of Housebuilding Firms
(Unit: hundred million won)
1985 1990 1995 Average 
Increase Rate
Total capital 1,264 2,018 3,941 12.0%
Equity capital 168 293 576 13.1%
Total sales 1,083 1,329 2,690 9.5%
5000
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Figure 7-15 Trends of business scale
Table 7-15 shows a positive relationship between the firms’ business scale and 
diversity. Cell D firms (firms with very high diversity) showed higher performance than 
cell A firms, cell B firms, and cell C firms. Moreover, the differences were statistically 
significant in 0.05 level. The cells having the same letter means their mean values were 
significantly the same. For example, in the case o f the total capital in 1995, cell D firms’
H total capital 
■  equity capital 
□  total sales
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total capital was not significantly different from that o f cell C firms, but significantly 
different from those o f cell B and cell A firms. Cell A firms’ total capital in 1990 was not 
significantly different from cell B firms, but significantly different from cell C and cell D 
firms.
Table 7-15 Two-way ANOVA results between business scale
anc diversification categories (Urnit: hundred million won)
Cell A Cell B Cell C Cell D
Total capital 1985 472 c,b 1076 c,b 3263 b,a 3354 a
1990 611 c 1508 c,b 2610 b,a 3933 a
1995 1195 c 2480 b 5669 b,a 7833 a
Equity capital 1985 64 b 98 b 473 a 515 a
1990 116 b 122 b 204 b 846 a
1995 110 b 276 b 674 b 1599 a
Total sales 1985 407 c 852 c,b 3719 a 2442 b,a
1990 501 b 1104 a,b 1685 b,a 2390 a
1995 814 b 1569 b 4129 a 5106 a
* Same letters denote significantly indifferent pairs of group means.
7.4.2 Measures of Profitability
Profitability means the return of value over the value put into a business 
endeavour. Profitability can be considered as an ultimate measure o f business efficiency. 
Profitability can be considered as return on sales, return on assets, or return to the 
shareholders. When profitability is considered as a return to investors, after-tax results 
are often the most significant (Fisher 1983, p.43). However, for operational purposes, it 
is sometimes calculated before taxation. Here, as the aim is to analyse business 
efficiency, ‘before tax profit’ was used. As the profit, we considered both ‘net income 
before tax’ and ‘ordinary profit’.
As the profitability ratios which relate profit to sales, ‘ordinary profit to total 
sales’ ‘net profit to total sales’ are commonly considered. The relationship of profit to 
sales volume aids the appraisal o f the efficiency of the operations. However, the pricing 
and volume fluctuations tend to limit the reliability o f the measures. Therefore, we also 
consider a more crucial test o f business efficiency, namely, profits to capital as a return 
on investment. As the profitability measure on capital, ‘net profit to total asset’, ‘net 
profit to equity capital’, ‘ordinary profit to total asset’ and ‘ordinary profit to equity 
capital’ were used. Therefore, we considered seven measures o f profitability as shown in 
Table 7-16 and the calculation methods were shown in Appendix 6 .
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Table 7-16 Profitability ratio
1985 1990 1995
Net profit to total asset -0.03 -0.00 0.91
Ordinary profit to total asset 0.02 0.03 0.02
Net profit to equity capital 0.03 0.16 6.27
Ordinary profit to equity capital 0.25 0.55 -0.14
Net profit to total sales -0.03 -0.05 1.23
Ordinary profit to total sales 0.01 0.05 0.01
Interest cost to sales 0.38 0.25 0.14
Table 7-16 shows the trends of profitability in each year. When extra cost is 
deducted from and extra profit is added to ordinary profit, net profit before taxation can 
be derived. Generally, financial cost consists o f large part o f extra cost in the 
housebuilding firms. Therefore, when considering profitability using ‘net profit’, the 
profitability is revealed as smaller than using the ‘ordinary profit’. Table 7-17 shows the 
situation. The ‘ordinary profit to total asset’, ‘ordinary profit to equity capital’, and 
‘ordinary profit to total sales’ were shown as higher than ‘net profit to total asset’, ‘net 
profit to equity capital’, and ‘net profit to total sales’ in 1985 and 1990. A contrary 
pattern was revealed in 1995. That is, the ‘net profit to total asset’, ‘net profit to equity 
capital’, ‘net profit to total sales’ were shown as higher than ‘ordinary profit to total 
asset’, ‘ordinary profit to equity capital’, and ‘ordinary profit to total sales’.
Table 7-17 Two-way ANOVA results between profitability 
__________ and diversification categories________________
Cell A Cell B Cell C Cell D
Net profit to total 
asset
1985 -0.002 -0.020 -0.013 -0.140
1990 -0.003 0.023 0.001 0.018
1995 2.896 -0.007 0.010 0.008
Ordinary profit to 
total asset
1985 0.095 -0.042 0.097 - 0.111
1990 0.088 -0.004 0.006 0.019
1995 0.029 0.001 0.019 0.013
Net profit to equity 
capital
1985 0.147 -0.043 0.223 -0.283
1990 -0.509 0.065 1.198 0.088
1995 20.49 -0.96 0.12 0.04
Ordinary profit to 
equity capital
1985 0.480 -0.032 0.767 -0.212
1990 0.033 0.161 1.229 0.091
1995 -0.014 -0.887 0.167 0.065
Net profit to total 
sales
1985 -0.015 -0.027 -0.042 -0.049
1990 -0.146 -0.005 -0.014 0.021
1995 3.926 -0.019 0.005 0.009
Ordinary profit to 
total sales
1985 0.045 -0.028 -0.010 -0.035
1990 0.145 0.023 -0.009 0.019
1995 0.014 -0.006 0.010 0.014
Interest cost to sales 1985 0.676 0.162 0.070 0.087
1990 0.578 0.125 0.095 0.059
1995 0.171 0.117 0.159 0.080
156
As seen in Table 7-17, we cannot find any relationship between firms’ profitability and 
diversity. The seven measures indicating firms’ profitability all showed inconsistency in 
each year and no significant relationship between profitability and diversity.
7.4.3 Measures of Asset Utilisation
Asset utilisation ratios are indicators of the ability to manage assets o f the firm 
effectively. They are designed to show the relationship between an income statement 
category (usually net sales) and a balance sheet category. ‘Turnover to total asset’ is a 
measure o f total asset utilisation. It provides information on the effectiveness o f the use 
of the firm’s total asset in generating sales. ‘Turnover to capital’ also means the 
effectiveness o f the use o f the firm’s capital in generating sales. ‘Turnover to working 
capital’ measures how effectively current resources are being used in the operating 
activities o f a firm; that is, how well the firm is generating net sales. A low ratio is 
indicative o f under-utilised working capital. ‘Turnover to fixed assets’ is a ratio 
measuring the ability to manage a firm’s long term asset.
Table 7-18 Asset utilisation ratio
1985 1990 1995
Turnover to total asset 1.27 0.89 0.76
Turnover to capital 6.20 4.77 4.92
Turnover to net working capital 6.88 7.81 8.55
Turnover to fixed asset 26.28 22.90 37.42
Table 7-18 shows the asset utilisation ratios in each year. Generally, if the ratio is 
below one (1), it says assets are not being used efficiently. The values o f turnover to total 
asset were shown as being below one in 1990 and 1995. All the other values showed 
were above one and the values o f turnover to fixed asset showed an especially high ratio. 
This means that most o f the assets are used efficiently and the firms’ long term assets are 
utilised most efficiently. With the exception of turnover to net working capital, the other 
asset utilisation measures decreased in 1990 but increased again in 1995. Generally all 
measures showed an increasing trend.
As Table 7-19 shows, even though there were some exceptions, utilisation ratios 
showed negative relationship with firms’ diversity. That is, high-diversity firms had a 
low utilisation ratio, whereas low-diversity firms showed higher utilisation ratios. The
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turnover to total asset, turnover to capital in 1990 and turnover to networking capital in 
1995 showed significant differences among different diversity groups.
Table 7-19 Two-way ANOVA results between asset utilisation 
________ and diversification categories ___________  (unit: turnover)
Cell A Cell B Cell C cell D
Turnover to total 
asset
1985 1.469 1.211 0.810 0.979
1990 1.174a 0.792 b 0.783b 0.726 b
1995 0.822 0.789 0.703 0.693
Turnover to capital 1985 7.012 5.922 4.204 5.188
1990 5.769 a 4.101b,c 5.142 a,b 3.530 c
1995 6.238 4.225 4.728 3.790
Turnover to net 
working capital
1985 8.39 5.54 49.84 -13.38
1990 14.85 4.35 5.34 3.72
1995 5.863 a,b 21.028 a 5.130 a,b 3.124 b
Turnover to fixed 
asset
1985 37.61 20.26 6.30 12.90
1990 29.52 25.61 17.10 16.89
1995 58.84 40.24 23.99 17.57
* Same letters denote significantly indifferent pairs of group means.
7.4.4 Measures of Financial Structure
Financial structure measures show the strength o f the firm from the investment. 
There are several ratios to express the relationship between all borrowed funds and 
ownership fund. ‘Net worth to total asset ratio’ means that the proportion not financed 
from equity must come from elsewhere and it must be loan capital. The higher this ratio, 
the larger the amount o f asset being provided by the owner. Debt ratio measures 
creditors’ claims against total assets relative to total claims. It serves as an indicator of 
the unsecured creditors’ margin o f safety in the event of a business downturn or 
liquidation. The higher the ratio, the greater the risk to creditors. ‘Current ratio’ is a 
commonly used indicator o f short-term solvency. It reflects the ability to cover current 
liabilities out o f current assets. The adequacy o f this ratio depends on the type of 
business, the quality and distribution o f the current assets, and the time of year. 2 0 0  % 
may be inadequate in one industry. This is because if a significant portion o f accounts 
receivable is uncollectable or inventories are obsolete, a high current ratio may be 
misleading. A low value indicates a low level o f financial risk and a great degree of 
flexibility in financial decisions. A high ratio indicates exactly the opposite.
‘Fixed ratio’ measures the relative degree to which owners have invested their 
equity in fixed assets (construction plant and equipment). The higher this ratio, the more 
vulnerable are creditors in the event of a firm liquidation. The lower the ratio, the better
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the cushion if such an event should occur. ‘Fixed assets to long-term capital ratio’ is a 
measure showing the relationship between long-term capital (equity capital + fixed 
liability) and fixed asset. The lower this ratio, the better the arrangement of firms’ 
capital. The standard ratio as a normal decision basis is less than 100 %. I f  this ratio is 
more than 100 %, it means that the investment on fixed assets may be carried out not 
only by long-term capital but also by current liabilities, that is, short-term debts. It means 
that the lack of the firm’s operating capital may make the affordability o f the firm 
deteriorate. Appendix 5 shows the calculated method o f each ratio.
Table 7-20 Financial structure measures
1985 1990 1995
Net worth to total asset ratio 22.10 48.45 12.01
Debt ratio 77.91 81.55 88.00
Current ratio 133.65 140.38 122.91
Fixed ratio 68.60 119.91 123.47
Fixed assets to long term capital ratio 37.40 32.06 -1.74
Table 7-20 shows the value and trend o f financial structure measures. This table 
shows that the financial structure is generally not in a good condition. ‘Net worth to total 
asset ratio’ has increased but decreased again in 1995. ‘Debt ratio’ has increased steadily, 
whereas ‘current ratio’ has decreased. Increasing fixed ratio means that the firms have 
invested their equity more in fixed assets such as plant, equipment.
Table 7-21 Two-way ANOVA results between financial structure 
________ and diversification categories _____________   (unit:%)
Cell A Cell B Cell C Cell D
Net worth to 
total asset ratio
1985 23.58 a 18.89 a,b 21.07 b 23.98 a,b
1990 23.75 15.91 10.10 22.64
1995 15.13 10.76 4.26 20.10
Debt ratio 1985 76.46 81.11 78.94 76.02
1990 46.25 b 84.09 a,b 89.89a,b 77.36 a
1995 84.94 89.24 95.75 79.90
Current ratio 1985 132.33 a,b 128.77 a,b 99.33 b 165.07 a
1990 141.65 137.64 129.84 153.56
1995 119.93 126.59 116.45 133.46
Fixed ratio 1985 59.62 60.99 119.70 89.01
1990 129.34 77.81 171.09 51.55
1995 144.69 95.54 164.48 58.04
Fixed assets to 
long term capital 
ratio
1985 31.43 39.94 56.28 43.39
1990 25.00 32.17 49.93 21.98
1995 -69.90 24.48 36.68 24.82
* Same letters denote significantly indifferent pairs of group means.
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Table 7-21 shows that highly diversify firms (cell D firms) showed higher net 
worth to total asset ratio (in 1985,1995), lower debt ratio (in 1990), higher current ratio 
(in 1985) and lower fixed ratio and lower fixed assets to long tern capital ratio. On the 
contrary, the unrelated diversified firms (cell C firms) showed higher debt ratio, lower 
current ratio and higher fixed ratio and fixed assets to long tern capital ratio. Generally 
low diversity firms (cell A) showed a more stable financial structure than related 
diversified firms and unrelated diversified firms. However, we were not able to find a 
consistent relationship between financial structure and the firms’ diversity.
7.4.5 Measures of Growth
Growth measures are a kind o f measure to analyse the trend o f past and present 
performance o f the firms. That is, it is related to find out the change o f business 
performance. Here, total asset growth ratio, equity capital growth ratio, net sales growth 
ratio, ordinary profit growth ratio and net profit growth ratio were considered. All the 
ratios were measured by the concepts o f increase in each item compared with those in 
previous years.
Table 7-22 Growth ratios
1985 1990 1995
Total asset growth ratio 36.63 59.84 24.37
Equity capital growth ratio 21.95 41.97 28.28
Net sales growth ratio 12.52 99.94 28.27
Ordinary profit growth ratio -51.09 4.93 58.45
Net profit growth ratio -157.33 358.59 41.97
As shown in Table 7-22, all the measures showed an increasing pattern up to 
1990, but a decreasing pattern between 1990 and 1995. This means that housebuilding 
grew greatly by 1990 but after then, the extent of growth decreased. This is consistent 
with the fact that the Korean housebuilding industry experienced high growth between 
1988 and 1992 and after that the growth of industry decreased. Net sales growth ratio 
increased outstandingly between 1985 and 1990. The ordinary profit and net profit were - 
(minus) in 1985, but increased in 1990, especially net profit increased greatly in 1990.
Table 7-23 also shows the result of the ANOVA test and it shows inconsistent 
relationship between firms’ growth ratio and diversity. We were not able to find any 
pattern or trend in the relationship.
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Table 7-23 Two-way ANOVA results between growth ratio 
__________ and diversification categories_______ __________ (u n it: %)
Cell A Cell B Cell C Cell D
Total asset growth 
ratio
1985 49.28 19.59 16.67 37.35
1990 83.17 47.53 52.47 45.26
1995 29.61 a 10.78 b 29.38 a 24.30 a,b
Equity capital 
growth ratio
1985 15.59 16.26 18.06 57.07
1990 63.95 23.83 31.23 39.52
1995 64.57 -2.70 19.28 17.45
Net sales growth 
ratio
1985 24.04 0.97 7.67 3.14
1990 192.7 41.8 45.0 85.5
1995 38.55 3.77 13.80 62.91
Ordinary profit 
growth ratio
1985 -28.0 -103.0 -43.8 -26.8
1990 -165.2 40.7 263.8 -63.1
1995 99.85 -20.29 82.73 46.33
Net profit growth 
ratio
1985 -71.5 -148.8 -148.6 -461.0
1990 -258 67 1782 67
1995 244.3 -154.1 -19.5 17.8
* Same letters denote significantly indifferent pairs of group means.
Here we may summarise the relationship between the firms’ performance and 
diversity as follows; first, as firms’ business scale increased, the firms’ diversity 
increased. Second, there was no relationship between firms’ profitability and diversity. 
Third, we found negative relationship between asset utilisation and diversity. That is, 
high-diversity firms showed low utilisation ratio, whereas low-diversity firms showed 
higher utilisation ratios. This means highly diversified firms do not utilise asset 
efficiency. Fourth, generally low diversity firms showed more stable financial structure 
than related diversified firms and unrelated diversified firms, whereas highly diversified 
firms (cell D firms) showed more stable structure than the low diversity firms. Moreover, 
we were not able to find a consistent relationship between financial structure and the 
firms’ diversity in every year. Fifth, an inconsistent relationship between firms’ growth 
ratio and diversity was found.
7.5 Findings and Discussion
In this chapter, first, the business areas in which the Korean housebuilding firms 
were involved and the extent o f diversification were investigated with a simple product- 
count measure. Second, with four-cell matrix measure, the building firms’ diversification 
pattern and the changes were traced out. Third, the relationship between firms’ diversity 
and performance were analysed with the ANOVA method.
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Korean housebuilding firms showed a diversified production structure in related 
and unrelated business. It is noteworthy that Korean housebuilding firms were involved 
in totally unrelated businesses such as forestry and logging, sales o f motor vehicles, hotel 
and restaurant business, broadcasting, and financial institutions. Type I firms were more 
involved in the unrelated businesses such as manufacturing, wholesale and retail o f 
motor vehicles, hotel and restaurant business. Type I firms were also participating in 
labour supply, advertising and broadcasting, even though the number of firms were 
small. Type II firms showed increasing trends of diversification into other business. It 
was outstanding that type II firms showed a high involvement ratio in transportation, 
financial institutions, and supermarket and department stores.
However, housebuilding was found to be a most important business in both types 
of firms, considering the unit sales share. The sales share in other unrelated business 
were rather low at about 10 %, but the number o f businesses increased every year. Type I 
firms showed smaller shares of other business in each year, but larger numbers o f the 
businesses than those o f type II firms. This means type I firms were involved in a large 
number o f other businesses but the sales shares were smaller than those o f type II firms. 
It is noteworthy that type II firms showed a larger sales share and an increasing trend in 
the unrelated business.
It was observed that the firms involved in vertical integrated businesses showed a 
consistently higher extent of diversification in related and unrelated areas. It was also 
observed that the Korean building firms, even though they were small, diversified from 
the beginning stage o f growth and they have been actively diversified throughout the 
high growth period. After a high growth period (1988-1992), the housebuilding business 
has been stagnant and the extent of diversification has decreased since 1990.
The pattern o f diversification was found to be different between different types 
and sizes o f firms. Type I firms showed higher diversity than type II firms. Among type I 
firms, large firms showed higher diversity than small firms but the pattern was similar. 
Both o f them showed high diversity by 1990 and the extent o f diversity decreased in 
1995. It is a natural result in a view that type I firms are those who started their business 
in other fields and entered into housebuilding later. That is why they have shown high 
diversity since the beginning o f the 1980s. It was noteworthy that their diversity has 
decreased since 1990 when growth o f the housing market became moderate.
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On the other hand, in the case o f type II firms, there are some differences in the 
diversification pattern between two sizes of firms. The large firms showed a sudden 
increase o f diversity after 1980 and they showed the highest diversity in 1995. Their 
diversity was higher than that of large firms in type I, whereas, small firms among type II 
showed the lowest diversity and they were diversified mainly into related business. 
Considering the fact that type II firms are mainly those which started in the 
housebuilding business, this result suggests that Korean housebuilding firms regard 
‘business diversification’ more importantly than ‘specialisation o f the business’.
It is generally known that firms diversify to achieve more profit and to grow into 
a big business group in the long run. However, the analysis between firms’ diversity and 
performance did not give a satisfactory answer. There was a positive relationship 
between scale o f firms and diversity. This was consistent with the interview survey 
results. However, it was found that there was no consistent relationship between firms’ 
profitability and diversity and between firms’ growth and diversity. We also found a 
negative relationship between asset utilisation and diversity. That is, high-diversity firms 
showed low utilisation ratio, whereas low-diversity firms showed higher utilisation 
ratios. This means that highly diversified firms do not utilise asset efficiently. However, 
highly diversified firms showed the most stable financial structure and low diversified 
firms showed a more stable financial structure than related diversified firms and 
unrelated diversified firms.
Here, some questions can be derived. We found that Korean housebuilding firms 
started to diversify from the beginning of business and most o f them diversified into 
various businesses for the high growth period. However, it was found that there was no 
relationship between firms’ performance and diversity. Then, why do building firms 
diversify, even though diversification does not guarantee high profit or rapid growth ? 
Furthermore, among large firms, type II firms whose main business is housebuilding 
showed higher diversity. What are the motives o f the diversification ? Some of the 
interviewees replied that building firms tend to diversify into counter-cycle business in 
order to compensate business loss and to reduce uncertainty found in the housebuilding 
process. Some o f them said they just follow the diversification trend o f large leading 
firms. To find the answer, the motives o f building firms are to be investigated in detail in 
the following chapter.
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Chapter 8 Motives of Diversification in Korean Housebuilding
Firms
The studies on diversification in the Korean economy started in the beginning of 
the 1980s when the negative effects of big business groups began to be highlighted as an 
economic issue. The studies have been mainly carried out at business group-level, and 
focused on economic power, market power and conglomerate power. Most studies aimed 
to analyse the relationship between the ownership and market power o f big business 
groups. The studies explained diversification as a situation o f economic concentration 
and focused on the effects of diversification on the performance o f firms or the 
competitiveness o f firms, not on the motives or causes of diversification.
Most o f the Korean housebuilding firms diversified into related and unrelated 
business. Large firms were more diversified than small firms. They showed some 
differences in the diversification pattern by type of firms. It is noticeable that large firms 
among type II showed higher diversity than the large firms of type I, that is, the firms 
more involved in the housebuilding business, especially large firms, showed the highest 
diversity. Then, why did the housebuilding firms diversify into various businesses ? 
Were there some differences in the motives or causes o f diversification by type o f firms 
or by nature o f firms ?
The objectives o f this chapter are to investigate motives of the housebuilding 
firms’ diversification and to examine differences by type o f firms and by size o f firms. 
Before investigating the motives o f diversification, definition o f diversification, 
measuring indices of diversification which are widely used in previous studies and 
literature, were reviewed. A diversification index for the Korean housebuilding industry 
was developed, taking into consideration the Korean housebuilding industry’s situations. 
Using the index, an empirical analysis was carried out to investigate motives of 
diversification. A series of analyses were followed to find evidence on differences in 
motives by different types o f firms and by type of diversification.
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8.1 Measuring of Firms’ Diversity
8.1.1 Definition of Diversification
Diversification has long been in the mainstream area of study both in industrial 
organisation economics and strategic management research areas. Basically the studies 
have focused on the extent (less/more), direction (related/unrelated) and mode 
(internal/acquisition). Definition o f diversification has been varied in a great deal of 
literature on diversification. There are many ways diversification is conceptualised, 
defined and measured.
A nsoff s (1957, 1965) definition of diversification emphasises the entry of firms 
into new markets with new products. His emphasis is on the diversification act rather 
than the state o f diversity. Gort (1962) defined diversification in terms of the concept of 
‘heterogeneity o f output’ based on the number o f markets served by that output. 
According to Berry (1975), diversification represents an increase in the number of 
industries in which firms are active. Kamien and Schwartz (1975) defined diversification 
as the extent to which firms classified in one industry produce goods classified in 
another. In all these early definitions, industry or market boundaries are assumed to be 
given.
In contrast, Piffs and Hopkins (1982) use the word ‘business’ rather than 
‘industry’, defining diversification as the extent to which firms operate in different 
businesses simultaneously. More recent studies attempt to define diversification focused 
on the multidimensional nature o f the diversification phenomenon. Booz, Allen and 
Hamilton’s study (1985) defined diversification as a means of spreading the base of a 
business to achieve improved growth and/or reduce overall risk.
Here, diversification is defined as the entry o f a firm into new lines o f activity 
either by a process o f internal business development or acquisition which entail changes 
in its administrative structure, system and management process. For this perspective, a 
simple product line extension that is not accompanied by changes in the managerial 
process is not included in the concept of diversification, even though it is adopted by 
acquisition or merger.
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8.1.2 Measuring Index of Diversification
Several measures have been used in diversification literature. However, there is 
no formal model that leads to a unique index of diversification. Each diversification 
measure has strengths and weaknesses. Therefore, some studies have used their own 
subjective measures based on the study’s characteristics. The most frequently used 
indices are summarised as Table 8- 1.
Table 8-1 Diversification indices
Diversification indices Definition
The number of industry Ni
D R i : the diversification ratio
m = t s J
7=1
Gort Index G = N  x D R j
Herfindahl Index
# = £ o s , ) 2
1=1
Berry index
b = i - # = i - 2 ; ( s () 2
j= i
Utton index
U = 2 ± r , s , - l
i=1
Entropy index
£  = £s,ln(l/S,)
1=1
Grav index
G = t , S , t lSld ,
J=1 j=1
Ni is defined as the number of industries in which the firm operates. DR j  is the 
diversification ratio. This is defined as the share o f total production undertaken outside 
the firm’s primary industry. Here, Sj is the share o f the f 1 secondary product in firm 
shipment and n is the number o f industries in which the firms operates. The number of 
industry (Ni) has a weakness in that it ignores the relative importance o f different 
activities. The diversification ratio ( D R j ) takes no account o f the spread o f activities, that 
is, it ignores the number of secondary activities and the distribution o f sales.
The Gort index (Gort, 1962) is intended to account for the importance and 
volume o f diversification simultaneously in a single index, but it does not reflect the
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relative importance of the firm’s non-primary (secondary) activities. The Herfindahl 
index (McVay and Berry, 1972) does satisfy both the number and distribution properties, 
but does not address product heterogeneity. The index takes a decreasing value as the 
distribution of production becomes more equal. Berry (Berry, 1975) suggested an applied 
form o f this index. The Berry index increases with increasing diversification and it takes 
an increasing value as the distribution o f production becomes more equal.
The Utton index (Utton, 1977) is a form of weighted average with the different 
activities o f the firm, by their relative importance, indicated by their rank. Here n is the 
shipment rank of the ith product. Products are ranked in descending order. Jacquemin and 
Berry (1979) proposed the Entropy index. This measure weighs each Si3 by the logarithm 
of (IA S /). The Utton index and the Entropy index are sensitive to changes in the number 
and distribution o f products. The difference between the Utton index and the Entropy 
index is as follow; as the simple number o f products increases or the distribution of 
products becomes more equal, the Utton index increases at a constant value, whereas the 
Entropy index increases at a decreasing rate in product number but at an increasing rate 
in production distribution (Gallop and Monhan p.320).
The Herfindahl, Berry, Utton and Entrophy indices do not satisfy the 
heterogeneity property. The Grav index is a modified form of the Herfindahl index. 
Here, dtj is a distant parameter. For example if i=j, then d,j=0 (in one 4-digit industry 
only). If  z and j  are in the same 3-digit industry djj= 1, if i and j  are in the same 2-digit 
industry d,j=2, and if  i and j  are in the different 2-digit industry dij=3. The Grav index 
reflects the heterogeneity between industries using weighted average. However, it has a 
weakness in that it is difficult to calculate and interpret the results.
The above eight indices have been mostly used in empirical studies of 
diversification and they are in general highly correlated. Each index may be better suited 
for particular analysis o f diversification. Several empirical studies about diversification 
have shown some consensus about the properties of a diversification measure. Gollop 
and Monahan (1991, p.319) summarised that a well-designed index o f diversification 
should have the following five properties. It should vary directly with the number of 
different products produced and it should vary inversely with the increasingly unequal 
distribution of products across product lines. It should vary directly with the dissimilarity 
or heterogeneity o f products and it should have scope, applying equally well to plants, 
firms and industries. And it should be bounded between zero and unity, if  possible.
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8.1.3 Limitation of Raw Data
Most empirical studies to measure the extent of diversification o f firms assume 
that a firm diversifies if it expands its business into another 4-digit/3-digit/2-digit 
industry. The SIC classification is based on the differences in the production process and 
demand side o f the product. In this study, the SIC classification was used as the base of 
analysis. However, the classification may have some problems; relevant products could 
be classified into disparate industries according to the criteria for classifying the industry, 
and the distance between SIC numbers cannot be interpreted as a measure o f relation. 
Therefore, in this study a more developed index is necessary considering the sales share 
o f each business and heterogeneity between businesses.
The raw data has some limitations when another existing diversification index is 
used, as follows; the original data do not give a separate sales share in each industry. 
Most sample firms give only three sales shares in housebuilding, construction and lump­
sum of other industries. The housebuilding business is classified in the construction 
industry at 2-digit level. It may be thought that analysis at 2-digit level may be possible. 
However, the data do not give separate sales ratio o f the other industries at 2 digit level, 
according to the KSIC classification. They only give a lump-sum sale o f other industries. 
However, we were able to get a number o f businesses the firms were operating at 2-digit, 
4-digit, and even at 5-digit level for the construction section. As we have seen before, the 
number of businesses in which sample firms were involved was ten at 2 -digit level and 
fifty at 4-digit level. Figure 8-1 shows the detailed business areas in which the Korean 
housebuilding firms are involved at 2-, 4-, and 5-digit levels.
Firms do not have separate accounting data at each business level. However, the 
sample firms have the separated financial data between housebuilding business and other 
construction data, that is, they have distinguished the housebuilding data from the 
construction data at 5-digit level. However, other construction business data are all 
aggregated at 5-digit level. In the case o f other businesses, data are also aggregated as a 
lump-sum of nine industries at 2-digit level. Due to the limitations of raw data, we were 
not able to use existing diversification indices such as Entropy, Herfintahl, and Berry in 
this study.
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2-digit level 4-digit level 5-digit level
1.Forest industry 1. Site preparation 3
2 .Mining industry 2. Building of complete construction 2 housebuilding business &
3.Manufacturing industry 3 other building construction
4.Construction industry 3. Heavy construction general contract 6
5.Wholesale & Retail trade 4. Building construction 9
6 . Hotel & Restaurant related special structure
7.Transport industry 5. Building installation 8
8 .Financial Institutes 6 . Building completion 8
9.Real estate renting & business 7. Renting of construction or 1
10.Other business Demolition equipment with operator
1 construction & 7 construction & 40 construction businesses
9 other industries 43 other industries
Total 10 industries Total 50 industries total 40 industries
Figure 8-1 Details in business areas of housebuilding firms
8.1.4 Development of Diversification Index
Due to the limitations of data, a subjective diversification index was developed in 
this study. This was adapted from the Gort and Gravity indices. The index was designed, 
taking into consideration not only distribution of sales and number of business, but also 
heterogeneity of the participating industry. It gives different weights in each industry; 
high weight in unrelated industry and low weight in related industry.
d v = L - w
1=1
St : sales share of each business to total sales 
d t]: distance parameter 
Wi - n i l n t \ weighted parameter
ni : number of businesses in which the firms participate 
nt : total number of businesses at each digit level
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Sj means sales share of each business to total sales. d i} is a parameter reflecting the
distance from the main business. The distant parameter was adapted from the Gravity 
index. If  i industry is equal to j, d v is zero. If / is in the same 5-digit industry with y,
d l} is 1; if i is in same 4-digit industry with j , d {j is 2; if i is in same 3-digit industry with
/, dy is 3; if i is in same 2-digit industry with y, d i} is 4; and if  /' is in different 2-digit
industry withy, d i}is 5. A large distance parameter means a business which is mutually
unrelated and heterogeneous from the main business.
Wi is a weighted parameter reflecting the number o f businesses in which the 
firms participate. The total business number at 4-digit level ( nt ) is 50. Among them, 7 
businesses are included in construction industry. The other 43 businesses are included in 
other business. In cases o f construction and housebuilding, we cannot use the 4-digit 
level classification. This is because housebuilding is only distinguished from 
construction at the 5-digit level, as seen in Figure 25. At the 5-digit level, there are 2 
housebuilding businesses, separated from 38 construction businesses. Therefore, we have 
to use the 5-digit level classification for analysing the housebuilding business. As an 
example, if a firm is involved in 2 housebuilding businesses, 8 construction businesses 
and 3 other businesses, the weighted parameters become as follows; housebuilding: 2/40, 
construction: 8/40, other business: 3/43. By using the above diversification index, the 
extent o f diversification of the Korean housebuilding firms was calculated. Table 8-2 
shows the extent of diversification and an increasing trend of diversification in each year. 
The indices were distributed between 0.05 and 1.31.
Table 8-2 Diversification Index of total firms
1985 1990 1995
Means 0.32 0.33 0.40
Standard
Deviation
0.20 0.22 0.25
Maximum 0.97 1.25 1.31
Minimum 0.06 0.07 0.05
Table 8-3 shows the indices by types o f firm and by the firms categorised by the 
four-cell matrix used in Chapter 7. Generally, type I firms showed higher indices than 
those of type II firms. Both types of firm showed different patterns from that o f total
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firms, that is, they showed an increasing trend between 1985 and 1990, but decreasing 
between 1990 and 1995. It showed low indices in cell A firms (firms with very low 
diversity) and high indices in cell D firms (firms with very high diversity). The indices of 
Cell B firms (related diversified firms) are shown lower than those o f cell C firms 
(unrelated diversified firms), except in the case o f 1985.
Table 8-3 Diversification Index by type of firms
1985 1990 1995
Total firms 0.32 0.33 0.40
Type I firms 0.50 0.59 0.56
Type II firms 0.21 0.24 0.21
Cell A firms 0.23 0.20 0.25
Cell B firms 0.36 0.29 0.35
Cell C firms 0.35 0.34 0.44
Cell D firms 0.48 0.55 0.68
The subjectively designed diversification index (DV) can be considered as a more 
improved index. The difference between the four-cell matrix used in chapter 7 and this 
index is that the former considers only the number of business in which the firms are 
involved, whereas this index considers the number o f business, sales distribution o f each 
business, and heterogeneity of businesses simultaneously.
8.2 Motives of Diversification
In this section, modelling procedures are followed in order to investigate the 
diversification motives o f building firms.
8.2.1 Theoretical Review
Many arguments have been put forward about motives of diversification. A 
number of individual points can be synthesised by some comprehensive perspectives; 
market-power view, resource view, transaction cost view, and risk avoidance view.
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Market power view
According to the market power view, firms want to achieve a monopoly position 
by strong market power to get more than regular profit. Mongomery (1994) emphasised 
three ways in which conglomerates may yield power in anti-competitive ways such as 
‘cross-subsidisation’, ‘mutual forbearance’ and ‘reciprocal buying’. Several studies 
emphasised a positive relationship between market share and firms’ market power. 
According to Martin (1993. p. 167), if firms pursue profit maximisation, maintaining 
inter-dependency to the response o f competitors, the structural relationship between the 
market share and the firm’s market power may be formed. According to Tremblay and 
Tremblay (1988), market structure as an environment variable may influence the market- 
power motive of diversification. They argued that market structure - whether it is 
competitive or not - may be an influential factor to diversification. In general, the studies 
on market power view have tended to stress the consequences of diversification, rather 
than its causes. In most of the empirical studies, market share and market concentration 
in the main business were used as motive variables o f diversification.
Besides, growth variable may be considered as another market power variable. 
This is based on the view that highly growing firms have room to invest into the related 
business or new business. Chun (1993) used ‘growth ratio o f demand’ to investigate a 
hypothesis that if ‘the growth ratio of sales’ in an industry is high, firms may enter into 
other new industry. It was hypothesised that if  housebuilding firms have a high growth 
ratio, the firm might extend its business into other new business areas.
Resource view
The resource view suggests that a firm’s profit and breadth o f diversification are 
a function o f its resource stock. The basis o f this view is found in the work o f Edith 
Penrose (1959). This view emphasises two important aspects; heterogeneous large 
diversified firms and theory of growth. She defined ‘resources’ narrowly to refer to the 
‘physical things a company buys, leases or produces for its own use and the people hired 
on terms that make them effectively part o f the firms’. However, the resources may be 
defined in a wider range including factors the firm has purchased in the market, services 
the firms have created from those factors, and special knowledge the firm has 
accumulated through time.
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According to this approach, if  a firm had enough resources, it might diversify in 
order to use the resources efficiently in the market or in the other market, that is, unused 
or enough resources may be the rationale for diversification. The diversification process 
is understood as a rent-seeking process by extending the market or by entering a new 
market. Caves (1971), Gorecki (1975), Teece (1982) also used excess capacity of 
productive factors as a motive o f diversification as Penrose did.
Chatteijee and Wernerfelt (1991) emphasised that ‘flexibility o f resources’ 
influenced the extent and the type o f diversification. This is based on the view that if a 
firm shows higher flexibility o f resources, it may have a high possibility o f expanding its 
business. As flexibility o f resources, ‘ratio o f current asset’ and ‘ratio of physical fixed 
asset’ were considered. They found that flexible current resources like financial 
resources led to both related and unrelated diversification, whereas excess physical fixed 
resources like plant, fixed equipment etc. led to related diversification. This view is 
hypothesised in that large firms usually retained more resources and high potential to 
diversify and scale o f firm is a general index to reflect accumulation level of 
management resources.
Transaction cost view
Transaction cost was considered as a motive o f the firms’ diversification. That is, 
firms may diversify with the motive of reducing the transaction cost. This view has 
mainly developed, focusing on the motives o f vertical integration, and has provided a 
theoretical base on the motives o f diversification. According to this view, if the level of 
uncertainty in the market and/or firms’ asset specificity were high, internalisation o f the 
transaction might be efficient.
The motives of diversification can be found in the works o f Teece and Kay. 
Teece (1980, 1982) focused on the common use o f know-how and physical asset with 
high specificity. He explained that it was effective to reduce the cost by diversifying into 
related business in which the resource could be utilised. Here, know-how means 
‘learning by doing’. The transaction containing know-how is revealed in opportunism. 
Therefore, the transaction is motivated to be internalised within the firm. Kay (1982, 
1984) argued that the firms using common marketing and technical information such as 
the same distribution channel or common advertisement could expect a synergy effect 
between firms. Synergy means the economic effects that firms can get if they diversify
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into related business (Hills and Hoskinson, 1987). Levy (1985) tried an empirical 
analysis on vertical integration based on the transaction cost theory. He used ‘intensity of 
advertisement’ and ‘intensity o f research and development (R&D)’ as variables 
reflecting asset specificity. Titman & Wessels (1988) also used ‘cost of advertisement’ 
and ‘cost o f R&D’, as asset specificity variables.
The transaction cost view also explains the motive of unrelated diversification, 
focusing on the financial effect. Williamson (1985, p.284) argued that the M-form firms 
could assign firm’s resources more efficiently; that is, M-form firms could use internal 
capital market for other business. Based on the arguments o f Williamson, Hills and 
Hoskinson (1987, pp.332-333) explained that as the unrelated diversification enabled 
firms to pool cash flows and then reallocate them according to strategic criteria, financial 
economies could be achieved by unrelated diversification. Therefore, diversification 
enabled firms to overcome the failure o f capital market.
Risk avoidance view
The fourth view is a risk-avoidance view that firms’ diversification is primarily 
undertaken to avoid or reduce risk associated with the firms’ business. Jensen (1986), 
Shleifer and Vishny (1989), and others explained that managers pursued risk-reducing 
strategies to further their own interests at the expense of the firms’ owners, that is, 
managers may pursue diversified expansion as a mean o f reducing total firm risk, thus 
improving their personal position. According to Amihud and Lev (1981, p.606), mergers 
may be carried out as a form of managerial perquisite intended to decrease the risk 
associated with managerial human capital. Their consequences may be regarded as an 
agency cost.
A frequently quotated study based on this view is the one o f Hill & Hansen 
(1991). They investigated the original motives for diversification in order to understand 
the performance o f diversification. They classified the relationship between risk and 
diversification into two respects; motives of diversification and consequences of 
diversification. They emphasised the risk avoidance motive. As a result, they explained 
that the degree o f risk was positively related to the level o f diversification as a motive of 
diversification, whereas the degree of risk as a result o f diversification was negatively 
related to the level o f diversification. This view did not expect that diversification 
improves firm’ performance.
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8.2.2 Modelling
(1) Basic Model
The market power view and the resource view are consistent with profit 
maximisation, based on the neo-classical economic theory. Moreover, the latter is 
consistent with the efficient use of resources. The transaction cost view is also consistent 
with those in pursuing the reduction o f cost. The above theoretical arguments about the 
motives of diversification are summarised into ‘profit maximisation’ because the 
arguments are not mutually substitutable, but mutually complementary. The basic 
structure o f analysis to investigate the motives o f diversification is described as follows.
DV= f  (M. R. T. O)
DV= diversification index as a dependent variable 
M= market power variables
R= resources variables -> independent variables
T= transaction cost variables 
0 = risk avoidance variables
The model consists of various independent variables explaining the motives o f 
diversification and diversification index as a dependent variable.
(2) Operational definition of variables 
Diversification index as a dependent variable
As a dependent variable, a subjective diversification index which discussed in 
prior section (1.4) was used. It is a continuous measure considering not only the extent of 
diversification of the firms by the number of business and sales share, but also 
heterogeneity o f their business.
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Market power variables
As the market power variables, market share in the main business (MS) and 
growth ratio of sales (GROWTH) were considered. Market share in the main business 
(MS) is defined as the ratio of the firms’ main business sales to total sales in the industry. 
Construction or housebuilding is the major business for most of the Korean building 
firms. I f  a firm’s main business is construction, MS becomes the market share in the 
construction industry and if a firm’s main business is housebuilding, MS becomes the 
market share in the housebuilding industry. GROWTH means growth ratio o f total sales 
o f building firms and it was calculated first, total sales in each year was divided by 
previous sales and then, deducted one from the value.
Resource variables
As a variable indicating a firm’s scale, many variables may be considered such as 
total sales, total assets, number o f employees etc. Here, total assets (ASSET), number of 
employees (EMPLOY) were considered. It is assumed that the total assets reflect the 
scale o f firms’ resources and number of employees reflects the scale o f personal 
resources. ‘Flexibility o f resources’ was also considered in the model. As variables 
indicating flexibility o f resources, ratio o f current assets (CASS), and ratio o f fixed assets 
(FASS) were considered. CASS is defined as a ratio o f current assets to total assets. 
FAS S is defined as a ratio o f fixed physical assets to total assets.
Transaction cost variables
When we consider asset specificity in the housebuilding and construction 
industry, ‘the intensity o f building equipment possession’ and ‘technical specificity and 
construction know-how’ may be considered. Here, we may define the business 
specificity in housebuilding as ‘the intensity o f investment of the firms to the business’. 
Considering the complexity o f the building process and the hierarchical structure of 
industry, the firm’s experience and know-how in the housebuilding business is a very 
important factor. Firms need special building facilities, heavy and specially designed 
machines, specially trained labour forces, and a well-established contracting system with
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small specialised contractors. If they want to operate their business smoothly, they need 
an initial large investment on the above factors as well as long-time experience.
The problem here was how to measure the ‘business specificity’. There were 
some difficulties in defining and measuring it operationally. In this study, ‘business 
period in the building business’(PEYEAR) was considered as a proxy variable of the 
business specificity. We assumed that if firms had a long business period in building, 
they would have high business specificity. They have already invested in construction 
facilities, professional and technical labour forces, and a systemised contracting 
relationship. Moreover, if they had long experience in the business, they may have 
retained a high name value and they did not need additional advertisement toward 
demanders. Therefore, we may derive a hypothesis that if  the firms had a higher business 
specificity, they may diversify (especially into related areas). PEYEAR is defined as the 
total business period in their main business.
As another transaction cost variable, financial cost (FC) was considered. 
Financial cost means the cost o f using funds from an external capital market. Korean 
housebuilding firms normally have very high financial costs. The financial cost is 
composed o f large parts o f the transaction costs. If a firm had high financial costs, this 
means they have some difficulty in financial transactions and they want to internalise the 
transaction within the firms. The point that internal financing or cross subsidisation is a 
major motive of diversification was emphasised in various studies. The financial cost 
(FC) was calculated as the sum of various interest, discount fees and debenture interest. 
The total financial cost was divided by the total debt of the building firm. This means 
financial cost per one unit o f debt.
Risk avoidance variables
As risk avoidance variables, debt ratio (RISK), profitability (PROF) and market 
share in the housebuilding business (MSH) were considered. Here, the debt ratio is a 
business index indicating security o f business. If  the ratio was high, this means that firms 
have a high dependency on debts and their business is insecure. This is based on the view 
that if they faced high risk or uncertainty in their major business, they tend to diversify 
into other businesses in order to lessen the risk. The debt ratio (RISK) was calculated as 
the total debt divided by the total capital.
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Also, profitability (PROF) and market share in the housebuilding industry (MSH) 
were considered. There are a lot of studies to investigate the relationship between 
diversification and performance. However, they do not give consistent results. Here, it is 
hypothesised that if a firm has a low profitability in business, they may try to diversify 
into other business to compensate for the loss. According to interviews, Korean 
housebuilding firms pursue the expansion of their business area in order to compensate 
for limited profit in housebuilding due to various regulations in the production process.
Profitability (PROF) was calculated as the ratio o f ordinary profit to total asset. 
Low market share in the housebuilding industry means insecurity o f the housebuilding 
business. It was hypothesised that the firms having a low market share in the 
housebuilding industry want to improve security of the firms and then pursue 
diversification into other business. MHS is defined as the ratio of each firm’s 
housebuilding sales to total housebuilding sales in the industry.
Table 8-4 Operational Definition o f Variables
Variables Definition of 
variables
Operational definition Expected
relations
Independent
variable
DV Diversification index
Market
power
variables
MS Market share in main 
business
The ratio of each firm’s main business 
sales to the industry’s total sales
+
GROWTH Growth ratio of sales (sales/ sales in prior year-1) *100 +
Resource
variables
ASSET* Total assets Total assets +
EMPLOY* Number of 
employees
Number of total employees +
CASS Ratio of current 
assets
Current assets divided by total assets +
FASS Ratio of physical 
fixed assets
Physical fixed assets divided by total assets +
Transaction
cost
variables
FC Financial cost to total 
assets
Total financial cost divided by total debts. 
(This means financial cost per debts.)
+
PEYEAR* Business specificity Business period in main business area +
Risk
avoidance
variables
RISK Debt ratio Total debt/capital *100 +
PROF Profitability ratio Ordinary profit/total assets *100 -
MSH
Market share in 
housebuilding area
The ratio of each firm’s housebuilding 
business sales to total housebuilding sales
-
* used as og form
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Table 8-4 shows each variable’s name and operational definition and expected 
relationship with firms’ diversity. The market power variables (MS, GROWTH) and 
resource variables (ASSET, EMPLOY, CASS, and FASS) and transaction cost variables 
(FC, PEYEAR) may show a positive relationship to a firm’s diversity. Among the risk 
avoidance variable, RISK variable may show a positive relation to firms’ diversity, 
whereas PROF and MSH variables may show a negative relation to firms’ diversity, that 
is, the lower the firms’ profitability and market share in the housebuilding business, the 
more the firms diversify into other business to compensate for the firms’ low profitability 
and the business’s low profit. I f  the firms have high risk in their business, they may 
therefore diversify into other business in order to divide total risk to various businesses 
and to keep total security.
In particular, the variables indicating flexibility o f resources (CASS and FASS) 
and transaction cost variables (FC and PEYEAR) may influence the type of 
diversification, related or unrelated diversification. Flexible current resources such as 
financial resources may lead both related and unrelated diversification, whereas physical 
fixed resources like plant and fixed equipment may lead to related diversification. 
Among transaction cost variables, the financial cost may lead to unrelated 
diversification, whereas business specificity may lead to related diversification. The 
firms’ high financial cost means financial difficulty o f the firms and the firms may 
diversify to internalise the transaction within the firms. Cross subsidisation from good 
cash-flow may be a good example. On the other hand, if a firm has a higher business 
specificity, they tend to diversify into a related business area, as they can utilise the 
know-how in the related business.
(3) Data sources and methodology
Total numbers of sample firms are 353 as shown in Table 8-5. Three time points; 
1985, 1990, and 1995 were considered. The sample firms consist o f two types o f firms as 
described in chapter 7. Type I firms are defined as those whose main business is 
construction and which are also involved in the housebuilding business. Type II firms are 
those which started their business in housebuilding and their main business is also 
housebuilding.
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Table 8-5 Number of sample firms
1985 1990 1995 Total period
Total firms 96 114 143 353
Type I firms 40 32 79 151
Type II firms 56 82 64 202
Basically, financial data required in the analysis came from the sample firms’ 
‘Annual Business Report’ published by the Korea Stock Exchange. All registered firms 
have an obligation to report their business performance every year by standard form. 
According to a standardised form, the firms should report details o f annual business; 
company profile, capital increase, share ownership, officers and employees, major 
business, sales o f major product, balance sheet, income statement, schedule o f cost of 
goods manufactured, statement o f cash flow, statement of appropriation o f retained 
earnings, stock price, key securities analysis and investment indices, financial analysis, 
and CPA’s opinion.
Nearly all variables (GROWTH, ASSET, CASS, FASS, FC, RISK, PROF) were 
got from each building firm’s ‘balance sheets’ and ‘income statement’ in each year. For 
the market share in the main business (MS), and the market share in the housebuilding 
business (MSH), we need separate sales shares. Fortunately, the annual business report 
gave separate sales share in three businesses; construction, housebuilding and other 
business. We also could get total sales in the construction industry and the housebuilding 
industry from formal publications. Total construction sales in the industry was obtained 
from ‘National Economic Statistics’ annually published by The Bank o f Korea. Total 
housebuilding sales in the industry was obtained from ‘the Housing Economic Statistical 
Yearbook’ from the Korea Housing Bank. Number o f employees (EMPLOY) and 
business period in main business (PEYEAR) were also got from the annual report.
All independent variables were discounted with GNP deflator index based on 
1990 in order to reflect price change during the analysis period. In the analysis process, 
the time lag was considered. All independent variables were used as average values for 
the previous three years from each year. This is based on the view that diversification is 
realised 3-5 years later, considering firms’ business status. Actually during the interview 
survey, it was observed that most o f the managers in the housebuilding firms consider a 
diversification strategy in mid-term decision making (between 3 and 5 years). As an 
independent variable, a total of eleven variables were considered as below.
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DV = /  (MS, GROWTH, ASSET, EMPLOY, CASS, FASS, FC, PEYEAR, 
MSH, RISK, PROF)
Among the variables, ASSET, EMPLOY, and PEYEAR are nominal amount variables, 
whereas the other variables are ratio variables. We need to adjust the unit o f variables, 
therefore the three variables were transformed into logarithmic value.
Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regression method was used to estimate the above 
model. SAS statistical package was used for the estimation. The estimation was carried 
out in several stages.
Firstly, the estimation was performed for all sample firms by pooling two types 
o f firms. However, there were some differences between the two types o f firms as 
discussed in chapter 7. Type I firms showed a larger scale in the number of employees, 
total sales and capital and a longer business period. About 80 percent o f these were 
designated firms. On the other hand, type II firms appeared smaller in the number of 
employees, total sales and capital and they showed a shorter business period. Only 37.5 
percent of type II firms were designated firms.
Due to the difference in scale between firms, it may be inadequate to use pooled 
data sets. We need to test whether the pooled data can be used or not. A Chow test was 
carried out as shown in Table 8-6 . The test equation is as follows under the hypothesis 
that there are differences in diversification motive between two types o f firms.
_ n ] + n 2 - 2 k  SSRt -(SSR x +SSR2) 
k (SSRX +SSR2)
Here, «2 are numbers o f observations in type I firms and type II firms, k is the 
number of variables for estimation. SSRt, SSRi. SSR2 are the sum of error term of the 
estimated model o f total firms, type I firms, and type II firms. The d  value was 
calculated as 18.088 for two types o f firms. It is higher than the decision value 2.415 of F 
distribution (11,318). Table 61 shows the result o f the Chow test.
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Table 8-6 Calculation of decision value for Chow Test
Type of firms
Type I firms 142
n2 Type II firms 198
k 11
SSRj 3.324
ssr2 1.351
SSRt 7.600
F value F(ll,318)=2.415
d 18.088
Therefore, the hypothesis that there is no structural difference between two types 
o f firms is rejected. This means it is more adequate to use different data set by type I 
firms and type II firms. Therefore, estimation was performed by two types o f firms. The 
estimation was also performed from three time points separately (1985,1990, 1995).
Lastly, in order to find out the motives on different types of diversification, the 
above process was carried out separately in two parts; related diversification and 
unrelated diversification.
8.3 The Results
8.3.1 Estimation of Diversification Motives
Table 8-7 shows the estimation results by two type o f firms. Adjusted R2 showing 
explaining degree of explanatory variables are shown as rather high between 0.39 and 
0.49. F-values showing the adequacy o f the model are shown as being statistically 
significant. The D-W value of this model was also shown to be between 1.6 and 1.7 and 
we can say the estimation model used in this analysis is adequate.
Both types of firms showed the same results in market power variable. Type I 
firms showed expected results in resource variables with ASSET, whereas type II firms 
showed expected results in resource variables with personal resource variable 
(EMPLOY). As a flexibility variable of resource, CASS was an influential factor only in 
type II firms.
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As transaction cost variables, business specificity (PEYEAR) was shown as 
significant in both types of firms and financial cost (FC) was shown as significant only in 
type I firms. Among risk avoidance variables, MSH was significant variable for both 
types of firm, but PROF was shown as significant only in type I firms. Even though there 
are some differences in the explanatory variables, market power variables, resource 
variables, transaction cost variables and risk avoidance variables were significant 
motives for both types o f firms.
Table 8-7 Estimation results by type of firms
Total firms Type I 
Firms
Type II 
firms
Intercept -1.18086***
- 10.733
-1.1679***
- 5.559
-0.34201***
- 3.649
Market
power
variables
MS
GROWTH
0.798821***
7.579
-4.6E-05
- 0.523
0.944216***
4.023
0.000105
0.519
19.93056***
3.578
1.12E-05
0.195
Resource
variables
ASSET
EMPLOY
CASS
FASS
0.084353***
7.038
0.048049***
3.757
2.23E-05
0.051
0.000401
0.536
0.083338***
4.168
0.030503
1.418
0.000959
0.935
0.001642
1.08
0.014582
1.492
0.036039***
3.627
0.00087***
3.046
0.000688
1.374
Transaction
cost
variables
FC
PEYEAR
7.68E-05
1.223
0.115263***
5.765
0.003042**
2.13
0.140963***
3.834
2.75E-05
0.759
0.049231***
3.322
Risk
avoidance
variables
RISK
PROF
MSH
5.58E-07
0.18
-8.8E-05
- 0.333
-9.83756***
- 7.576
2.76E-05
0.994
-0.0078**
- 2.077
-11.6343***
- 4.023
-8.7E-07
- 0.489
-0.00013
- 0.86
-6.98154***
- 3.149
Adj. R2 
F-value 
D/W value
0.5808
43.95***
1.479
0.4940
13.605***
1.601
0.3911
12.563***
1.717
Bold figure: standard error
* : significant at 10 % level ** : significant at 5 % level *** : significant at 1 % level
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Table 8-8  and Table 8-9 show results of type I firms and type II firms for each of 
the three years. When considered in separate year, adjusted R2 became higher between 
0.51 and 0.61. F-values showing the adequacy of the model are shown as statistically 
significant. Durbin-Watson value (D-W) also shows near 2 and it means the model is 
adequately estimated.
In case o f type I firms, there were some differences in the explanatory variables 
in each year. First, it was found that market power variables (MS), resource variables 
(ASSET, CASS, FASS), and risk avoidance variables (PROF, MHS) were influential 
factors in 1985; however, in 1990, only risk avoidance variables (PROF, MSH) were 
influential motives, and in 1995, resource variable (EMPLOY) and transaction cost 
variables (FC, PEYEAR) were significant motives o f diversification.
Table 8-8  Estimation results of type I firms by year
Total
Period
1985 1990 1995
Intercept -1.1679***
- 5.559
-1.83637***
- 3.419
-2.22031***
- 3.171
-0.66758***
- 2.209
Market
power
variables
MS
GROWTH
0.944216***
4.023
0.000105
0.519
-2.41843*
- 2.068
0.000929
1.438
2.185222
0.657
-0.00021
- 0.484
0.516884
1.503
0.000199
0.749
Resource
variables
ASSET
EMPLOY
CASS
FASS
0.083338***
4.168
0.030503
1.418
0.000959
0.935
0.001642
1.08
0.130864**
2.119
0.023202
0.402
0.004692*
2.073
0.009821**
2.687
0.133119
1.697
0.125924
1.44
0.003227
1.383
-0.004
- 1.182
0.005062
0.145
0.093401**
2.358
0.0004
0.212
-0.0003
- 0.14
Transaction
Cost
Variables
FC
PEYEAR
0.003042**
2.13
0.140963***
3.834
0.000989
0.099
0.081684
0.951
-0.01314
- 0.972
0.142634
1.494
0.002622*
1.669
0.179371***
3.831
Risk
Avoidance
Variables
RISK
PROF
MSH
2.76E-05
0.994
-0.0078**
- 2.077
-11.6343***
- 4.023
6.81E-05
0.945
-0.00919*
- 2.006
-13.9836***
- 3.11
3.01E-06
0.062
-0.01459*
- 1.815
-38.3468***
- 4.097
1.14E-05
0.349
-0.00433
- 1.451
-6.3715
- 1.504
Adj. R2 
F-value 
D/W value
0.4940
13.605***
1.601
0.6134
5.616***
2.062
0.6134
5.616***
2.062
0.5121
8.442***
2.161
Bold figure: standard error
* : significant at 10 % level ** : significant at 5 % level *** : significant at 1 % level
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Table 8-9 shows the case o f type II firms and it also shows different results in 
each year. In 1985, adjusted R2 o f the model was relatively low (0.1725) and there were 
no significant variables. However, results in 1990 and 1995 showed higher R2 and better 
D-W values. In 1990, only market share variables (MS), business specificity variable 
(PEYEAR), and market share in the housebuilding business (MSH) were shown as 
statistically significant. The results in 1995 were better. Market power variables (MS, 
GROWTH), resource variables (EMPLOY, CASS) and risk avoidance variables (RISK, 
MSH) showed statistically significant results. However, it is noticeable that risk variables 
show the opposite sign from the expected one. This means the type II firms show high 
diversity in the case when they have low risk in their business.
Table 8-9 Estimation results of type II firms by years
Total
period
1985 1990 1995
Intercept -0.34201***
- 3.649
0.246462
1.017
-0.3609*
- 1.896
-0.33031
- 1.672
Market
power
variables
MS
GROWTH
19.93056***
3.578
1.12E-05
0.195
5.663716
0.564
-0.00025
- 1.464
39.53815***
3.089
-2.6E-05
- 0.358
19.959*
1.977
0.000431**
2.481
Resource
variables
ASSET
EMPLOY
CASS
FASS
0.014582
1.492
0.036039***
3.627
0.00087***
3.046
0.000688
1.374
0.011903
0.485
0.009104
0.481
-0.0016
- 1.319
-0.00121
- 0.835
0.006814
0.269
0.041929
1.566
0.000863
0.925
0.000855
0.795
0.000383
0.016
0.071321***
3.046
0.000969***
2.979
0.001122
1.48
Transaction
cost
variables
FC
PEYEAR
2.75E-05
0.759
0.049231***
3.322
-2E-05
- 0.472
-0.01884
- 0.56
0.000136
1.011
0.07107**
2.385
0.000498
0.421
0.037518
1.648
Risk
avoidance
variables
RISK
PROF
MSH
-8.7E-07 
- i0.489 
-0.00013 
- 0.86 
-6.98154*** 
- 3.149
7.25E-06
0.141
-6.2E-06
- 0.033
-0.85179
- 0.221
2.83E-07
0.147
-0.00023
- 0.792
-11.1243**
- 2.628
-1.3E-05**
- 2.062
-0.00125
- 0.481
-10.4674*
- 1.923
Adj. R2 
F-value 
D/W value
0.3911
12.563***
1.717
0.1725
2.061**
2.029
0.4408
6.517***
2.01
0.5454
7 g7***
1.922
Bold figure: standard error
* : significant at 10 % level ** : significant at 5 % level *** : significant at 1 % level
185
8.3.2 Estimation of Motives of Related and Unrelated Diversification
In this section, an attempt was made to examine whether there was any difference 
in influential variables between related and unrelated diversification. The diversification 
index needs to be divided into related index and unrelated index. As shown in the 
previous section, the diversification index designed in this study is composed o f three 
parts; housebuilding, construction and other business. As the housebuilding business is 
placed in the same two-digit industry with the construction business, we can consider the 
two businesses as being related. As other business is included in a different two-digit 
industry from housebuilding, it is considered as being unrelated businesses. We may 
divide the diversification index into two parts as below;
DV= related diversification index + unrelated diversification index
Z  V j , w i =  d „  W i j  +  S c  d , j  M's) + ( S 0  d n  w : ] )
SH : the sales share o f housebuilding business to total sales 
Sc : the sales share o f construction business to total sales 
SQ : the sales share o f other businesses to total sales
d i}: a distance parameter
Wi = ni / nt : weighted parameter
After dividing the diversification index into two parts, the estimate was carried out by 
type o f firms. There were some differences in the influential factors.
Type Ifirms ’ case
The estimation results by type o f firms were carried out. Tables 65 and 66  
showed the estimated results of related diversification and unrelated diversification in the 
case o f type I firms.
Table 8-10  showed the case o f related diversification. First, market power 
variable (MSC), resource variables (ASSET, CASS), and transaction cost variable 
(PEYEAR) were influential motives o f the related diversification. Risk avoidance 
variables (PROF, MSH) were shown as a negative influential factor as expected. There
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were some differences in each year but the signs are all consistent. In 1985, resource 
variables (ASSET and CASS) and market share in the housebuilding industry (MSH) 
were shown as being influential motives. In 1990, market power variables (MS), 
resource variable (ASSET), risk avoidance variable (PROF) were significant motives. In 
1995, resource variable (EMPLOY), transaction cost variable (PEYEAR) and market 
share in the housebuilding business (MSH) were shown as being significant.
Table 8-10 Estimation results o f type I firms in related diversification
Related Total
period
1985 1990 1995
Intercept -1.0436***
- 4.638
-2.08222***
- 3.093
-2.06862***
- 2.907
-0.51999
- 1.466
Market
power
variables
MS
GROWTH
0.879837***
3.5
-6.5E-05
- 0.3
-1.42811
- 1.034
2.16E-06
0.003
6.054939*
1.792
-0.00032
- 0.721
0.412554
1.118
7.04E-05
0.275
Resource
variables
ASSET
EMPLOY
CASS
FASS
0.076557***
3.575
0.020217
0.878
0.002091*
1.904
-0.0011
- 0.678
0.169693**
2.289
-0.00829
- 0.123
0.008351**
2.286
0.00699
1.631
0.168143**
2.109
0.041629
0.468
0.003983
1.679
-0.00385
- 1.117
-0.00925
- 0.239
0.07957*
1.813
0.001763
0.765
-0.0018
- 0.717
Transaction
cost
variables
FC
PEYEAR
0.002273
1.486
0.121577***
3.088
-0.01272
- 0.963
0.048812
0.471
-0.01576
- 1.146
0.108381
1.117
0.00171
0.826
0.174556***
3.247
Risk
avoidance
variables
RISK
PROF
MSH
3.66E-05
1.232
-0.00814**
- 2.024
-10.8417***
- 3.501
-1.6E-05
- 0.155
-0.01604
- 1.499
-13.9536**
- 2.523
1.58E-05
0.319
-0.01752**
- 2.143
-40.5308***
- 4.261
3.02E-05
0.67
-0.0068
- 1.109
-5.08669
- 1.119
Adj. R2 
F-value 
D/W value
0.3960
9.462***
1.573
0.5181
4.127***
2.242
0.6384
5.815***
1.824
0.3663 
5 1*** 
2.098
Bold figure: standard error
* : significant at 10 % level ** : significant at 5 % level *** : significant at 1 % level
Table 8-11 showed the case of unrelated diversification in type I firms. Mainly 
market power variables (MS, GROWTH) and resource variables (ASSET, EMPLOY, 
FASS) were significant variables to the unrelated diversification. It is outstanding that 
FASS showed positive relation with related diversification unlikely as expected. We 
expected that if the firms have high fixed assets (FASS), the firms tend to diversify into
187
related business. The MS variable showed the opposite sign (-) and PROF showed (+) 
sign differently from that expected.
Table 8-11 Estimation results of type I firms in unrelated diversification
Unrelated Total
period
1985 1990 1995
Intercept -0.09767
- 0.936
0.359036
1.114
-0.12278
- 0.416
-0.34194**
- 2.178
Market
power
variables
MS
GROWTH
0.039222
0.325
0.000231**
2.16
-1.22191*
- 1.741
0 .0012***
3.095
-3.99044**
- 2.831
-3.8E-05
- 0.105
0.108609
0.618
3.74E-05**
2.105
Resource
variables
ASSET
EMPLOY
CASS
FASS
0.004472
0.442
0.009702
0.893
-0 .00122***
- 2.445
0.002545***
3.372
-0.07914**
- 2.136
0.069373*
2.001
-0.00104
- 0.767
0.003843*
1.752
-0.02681
- 0.733
0.07764*
1.883
-0.00199
- 1.72
-0.00037
- 0.227
0.029502*
1.847
-0.00736
- 0.413
-0.00027
- 0.268
0.002724**
2.299
Transaction
cost
variables
FC
PEYEAR
0.000596
0.799
0.021625
1.167
0.00777
1.294
0.019695
0.382
0.006896
1.145
0.030475
0.758
0.001052
1.045
0.016292
0.679
Risk
avoidance
variables
RISK
PROF
MSH
-6.8E-06
- 0.464
0.000548
0.364
-0.48283
- 0.325
5.31E-05
1.229
-0.00249
- 0.905
1.573369
0.583
-3.5E-05
- 1.421
0.007403*
2.015
2.962431
0.717
7.22E-06
0.312
-0.00018
- 0.079
-1.33847
- 0.618
Adj. R2 
F-value 
D/W value
0.2382
5.036***
1.944
0.5996
5.356***
1.921
0.3457
2.441**
2.347
0.2425
3.27***
2.41
Bold figure: standard error
* : significant at 10 % level ** : significant at 5 % level *** : significant at 1 % level
Summarising the results o f type I firms, there were some differences in the 
motives o f diversification between related diversification and unrelated diversification. 
Related diversification was mainly performed by market power view, resource view and 
transaction cost view and risk avoidance variables. When flexibility of current asset 
(CASS) was higher and business specificity (PEYEAR) was higher, but profitability 
(PROF) was lower as expected, they diversified into related business areas; whereas 
unrelated diversification was mainly carried out by market power view and resource 
view. When firms had a higher growth ratio (GROWTH) and excess personal resource 
(EMPLOY), they diversified into unrelated business as expected. Especially, it is
188
noteworthy that when they had a higher ratio of physical fixed assets (FASS) and higher 
profit (PROF), they diversified into unrelated business unlike the expected.
Type IIfirms ’ case
Table 8-12 and 8-13 show the estimation results o f type II firms.
Table 8-12 Estimation results o f ty p e !I firms in re ated diversi ication
Related Total
Period
1985 1990 1995
Intercept 0.041977
0.549
0.344507
1.534
0.149227
0.966
-0.09932
- 0.579
Market
power
Variables
MS
GROWTH
19.62519***
4.188
-1.1E-05
- 0.367
9.182609
0.986
-0.00019
- 1.226
22.37885**
2.154
-3.2E-05
- 0.553
32.62992***
3.722
0.000373**
2.474
Resource
variables
ASSET
EMPLOY
CASS
FASS
-0.00997
- 1.225
0.030015***
3.586
0.000642***
3.734
-0.00036
- 1.057
-0.00586
- 0.258
0.019708
1.123
-0.00135
- 1.201
-0.00214
- 1.589
-0.01702
- 0.829
0.025927
1.193
0.000468
0.617
-0.00068
- 0.776
0.006159
0.302
0.026183
1.288
0.001168***
4.133
0.000531
0.807
Transaction
cost
variables
FC
PEYEAR
2.18E-05
1.124
0.015383
1.232
-2.5E-05
- 0.629
-0.02117
- 0.679
4.98E-05
0.457
0.018219
0.753
-0.00088
- 0.859
-0.00326
- 0.165
Risk
avoidance
variables
RISK
PROF
MSH
-3.9E-06
- 1.254
-0.00016*
- 1.847
-5.3873***
- 2.884
2.43E-06
0.051
3.7E-05
0.214
-2.4924
- 0.696
-5.6E-07
- 0.357
-0.0004*
- 1.675
-4.26902
- 1.243
-9.5E-06
- 1.757
0.000614
0.273
-13.4239***
- 2.84
Adj. R2 
F-value 
D/W value
0.3082
9.02***
1.553
0.069
1.377
2.157
0.215
2.917***
2.344
0.5356
7.605***
1.947
Bold figure: standard error
* : significant at 10 % level ** : significant at 5 % level *** : significant at 1 % level
In the case of related diversification, market power variables (MS, GROWTH), resources 
variables (EMPLOY, CASS) and risk avoidance variables (PROFIT, MSH) were 
significant motives. There were also some differences within each year. In 1985, there 
were no being significant factors at all and, in 1990 only two variables (MS, PROF) were 
estimated as significant variables. In 1995, besides MS, GROWTH variables, CASS was 
shown as influential factors. We can interpret this as follows; if  they had higher market
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power in the main business and if they had higher flexibility o f current assets, and lower 
profitability and lower market share in the housebuilding business, they diversified into 
related diversification.
Table 8-13 shows the case o f unrelated diversification. The results of the 
estimation were not so good. Adjusted R2 value was rather low between 0.15 and 0 .2 0 . 
There were few significant variables. The scale variables o f resources (ASSET, 
EMPLOY, FASS), and business specificity (PEYEAR) were influential motives. It is 
noticeable that business specificity (PEYEAR) was an influential factor in unrelated 
diversification. It is the opposite result to that expected. We expected that if the firms had 
long experience in the business, they diversified into related business not unrelated 
business.
Table 8-13 Estimation results of type II firms in unrelated diversification
Unrelated Total year 1985 1990 1995
Intercept -0.34652***
- 4.687
-0.09805
- 0.985
-0.51013***
- 2.836
-0.23099
- 1.359
Market
power
variables
MS
GROWTH
0.209414
0.048
1.18E-05
0.263
-3.51889
- 0.852
-5.5E-05
- 0.795
17.15931
1.418
6.49E-06
0.096
-12.6709
- 1.458
5.8E-05
0.388
Resource
variables
ASSET
EMPLOY
CASS
FASS
0.023193***
3.008
0.006464
0.825
-2.1E-05
- 0.091
0.000925**
2.339
0.017764*
1.762
-0.0106
- 1.363
-0.00025
- 0.5
0.000927
1.553
0.023832
0.997
0.016002
0.632
0.000396
0.448
0.001532
1.507
-0.00578
- 0.286
0.045137**
2.239
-0.0002
- 0.708
0.000591
0.906
Transaction
cost
variables
FC
PEYEAR
1.47E-05
0.513
0.032356***
2.768
4.82E-06
0.271
0.00233
0.168
8.61E-05
0.677
0.05285*
1.876
0.001377
1.356
0.040777**
2.081
Risk
avoidance
variables
RISK
PROF
MSH
1.65E-07
0.119
3.99E-05
0.337
-1.44568
- 0.827
4.82E-06
0.229
-4.3E-05
- 0.563
1.640616
1.034
8.41E-07
0.462
0.000167
0.6
-6.85524*
- 1.713
-3.3E-06
- 0.623
-0.00186
- 0.835
2.956426
0.631
Adj. R5 
F-value 
D/W value
0.1664
4.592***
1.726
0.1746
2.077**
1.628
0.2036 
2 79*** 
2.155
0.15
2 .011**
1.744
Bold figure: standard error
* : significant at 10 % level ** : significant at 5 % level *** : significant at 1 % level
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Summarising the results of type II firms, there were also some differences in 
motive between related and unrelated diversification. Related diversification was 
performed by market power view, resource view, and risk avoidance view. Especially 
when the flexibility o f current asset (CASS) was higher, the profitability (PROF) was 
lower and market share in the housebuilding business (MSH) was lower, they diversified 
into related business areas. Unrelated diversification was carried out mainly in resource 
view and transaction cost view. When flexibility of physical fixed asset (FASS) is higher 
and business specificity (PEYEAR) was higher, they diversified into unrelated business 
areas. The noticeable point was business specificity (PEYEAR) which is an influential 
motive in unrelated business, not related business. This is the opposite results to that of 
type I firms.
8.3.3 Summary of the Results
So far, we have examined the estimation results on the motives o f diversification. 
We can summarise the results as in the following three tables (Tables 8-14,). They 
showed influential variables and relations with diversification in each case.
Table 8-14 Summary table by type of firms
Total
years
Type I 
firms
Type II 
firms
MS + + +
GROWTH
ASSET + +
EMPLOY + +
CASS +
FASS
FC +
PEYEAR + + +
RISK
PROF -
MSH - - -
Table 8-14 shows the differences between two types o f firm. Both types o f firms 
showed similar results. Even though there were some differences in the explanatory 
variables, market power variables, resource variables, transaction cost variables and risk 
avoidance variables were significant motives for both types o f firms. We can interpret 
this as follows; if the firms had high market power in their main business, they may
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diversify to strengthen their power and to grow further. The resource variables were also 
a significant motive o f diversification, that is, if  the firms had more resources both in 
physical and personal assets, they may diversify in order to utilise their resources fully. 
Furthermore, transaction cost variables and risk avoidance variables were significant 
motives o f diversification. It was observed that if  the firms had higher financial costs and 
longer business experience, they tended to diversify, and if the firms’ profitability and 
market share in the housebuilding business were lower, the firms tended to diversify.
Type I firms showed expected results in resource variables with ASSET and type 
II firms showed expected results with personal resource variable (EMPLOY). As a 
flexibility variable of resource, current asset ratio (CASS) was an influential factor only 
in type II firms. However, financial cost (FC) and profitability variable (PROF) were 
significant motives only in type I firms.
When we considered the type of diversification separately in investigating the 
motives of diversification, it was found that there are some differences between related 
diversification and unrelated diversification. To investigate the difference between types 
o f diversification, the same estimation process was carried out by type o f firms. Tables 
8-15 and 8-16 summarise the results in the case o f type I and type II firms.
Table 8-15 Summary table in type I firms (related/ unrelated diversification)
Related
diversification
Unrelated
diversification
Total period 1985 1990 1995 Total period 1985 1990 1995
MS + + - -
GROWTH + + + +
ASSET + + + - +
EMPLOY + + +
CASS + + -
FASS + + +
FC
PEYEAR + +
RISK
PROF - - +
MSH - - - -
In case o f type I firms, there were some differences in the motives between 
related diversification and unrelated diversification. Related diversification was mainly 
motivated by market power view, resource view, transaction cost view, and risk 
avoidance view, whereas unrelated diversification was mainly carried out by market 
power view and resource view. In particular, when flexibility o f current assets (CASS)
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was higher and business specificity (PEYEAR) was higher, and profitability (PROF) was 
lower, they diversified into related business areas. On the other hand, when the firms had 
a high growth rate (GROWTH), large personal resource (EMPLOY) and higher ratio of 
physical fixed asset (FASS), they diversified into unrelated business.
Table 8-16 shows the type II firms’ case. There were also some differences in 
motive between related and unrelated diversification. Related diversification was carried 
out by market power view, resource view, and risk avoidance view. Especially when the 
flexibility o f current asset was higher, when the MSH and PROF was lower, they 
diversified into related business area. It was estimated that unrelated diversification was 
carried out mainly in resource view and transaction cost view. When flexibility of 
physical fixed assets (+FASS) was higher and business specificity (+PEYEAR) higher, 
they diversified into an unrelated business area. These were also different results as 
expected.
Table 8-16 Summary table in type II firms (related/ unrelated diversification)
Related
diversification
Unrelated
diversification
Total period 1985 1990 1995 Total period 1985 1990 1995
MS
GROWTH
+ + +
+
ASSET
EMPLOY
CASS
FASS
+
+ +
+
+
+
+
FC
PEYEAR + + +
RISK
PROF
MSH
- -
We found that the variables indicating flexibility o f resources (CASS and FASS) 
and transaction cost variables (FC and PEYEAR) were influential variables to the type o f 
diversification we expected. However, we found some differences. First, we expected 
that flexible current resources like financial resources may lead both related and 
unrelated diversification, whereas physical fixed resources like plant and fixed 
equipment may lead to related diversification. However, the results showed the opposite. 
When FASS was higher, they diversified into unrelated business and when CASS was 
higher, they tended to diversify into related business. Second, among transaction cost
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variables, the financial costs may lead to unrelated diversification, whereas business 
specificity may lead to related diversification. As the firms’ high financial cost means 
financial difficulty they may diversify to internalise transaction within the firms. Cross 
subsidisation from good cash-flow business may be a strong motive. On the other hand, 
if  a firm had a higher business specificity, they tended to diversified into a related 
business area, as they could utilise the know-how in the related business. However, FC 
did not appear as an influential variable and PEYEAR showed opposite results, that is, if 
the firms showed higher business specificity, they diversified into a related business only 
in case type I firms. Type II firms diversified into unrelated business as they showed 
higher business specificity.
8.4 Findings and Discussion
In this chapter, the diversification motives o f Korean housebuilding firms were 
investigated by using more than 300 firms’ data. For this, a more sophisticated 
diversification index than ‘the product-count measure’ and ‘the four-cell matrix measure’ 
used in the previous chapter was designed, considering the limitations o f the raw data. 
The diversification index was a more improved measure considering both the extent of 
diversification and heterogeneity. When we considered the status of the Korean 
housebuilding industry, four views were considered as the motives o f the diversification.
The results showed that the Korean housebuilding firms’ diversification was 
motivated by market power view, resource view, transaction cost view, and risk 
avoidance view as we expected. We expected that there may be some differences in the 
diversification motives between type I firms and type II firms. It is natural that type I 
firms showed diversified structure from the beginning when they started the 
housebuilding business. Type II firms are those who started their business in 
housebuilding first and expanded into other areas. However, there were no differences in 
the diversification motives between types of firm.
There were some differences between types of diversification. Related 
diversification was motivated by market power view, resource view, transaction cost 
view and risk avoidance view, whereas unrelated diversification was motivated by 
different views by type of firms. Unrelated diversification was motivated by market 
power view and resource view in the case of type I firms, whereas it was motivated by
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resource view, transaction cost view, and risk avoidance view in case o f type II firms. 
This means that type I firms diversify into unrelated business in order to grow further 
and to utilise their large capital and resources efficiently. Type II firms diversify into 
unrelated business in order to use their resources efficiently and to avoid risk from the 
housebuilding business. They also pursue diversification in order to reduce transaction 
costs by using their long experience and know-how in the business. This is a consistent 
result with the interview survey indicating that housebuilding firms want to diversify into 
different business showing ‘counter-cycle’ to mitigate risk and uncertainty and to 
compensate for business loss from housebuilding.
It is interesting that there were some differences in the motives o f each type o f 
diversification between types of firm. The variables indicating flexibility of resources 
(CASS and FASS) and transaction cost variables (FC and PEYEAR) were influential 
variables for type of diversification as we expected. The differences from those we 
expected were first, flexible current resources (CASS) such as financial resources led to 
related diversification, whereas physical fixed resources (FASS) like plant and fixed 
equipment led to unrelated diversification. This was an opposite result from that we 
expected. High ratio of current asset (CASS) was a significant motive in the related 
diversification for both type o f firms, whereas a high ratio of physical fixed asset (FASS) 
was a significant motive in unrelated diversification. We interpret from this that if 
building firms retained more fixed physical assets such as buildings, land or construction 
facilities, they may get easier access to outside financial loans. This is because most of 
the financial institutes want more physical assets as security for the financial transaction, 
that is, if the building firms had more physical assets, they may diversify more into 
unrelated business. This was supported by the interview results that most o f the building 
firms were using outside financing as the security o f the fixed asset.
The second difference was that among the transaction cost variables, the financial 
cost (FC) variables did not appear to be influential and only business specificity 
(PEYEAR) variable was chosen. The business specificity was an influential motive in 
related diversification for the type I firms, whereas it was a significant motive in 
unrelated diversification for the type II firms. If a building firms showed a higher 
business specificity, type I firms diversified into related business and type II firms 
diversified into unrelated business. It means if type I firms had long experience in their 
main business, and therefore had a good name in the area, they tend to diversify into 
related business areas by using their own experience and know-how without any
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additional investment. On the other hand, if type II firms had long experience in their 
main business, they tended to diversify into unrelated business, not in the related 
diversification. We may think that type II firms diversify into related business first, when 
they are small and don’t have long experience in the business. After they get some 
experience and know-how in the business, they diversify into unrelated business. This 
indicates a process o f the type II firms’ diversification.
The results gave an important meaning as to why building firms pursue 
‘diversification’ rather than ‘specialisation’ in the main business. It is a natural 
phenomenon that large-scale firms having large physical and human resources want to 
extend their business to use the excess resources efficiently and to heighten market 
power in the industry. In fact, the Korean government encouraged the large contracting 
firms to participate in housebuilding in a high growth period. The government supported 
the large firms in various ways. However, type II firms showed that they diversified into 
related business and unrelated business to avoid risk and uncertainty from housebuilding 
and to compensate for low profit from the business. Most of the hypothesised motives 
based on the interview survey and literatures were verified, however, the results could 
not show priority o f the various motives.
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Chapter 9 Economic Efficiency of Multi-Product Firms
9.1 Introduction
The application of economic theory to the housebuilding industry is rather limited 
by the many different ways in which large housebuilding firms can maximise profits. 
Profit o f the building firms can come from housing construction or from land dealing or 
from investment made by the firm in other sectors. Furthermore, building firms are 
involved in various businesses simultaneously through the diversification strategy.
In most modem large firms, a single output is exceptional. In particular, large 
firms in most industries are producing multi-products. The competitive advantage o f the 
typical multi-products firms comes from the fact that they have economy of scale in every 
stage of production. The relationship between average costs and output can be explained 
by the relation between physical quantities o f input and output summarised in production 
function. At given factor prices, as output rises, some firms use more inputs or some 
firms use fewer inputs per unit o f output. This is a kind o f technical issue about efficient 
production technique. We may say that there are economies of scales when long-run 
average costs decreases as output rises. In this context, scale refers to the size o f the firm 
as measured by its output. If  a specific industry were observed having ‘increasing returns 
to sale’, it means firms can heighten cost efficiency through the extension o f their size. 
The large firm also was distinguished by higher profits resulting from economy of scale.
In addition to economies o f scale, cost savings may result from simultaneous 
production of several different outputs in a single firm. That is, there may exist 
economies resulting from the scope of firm’s operation. Economy of scope means when 
a firm produces more than one product, total cost is lower than that when individual 
firms produce the product separately. Therefore, a single firm can provide them at a 
lower cost than several other firms, which specialised and attempted to produce and sell 
the outputs individually. Formally economies o f scope can be interpreted as a restricted 
form of subadditivity. In an industry that does not achieve economies o f scope, a multi­
product firm can be broken up into several specialised firms without any increase in cost.
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The objective o f this chapter is to analyse the economic efficiency of the 
diversified Korean housebuilding firms. It aims to investigate business scale, structure of 
cost and profit in each business and to analyse the efficiency o f the multi-production 
structure. For this, we need to estimate the cost function o f multi-product firms and then, 
to derive various efficiency measures from the estimated function.
9.2 Estimating Cost Function of Multi-Product Firms
The cost function shows the relationship between various input and output 
assuming that firms produce a single product. Multi-product cost theory has been 
developed by Baumol, Panzar and Willig (1982). They explain that it is obvious that a 
multi-product cost function possesses no natural scalar quantity over which costs may be 
‘averaged’. We cannot construct a measure o f the magnitude o f multi-product output by 
simply adding those of different products. They explain that an alternative method is to 
fix output proportions and consider the behaviour o f costs as the size of the resulting 
output package is varied. The estimations of the economy o f scale and economy o f scope 
developed by Baumol et al in 1982 have been widely used in the study about the 
efficiency and productivity o f multi-product firms.
It is necessary to estimate the production function in order to analyse the 
efficiency o f production behaviours in a specific firm or industry. In empirical analysis, 
however, it is difficult to estimate the production function, because it needs to observe all 
prices o f input factors and output. Therefore, under a hypothesis that the production 
function is homogeneous, the cost function is estimated alternatively, using Samuelson- 
Shephard Duality Theorem (Diewert, 1971). In order to measure the scale economies and 
scope economies, we first need to estimate the multi-product cost function of the 
housebuilding firms.
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9.2.1 General Form of Translog Cost Function1
To estimate economies o f scale and economies o f scope in the multi-production 
structure, the most frequently used function is the Translog cost function. This function 
has a weakness in that it cannot explain the case that the value of output is zero. 
Regardless o f the weakness, the Translog cost function has been most frequently used, 
because the other functions like the Cobb-Douglas cost function and the CES cost 
function can apply only to the single-product case.
The optimised cost function is expressed with output quantity and input factor’s 
costs. On the base of homogeneous production function, the Translog cost function is 
essentially a Taylor series expansion in output quantities and input prices and the 
function can be written as follows.
lo g r c  = a„ + £  a , ( '°g  > \) + ;!: Z 2X* (loS y. )
1=1 i k
n i  m m n m
+Z Pi (log wj )+~ Z Z Yi* c°8 wt )(log w'J+ZZ s ui (|os y> )(*°gw,)
j=\ L j h i ;
(1)
TC= total cost
y i =  output o f ith product, i=l,2,3,------,n
Wj = cost o f j*  input factor j= l,2 ,3 ,------ ,m
Basic assumptions o f the cost function, equation (1), are; first, the function should be 
linearly homogeneous in all input prices, second, should be concave in costs o f input 
factors (wj), third, output (yi ) and costs of input factors (wj.) should increase. The 
linearly homogeneity condition is satisfied when
;= i
m
Z T i.h = ° ■ ,>0 M J=1.......   m
m
iii) Z 5 i,j = ° i=1> >n
j=i
1 For a discussion of the Translog functional form, see Christensen, Jorgensen and Lau (1973), 
Denny and Pinto (1978) or Diewert (1971).
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and symmetry conditions are as follows;
iv) Oi k = 0 kl i , k= l,2 , ........ ,n
rj,h=Yh,j j , k= l,2 , ....... ,m
Equation (1) is quadratic in logarithms and linear in the unknown parameters, 
permitting easy estimation. This cost function can be estimated alone or factor share 
equations can be derived using Shephard’s lemma and the system equations can be 
estimated simultaneously. When we estimate the equation (1) under the restrictions by 
the OLS method, OLS provides a simple means of deriving unbiased estimates. 
However, it fails to incorporate ray extra information which might be extracted from a 
restricted system of cost equations. For this reason, it is deemed desirable to estimate the 
single cost equation and a set o f cost share equations simultaneously.
A system o f cost share equations can be derived directly from the Translog cost 
function by differentiating equation (1) with respect to Wj.
s h - = p ' + l Y^ (i° 8 W k ) + l 5i' ( io g y ‘) (2)
S H j  is cost share on the j*  input factor in total cost. Because o f the restriction o f linear 
homogeneity in input prices, the factor share equations must sum to one to avoid 
singularity problems. One o f the share equations must be excluded from the estimation 
process. Christensen, Jorgensen, and Lau (1973) explain that the parameter estimates are 
invariant with respect to which equation is excluded from the estimated system. We can 
gain additional degrees o f freedom by estimating the cost function and the derived cost 
share equations together as a multivariate regression system. Since the cost share 
equations do not introduce any additional unknown parameters into the estimation, it is 
known that the system estimates should be more efficient than the single equation 
estimates generated by the cost function alone (SAS User’s guide, 1985).
2 0 0
9.2.2 Modelling for estimation
The specific equations to be estimated are as follows; 
log TC = a 0 + a , log y, + a 2 log y2 + a 3 log y3
+ ^ n ( io g y i  f  +©i2 logyi !ogy2 + 0 i3 ^ g y i  !ogy3 + ^ 0 22(log y 2) 2 + 0 23 log y 2 log y 3 + ^ 0 33Oogy3 
+ p, log Wj + P 2 log w 2 + P 3 log w 3 + P 4 log w 4
+ ^  Y11 (log W! ) 2 + Y12 log w, log w 2 + Y13 log w, log w 3 + y I4 log w, log w 4
1 2 
+ 2  y  220 og W2) + y23 log w 2 log w 3 + y24 logw 2 log w 4
+ ^  Y 33(log W3 )2 + Y 34 log W3 log W4 + ^  Y44(log W4 )"
+  5,, log y ,  log Wj +  6 ,2  log yj log w 2 +  8 13 log y, log w 3 +  514 log y l log w 4 
+ S21 log y2 log w, + 5 22 log y2 log w 2 + 5 23 log y2 log w 3 + 524 log y 2 log w 4 
+ 5 31 log y3 log w, + 532 log y3 log w 2 + 533 log y3 log w 3 + 8 34 log y3 log w 4
The equation includes three output variables (yi; housebuilding, construction and other 
business outputs) and four input factor costs (wj; material, labour, contracting and fixed 
factor cost), therefore, a total o f 36 coefficients should be estimated.
Cost share equations to be estimated are expressed as follows;
SH, =p, + Yu logw, + Y12logw2 + Yi3logw3 + Y]4logw4 + 6n l o g + 5 21 logy2 + 531 logy3 
SH2 = P 2 + y 21 logw 1+Y22logw2 +Y23logw3 + Y24logw 4 + 5 12logy1 + 5 22logy2 + 5 32 logy3 
SH 3 ^P3+Y3ilogWi+Y32logW2+Y331ogw3+Y34logw4+ 5 13logy1 + 5 23logy2 + 533logy3 
SH4 = 1 -(S H 1+ S H 2 +SH 3)
As one o f the share equations has to be excluded in the estimation process, single cost 
function equation and three cost share equations are to be estimated simultaneously.
The restrictions given to the cost function are expressed as follows;
Pi + P 2 +  P 3 + P4 =  *
2 0 1
Yn + y2i + y„ +y41 = 0
Y , 2 + Y 2 2 + Y 3 2 + Y 4 2 = °
Y 13 Y23 Y 33 Y 4 3  =  ^
Y , 4 + Y 2 4 + Y 3 4 + Y 4 4 = °
8 „ +  5 , 2 +  8 ] 3 + %
II: 0
6 21 +  5 22 +  6  23 +  5 2 4  :=  0
S 31 +  5 .3 2 + ^ 3 3 +  5 3 4  ==  0
84,+  § 42 +  5 43 +  6 4 4  ==  0
Once the multi-product cost function is estimated, we can gain various efficiency 
measures from that estimated function.
Economy o f  scale
The relationship between average costs and output must be explained by the 
relation between physical quantities o f inputs and outputs summarised in the production 
function. At given factor prices, some firms use more inputs or some firms use fewer 
inputs per unit o f output, as output rises. This is a kind o f technical issue about efficient 
production technique. We may say that there are economies of scales when long-run 
average costs decrease as output rises in the fixed product mix. In this definition, scale 
refers to the size of the firm as measured by its output. If  a specific industry was 
observed as having ‘increasing returns to scale’, firms can heighten cost efficiency 
through the extension of firms’ size.
The overall economies of scale are realised when all outputs are increased by a 
common factor, and it is obtained by differentiating equation ( 1) in section 2.1 with 
respect to all y*
g  _  ^  (T; )
e “ h  &,C(y)
+ + 8",) (3)
i=l y  i ?=] 1=] k=] 1 j
2 0 2
If Se is greater than one, firms could experience ‘decreasing return to scale’, as costs rise 
proportionately more than output. Se equal to one indicates ‘constant returns to scale’ and 
the value less than one indicates ‘increasing returns to scale’.
The scale economies o f individual products are estimated in the same way. It can 
be gained by dividing each product’s marginal production cost by each product’s average 
incremental cost (AlCi) .
0C(y) c(y)dlogC(y)
SA -  d C { y '  ^ -  y ‘ '?1° g> '1 (4)
‘ e A i d  AlCi
In equation (4), average incremental cost is gained as follows;
AIC, = C (y )~ C (y-> (5)y,
In equation (4), C( y t) means the cost occurred when the firm produced only y  i . In 
equation (5), C ( y _f)means the cost occurred when the firm produced the other products 
except y . . However, the Translog cost function used in this study could not explain the 
situation when any one o f outputs is zero (yi=0). Therefore, we need an approximation in 
estimating A lC i. That is, when we calculate C(y_}),  the smallest output in each sample
is used instead o f zero, as Goldberg, Hanweck, Keenan and Young (1991) did. If  the 
estimated SAe is less than one, it means that there is economy of scale in producing ith 
output.
The degree of scale economies specific to product / are said to be increasing, 
decreasing, and constant as SAe is greater than, less than, or equal to unity, respectively.
Economy o f  scope
In addition to the economy of scale, cost savings may result from simultaneous 
production o f several different outputs in a single firm. There may be economy resulting 
from the scope o f the firm’s operation. Economy of scope may be achieved when a firm 
produces more than one product within a firm; the total cost is lower than that when 
individual firms produce the product separately. A single firm can provide several
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products at a lower cost than the aggregated cost of other firms which specialised and 
attempted to produce and sell the outputs individually. Formally economies of scope can 
be interpreted as a restricted form of subadditivity. In an industry that does not achieve 
economies o f scope, a multi-product firm can be broken up into several specialised firms 
without any increase in cost. This suggests why economies o f scope are related to 
analysis o f multi-product industry structure. For example, common utilisation o f existing 
human resources and facilities, fixed assets like building equipment, know-how about 
contracting system used in the construction business, information about market and 
customer information etc. may be important factors in reducing average costs o f the 
multi-products firms. The estimated results on ‘economy o f scope’ may give useful 
information for the readjustment o f the business areas of housebuilding firms and some 
guidelines to the direction of diversification.
Overall economies o f scope can be derived as follow;
E coo-coo
-  _»z!______________________________
C(y) (6)
Equation (6) is calculated using the estimated value from the cost function equation (1). 
C (yi) means cost occurred when a firm produces only y 4 . C(y) means cost occurred
when the firm produces all products. The equation (6) can be rewritten specifically when 
the firms produce three outputs as follows;
s c  _ (cOvi, 0 ,0)+c(o. y 2f i )+ c(Q,o, y %) -  c p i . y 2. y 2))
If the estimated value is less than zero, firms may experience ‘diseconomies o f scope’, 
whereas, if it is greater than zero, firms may experience ‘economies of scope’.
SC e < 0 : diseconomies o f scope 
SC e > 0 : economies of scope
The economies of scope in the individual product are estimated in the same way.
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s c .
_ C ( y i) + C(y_i) - C ( y )  
C(y)
i = 1,2 , m (7)
If  SCei is greater than zero, it means there is economy of scope in the 
multiproduction. It means that to produce ith products additionally within a firm with the 
other products can reduce total cost and, therefore, it is more profitable than producing ith 
products in other individual firms.
In equation (7), C (y*) means cost were incurred when a firm produces only y , .
C (y_t) means cost occurred when the firm produced the other products except y { . The
equation (7) can be rewritten specifically as follows;
s c  _ (cp>,,0 ,0 ) + c(0 , y 1, y , ) - c ( j „ y 2, y i ))
' c ( y „ y 2, y 3)
s c  _  (c(0 .y 2 .0 ) + c(y , ,0 , y , ) - c ( y l , y 2, y , ) )
C(.Vl.-Vl.-Vs) 
s c  (c(0 ,0 , y , ) + c Q i. y 2.0 ) - c ( y , , y 2, y 3))
C0'1.^2»J'3)
As discussed before, the Translog cost function cannot explain the case even 
though any one o f the outputs is zero. An approximation must be used to estimate 
economies o f scope with this functional form. When we calculate the SC ei and SCi, SC 2, 
SC3, instead o f zero value, the smallest output values in each sample have to be used.
From the definition o f economies of scope, it is clear that the presence o f such 
economies creates an incentive for specialised firms to extend their business areas. In 
practice, as the sources of economies of scope, three cases can be considered. The first 
arises where some factors of production are public. This means the case when some 
factors have been acquired for use in producing one good, they are costlessly available 
for use in producing others. The second source is the case that an input or inputs can be 
shared by the processes utilised to produce several outputs. This depends on the presence 
of inputs that are readily shared by the processes used to produce several different 
outputs. The third source arises from cost complementarities which means that the 
marginal cost o f producing one product falls as the output of another increases. This is an 
auxiliary index for evaluating the effect of scope economy.
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Cost Complementarity
We may consider estimated cost complementarity as an auxiliary index for 
evaluating the effect o f scope economy. The values o f so called ‘inter-product cost 
complementarity’ measure the change in marginal cost o f one product as a result o f a 
change in another jointly produced product. ‘Inter-product cost complementarities’ are 
defined as follow;
CM  -  ^ 2c0 ') -  ( ^ lnc(y)  ! 8 h c ( y )  d  inc(y) /g)
“ t y f t ,  y , y j  8 \a y i8 \ a y / 8 \a .y i d \ n y j
• * j
A twice differentiable multi-product cost function exhibits cost 
complementarities over the product set. If  CM/ is less than zero (-), we may say there 
exists an inter-product cost complementarity. The sign o f CM/ depends on the sign o f the 
first term within the brackets. This term is the estimated coefficient o f the output 
interaction terms in cost function equation (1). As the other terms are restricted to be 
positive on theoretical grounds, a negative value for the first term in the brackets is a 
necessary condition, but not sufficient condition for the existence o f inter-product cost 
complementarities between each product.
The results of cost complementarities between businesses may be used as a 
guideline of decision making when the firms choose cost efficient business areas, that is, 
they may give some information about the direction of business expansion. For example, 
if the cost complementarity between businesses is less than zero, a joint production 
strategy is regarded as more cost efficient. According to the estimates o f the cost 
complementarity, the firms may evaluate whether they operate multi-business efficiently. 
Based on the information, they may decide to expand the scale o f business further or 
specialise in the original business.
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9.3 Description of Data
9.3.1 D ata Sources
The sample firms used in this analysis were limited designated firms and 
registered firms. The total number of samples was 318 firms as shown in Table 9-1.
Table 9-1 Number o f samples
Type of firms No. of sample
Designated firms 
Registered firms
234
84
Total 318
The data used were taken from ‘Annual Business Report’ o f each building firm 
published by the Korea Stock Exchange. All registered firms have an obligation to report 
their business performance every year by standard form. According to a standardised 
form, the firms should report details of annual business; company profile, capital 
increase, share ownership, officers and employees, major business, sales of major 
product, income statement, schedule o f cost o f goods manufactured, statement o f cash 
flow, statement o f appropriation of retained earnings, stock price, key securities analysis 
and investment indices, financial analysis, and CPA’s opinion.
The variables required for estimation o f the cost function o f multi-product firms 
are; total cost as a dependent variable, output variables from different business, and input 
factor variables as independent variables. We could get the necessary variables from the 
‘Annual Business Report’. Each firms’ income statement provides all costs and profits 
occurring in each year. Output variables of major business could be obtained from sales 
of major products. Even though housebuilding is classified in the construction business 
by KSIC code, building firms usually aggregate the housebuilding data separately from 
the construction data. However, the output variables were available only for three years, 
from 1993 to 1995. Therefore, the analysis period in this chapter was limited to three 
years from 1993 to 1995.
The three-year period is regarded as a ‘stable period’ for the analysis in some 
points of view. First, the outcome o f housebuilding during the period was in ‘stable 
status’ at about 600,000 dwellings per year since 1992 when ‘the construction
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programme for two million dwellings’ was finished. During the mass construction 
periods, the output o f housebuilding was not stable2. Second, during this period, the 
government’s investment level on housing stayed at 7 percent which is a similar level to 
that o f most of the advanced countries. Third, housing prices also stabilised during that 
period. Korea experienced housing speculation in the late 1980s and house prices 
decreased after the beginning o f the 1990s and then stabilised during the period of 
analysis. Considering the above three points, the three-year period is not long enough to 
reflect all business conditions o f building firms; however, the period is regarded as ‘the 
most stable period’ after experiencing a fluctuating housebuilding cycle between the mid 
1980s and the beginning of the 1990s.
Table 9-2 shows the various costs and profits used in this analysis. As the 
variables reflecting scale o f the firms, number of employees, capital, and total sales were 
considered. Total sales, cost o f goods sold, and profits o f sales are classified into three 
businesses; construction, housebuilding, and the other businesses.
The cost o f goods sold (2) means ‘on-site building cost’ as a direct cost in the 
housebuilding business. Overhead costs (4) means indirect costs to perform the business. 
This includes all the wages o f employees from the managerial level to the daily 
employed, bonus and welfare costs. All kinds of other costs incurred for operating the 
business are also included. For example, employees’ training costs, depreciation, 
insurance, advertising, transportation, travelling, and various kinds o f taxes and fees 
payable etc. are included in the overhead costs. Extra costs (6) mean those not directly 
related to the year’s business but which should be paid. For example, interest from 
borrowed money, loss on disposal of marketable securities, loss o f foreign currency 
transaction, donation costs, and other miscellaneous losses are included. In the case of 
Korean housebuilding firms, interest costs make up a large proportion (about 88 %)  of 
extra cost.
The difference between total sales (1) and cost of goods sold (2) o f each year is 
‘profit o f sales’ (3). When the overheads costs (4) are deducted from the profit o f sales 
(3), operating profits (5) are calculated. Operating profits mean that which resulted from
2 No. of new construction of houses (unit: dwelUngs)1980 1985 1988 1989 1990211,537 227,362 316,570 462,159 750,3781991 1992 1993 1994 1995
613,083 574.492 695,319 622,854 619,057Source: Ministry of Construction and Transportation
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the firms’ original business. Extra profits (6) are considered as that not directly related to 
the business, that which happened during the operating year. It includes interest received, 
gain on disposal o f marketable securities, rent received and dividend income etc. I f  extra 
profit is added to, and extra cost is deducted from the operating profit, ordinary profit (8) 
is calculated.
Table 9-2 Items for analysis
Total firms
N=318 %
Scale of business No. of employees 
Capital 
Total sales
901
58,673
267,452
Total sales (1) Total
Construction
Housebuilding
Others
267,452
161,256
79,730
26,466
100.00
Cost of goods sold (2) Total
Construction
Housebuilding
Others
229,782
141,330
66,670
21,781
85.91
Profit of sales (3) Total
Construction
Housebuilding
Others
37,671
19,926
13,060
4,685
14.09
Overhead cost (4) 15,980 5.97
Operating profits (S) 21,691 8.11
Extra profits (6) Total
Interest profit 
Other profit
8,773
5,899
2,874
3.28
Extra costs (7) Total
Interest cost 
Other cost
27,344
24,093
3,251
10.02
Ordinary profits (8) 3,472 1.30
According to Table 9-2, the direct cost of the firms’ operation is about 86  % of 
total sales and overhead cost is about 6 % on average. Operating profit is about 8 % of 
total sales. However, if the extra cost and extra profit are deducted and added, ordinary 
profit o f the firms decreased into 1.3 % of the total sales. The table shows that extra cost 
consists o f quite a high proportion at about 10 % of total sales.
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9.3.2 The Structures of Cost and Production in the Sample Firms
Before estimating cost function, in this section we examined whether the sample 
firms’ business scale, structure o f production, sales profit and the structures o f cost and 
profit are different by size of firms. To describe the structures o f cost and production by 
the different sizes o f the firms, the sample was divided into four groups based on firms’ 
total sales. As a cut-off point, quarter values o f sales were used. If the firms’ sales were 
less than a quarter of total sales, the firms were classified as small firms. I f  the firms’ 
sales were between a quarter and a half o f total sales, the firms were classified as 
medium firms. If the firms’ sales were between a half and three-quarters o f total sales, 
the firms were classified as large firms. I f  the firms’ sales were over three quarters of 
total sales, the firms were classified as very large firms. Table 9-3 shows the 
classification and number o f samples in each group.
Table 9-3 Classification of firms
Group Size o f  Firms No. o f  
samples
Small firms Total sales <45,577 million won 76
Medium firms 45,577 million won <= total sales <126,000 million won 81
Large firms 126,000 million won <= total sales <300,000 million won 82
Very large firms 300,000 million won <= total sales 79
Total firms 318
Table 9-4 shows the business scale, structure o f costs and profits by different sizes of 
firms.
Business Scale
As we can see in Table 9-4, there were quite big differences in business scale 
among different sizes of firms (small, medium, large and very large firms). As the 
variables reflecting firms’ business scale, we used number o f employees, capital and 
scale o f total sales. When we compared these variables based on the value o f very large 
firms, the differences were shown in Figure 26. The number o f employees o f the other 
three groups were quite small compared to that of very large firms. It is noticeable that 
medium firms’ capital was smaller that o f small firms. Figure 27 shows the scale o f total
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sales. Sales o f the small firms was only 2.76 % o f that o f very large firms. Those of 
medium firms and large firms were each 10.05 % and 22.71 % to that o f very large 
firms.
Table 9-4 Structure o f cost and profit by size of firms (unit: million won, %)
Small Firms Medium firms Large firms Very large firms
N=76 % N=81 % N=82 % N=79 %
Scale of business No. of employees 
Capital 
Total sales
88
5,192
21,778
3.21
2.63
2.76
231
1,151
79,243
8.36
0.58
10.05
530
31,726
179,075
19.23
16.10
22.71
2,757
197,073
788,505
100.00
100.00
100.00
Total sales (1) Total
Construction
Housebuilding
Others
21,778
9,883
11,122
774
100.00 79,243
44,413
31,747
3,082
100.00 179,075
107,982
59,652
11,441
100.00 788,505
481,980
215,772
90,753
100.00
Costs of goods sold 
(2)
Total
Construction
Housebuilding
Others
18,781
8,738
9,482
561
86.24 67,856
38,981
26,391
2,484
85.63 151,346
93,890
48,642
8,814
84.52 680,209
423,069
181,699
75,441
86.27
Profit of sales (3) Total
Construction
Housebuilding
Others
2,997
1,145
1,639
213
14.25 11,387
5,433
5,356
598
14.25 27,729
14,092
11,011
2,627
15.48 108,296
58,911
34,073
15,312
13.73
Overhead costs (4) 1,816 8.34 6,582 8.31 11,504 6.42 43,886 5.57
Operating profits
(5)
1,181 5.42 4,805 6.06 16,225 9.06 64,409 8.17
Extra profits (6) Extra profits (6)
Interest profits 
Other profits
558
441
117
2.56 2,477
1,822
655
3.13 5,629
4,115
1,514
3.14 26,395
17,182
9,213
3.35
Extra costs (7) Extra costs (7) 
Interest costs 
Other costs
1,851
1,639
213
8.50 8,131
7,139
992
10.26 17,799
15,494
2,305
9.94 81,476
72,004
9,472
10.33
Ordinary profits
(8)
Ordinary profits 
(8)
-115 -0.53 527 0.67 4,056 2.26 9,335 1.18
Figures 9-1 and 9-2 show that there are big differences in business scale of the 
Korean housebuilding firms by size of firms. The differences between large firms and 
very large firms are much bigger (more than 70 % point) than those among small, 
medium and large firms. It suggests that the very large firms may show some differences 
in the structures o f cost, production, and profits from those of the other group o f firms.
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Figure 9-1 Scale of business by size of firms Figure 9-2 Scale of total sales by size of firms
Structures o f  Production and Sales Profit
We found that all sample firms were performing construction business and other 
unrelated business, besides housebuilding. Table 9-5 and Figure 28 showed the structure 
o f production o f each group o f firm.
Table 9-5 Structure of production (Unit: million won, %)
Small firms Medium firms Large firms Very large Finns
N=76 % N=81 % N=82 % N=79 %
Total Sales 
Construction 
Housebuilding 
Others
21.778
9.883
11.122
774
100.00
45.38
51.07
3.55
79,243
44,413
31,747
3,082
100.00
56.05
40.06 
3.89
179,075
107,982
59,652
11,441
100.00
60.30
33.31 
6.39
788,505
481,980
215,772
90,753
100.00
61.13
27.36
11.51
We may find a trend in Figure 9-3. As the size of firms increases, the proportion 
of housebuilding business decreases and the proportions o f construction and other 
business increase. Large and very large firms show a similar pattern in the structure of 
production. They were carrying out about 60 percent of construction business and very 
large firms showed a rather high proportion of other business (12%). Small firms were 
carrying out the highest proportion of the housebuilding business (51 %) and the ratio of 
other business was rather low.
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Figure 9-3 The structure of production
The structure of sales profit was also similar to that of production. Table 9-6 and 
Figure 9-4 showed the structure o f sales profit. As the size of firms increases, they 
achieved higher a proportion of profits from construction and other business and a lower 
proportion o f profit from housebuilding. In the case o f very large firms, about 55 % of 
total profit resulted from the construction business, and 30 %  from housebuilding and 
14 % from other business. In the case o f small firms, about 55 % of total profit resulted 
from housebuilding.
Table 9-6 The structure of sales profit (unit, million won, %)
Small Firms Medium firms Large firms Very large firms
N=76 % N=81 % N=82 % N=79 %
Total profit o f sales 2,997 100.00 11,387 100.00 27,729 100.00 108,296 100.00
Construction 1,145 38.19 5,433 47.71 14,092 50.82 58,911 54.40
Housebuilding 1,639 54.69 5,356 47.03 11,011 39.71 34,073 31.46
Others 213 7.12 598 5.26 2,627 9.47 15,312 14.14
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Figure 9-4 The structure of sales profit
Every group o f firms achieved some profits ffom other business. Very large firms 
showed the highest profit (14 %) from other businesses. Small and medium firms also 
showed a high profit (5-7 %) compared to the sales scale o f the other business.
When we compare the scales o f sales and profit o f each business, we found 
interesting figures. Relatively high profits were realised from housebuilding, whereas 
relatively low profits were realised from construction. Figure 9-5 showed the 
proportions o f sales and profit realised in construction. Every group of firms showed that 
the proportion of sales is higher than those of profit (very large firms: 54.40% profit/ 
61.13 % sales; large firms: 50.82 % profit/60.30 %  sales; medium firms: 47.71 % profits/ 
56.05 % sales; small firms. 38.19 % profits/ 45.38 % sales).
Figure 9-6 also shows the case in the housebuilding business. Every group of 
firms shows that proportions o f profit are higher than those o f sales in housebuilding 
(very large firms: 31.46% profit/27.36% sales; large firms; 39.71% profit/33.31 %  sales; 
medium firms: 47.03 % profit/ 40.06 %  sales; small firms: 54.69% profit/51.07 % sales). 
This means that when we consider only direct production costs, housebuilding is more 
profitable than construction.
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Structure o f  Cost and Profit
Table 9-4 also shows the ratio of various costs and profits to total sales. Cost of 
goods sold as a direct production cost were commonly about 85 % of total sales. As a 
result, profits from the direct sales were shown as 13-15 percent to total sales in every 
group of firms.
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Figure 9-7 Ratio of profit o f sales, overhead costs and 
operating profit to total sales
Figure 9-7 shows profit o f direct sales, overhead costs and operating profit in 
every group o f firms. First, it shows that as the size o f firms increases, the ratios o f sales 
profit decreases. Second, it shows that the ratio o f overhead costs decreases, as the size 
of firms increases (8.34 %  -> 5.57 % ) .  As a result, relatively high operating profit was
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realised in large firms and very large firms (9.06 %, 8.13 %) compared with small and 
medium firms (5.4 %, 0.06 %). That is, large scale firms achieved higher operating 
profits due to small overhead costs.
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Figure 9-8 Scale o f ordinary profit by size of firms
Figure 9-8 shows the scale of extra cost, extra profit and ordinary profit in each 
group o f firms. Extra profits were realised on a similar level (2.5-3.3 % to total sales). 
Extra costs were about 8-10 % of total sales. It is known that most of the extra costs are 
interest costs which ensued from borrowed funds. After considering the extra cost and 
extra profit, small firms achieved some loss, whereas the other firms achieved positive 
but rather low ordinary profit (0.27-2.26 %).
Summarising the structure of cost and profit, there were no big differences in the 
direct production costs and direct profits among firms. They achieved commonly 
14-15 % profit from direct production. However, as indirect costs, overhead costs and 
extra costs showed some different ratio among groups. In large firms and very large 
firms, relatively low overhead cost and relative high extra profits resulted in relatively 
high ordinary profit. In the case o f medium and small firms, relatively high extra costs 
and high overhead costs may be major reasons to reduce the level o f ordinary profit.
■  extra profit 
U extra cost 
□  ordinary profit
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9.3.3 Differences by Type of Firms
To examine the structure of cost and production from another point of view, the 
sample firms were divided into two groups by different type o f firms. Table 9-7 shows 
business scale, the structure of costs and profits by different type of firms.
Table 9-7 The structure o f cost and profit by type of firms 
________________   (unit: million won, %)
Type][firms Type II firms
N=207 % N =lll %
Scale of business No. of employees 
Capital 
Total sales
1,163
78,729
318,419
100.00
100.00
100.00
415
21,273
172,406
35.66
27.02
54.14
Total sales (1) Total
Construction
Housebuilding
Others
318,419
217,231
65,601
35,587
100.00 172,406
56,872
106,079
9,455
100.00
Costs of goods sold 
(2)
Total
Construction
Housebuilding
Others
273,697
189,877
54,309
29,511
85.96 147,885
50,797
89,722
7,366
85.78
Profit of sales (3) Total
Construction
Housebuilding
Others
44,722
27,354
11,292
6,076
14.04 24,521
6,075
16,357
2,089
14.22
Overhead costs (4) 18,841 5.92 10,643 6.17
Operating profits 
(5)
25,881 8.13 13,878 8.05
Extra profits (6) Total
Interest profits 
Other profits
10,932
7,314
3,618
3.43 4,747
3,261
1,486
2.75
Extra costs (7) Total
Interest costs 
Other costs
32,106
28,532
3,573
10.08 18,464
15,815
2,650
10.71
Ordinary profits (8) 5,248 1.65 158 0.09
Business Scale
Figure 9-9 and Figure 9-10 show business scale o f two types of firms. Type II 
firms were smaller than type I firms in the scale o f business. The size o f employees of
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type II firms was about 36 % of the one of type I firms. The scales of capital and sales of 
type II firms were about 27 % and 54 % of those of type I firms.
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Figure 9-9 Scale of business by type of firms Figure 9-10 Scale of total sales by type of firms
Structure o f Production and Sales Profit
As shown in Table 9-8, type I firms performed mainly in the construction 
business (68.22 %) and a rather high proportion of other business (11.83 %). Type II 
firms carried out mainly housebuilding (61.53 %) and relatively a low proportion of 
other businesses (5.48 %) than type I firms.
Table 9-8 Structure of production (unit: million won)
Type I firms Type II firms
N=207 % N = ll 1 %
Total sales 
Construction 
Housebuilding 
Others
318,419
217,231
65,601
35,587
100.00
68.22
20.60
11.18
172,406
56,872
106,079
9,455
100.00
32.99
61.53
5.48
Table 9-9 shows the structure of sales profit and it shows a similar pattern to that of 
production. Both types of firm achieved relatively high profits from housebuilding 
compared to the profits from construction. This explains that why, when we consider
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only direct production costs, housebuilding is more profitable than construction. Figures 
9-11 and 9-12 shows the contents.
Table 9-9 Structure o f sales profit (unit: million won)
Type I firms Type II firms
N=207 % N = l l l %
Total profit of sales 
Construction 
Housebuilding 
Others
44,722
27,354
11,292
6,076
100.00
61.16
25.25
13.59
24,521
6,075
16,357
2,089
100.00
24.77
66.71
8.52
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Figure 9-11 Ratio of sales and profit Figure 9-12 Ratio of sales and profit
in the construction business in the housebuilding Business
Structure o f  Cost and Profits
Table 9-7 also shows various costs and profits in each type of firm. There were 
no big differences between firms in the ratios of sales, cost o f goods sold, profit o f sales, 
overhead costs and operating profits. Type II firms show a slightly high ratio o f overhead 
cost and extra cost and a slightly low ratio of extra profit. As a result, the level of 
ordinary profit o f type II firms was nearly 0 % of total sales. Figure 38 and Figure 39 
show ratios o f each cost and profit to total sales.
Summarising the above, there were no big differences in the structures of 
production and cost between type of firms. The difference was that the scale o f business 
in type II firms was about 30 -50 percent of those in type I firms and type II firms 
achieved a lower level o f profits despite the high profitability o f housebuilding.
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overhead costs and operating profits and ordinary profits
From the simple descriptive analysis on the structures of production and costs of 
Korean housebuilding firms, we found some attributes. First, there were some 
differences in business scale between type o f firms and by size of firms. The very large 
firms showed larger business scale in number of employees, sales and capital than the 
other three groups of firms. There were no big differences among the other three sizes of 
firms. Second, there were no differences in the structure of production among firms. The 
structure of production and the structure of profit were similar among each type of firms 
and each size o f firms. Nearly all the firms were involved in various businesses. The 
difference was that medium, large and very large firms all showed a higher proportion of 
construction business, whereas small firms showed high depending ratio on 
housebuilding business. Large firms and very large firms were more diversified into 
unrelated businesses than medium and small firms. Third, when we considered only 
direct production costs, housebuilding was more profitable than construction. However, 
finally large firms and type I firms showed higher profits. The reason that smaller firms 
and most o f the type II firms achieved lower ordinary profits may be due to the higher 
ratio o f overhead costs, extra costs and relatively lower ratio o f extra profits. It is 
noteworthy that Table 4 shows that large firms achieved a higher ratio of ordinary profits 
to sales (2.26 %) than very large firms (1.18 %).
■  extra profit 
EH extra cost 
□  ordinary profit
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9.4 Estimation of Model
9.4.1 Number of Sample and Operational Definition of Used Variables
For estimation of the model, a total o f 36 coefficients need to be estimated. To 
compensate for shortage of numbers o f samples, pooled data of time-series data and 
cross-sectional data were used and the total number o f samples was 318. However, only 
201  firms’ data were included in the regression due to missing data. As many missing 
data were found in small and medium group firms, the two groups, small firms and 
medium firms, were united into one group as shown in Table 9-10.
Table 9-10 Number o f samples used
for estimation o f cost function
Sample used
Small and medium firms 55
Large firms 71
Very large firms 75
Total 201
The operational definitions o f the variables are as shown in Table 9-11. All 
variables were expressed in nominal monetary terms and all prices were discounted with 
GNP deflator index based on year 1993. The total cost included all costs which accrued 
in each year. The output in each year was divided into three groups, on the basis o f sales; 
construction, housebuilding, and other businesses. As input factor variables, four costs 
were considered. As the main composition o f direct cost, material factor costs, labour 
factor costs and contracting factor cost were considered. Fixed factor cost was 
considered as an indirect cost. The fixed factor costs include overhead costs in both main 
office and building site, leasing cost for building plant and facilities, extra cost such as 
interest cost happened from borrowed fund.
If  we use nominal monetary data, the problem of multicollinearity may arise. If 
high multicollinearity was observed in the model, the estimated coefficient was unstable. 
The results of economies of scale and economies of scope estimated from the model may 
be different, according to the variables chosen in the model. To minimise the 
multicollinearity between variables, input factor costs were standardised by the variables 
indicating total operating scale as shown in Table 9-11. Then input factor variables were
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used as ratio variables, not nominal variables. According to this, correlations between 
variables became low and multicollinearity problem could be improved.
Table 9-11 Operational definitions of variables
Variables Operational definition
Dependent
variable
Total cost (TC)
All the cost arising for business 
in each year
-on-site building costs (direct cost) 
+overhead costs (indirect cost) + 
interest cost
Output
variables
-yl: construction output 
-y2 : housebuilding output 
-y3: other business output
-construction sales per year 
-housebuilding sales per year 
-other business sales per year
Input factor 
variables
-wl: material factor cost 
-w2 : labour factor cost 
-w3: contracting factor cost 
-w4: fixed factor cost
-material factor price/total costs 
-labour factor price/ no. of employees 
-contracting price/total costs 
-fixed factor price/ total costs
9.4.2 Estimation Method
The estimations were performed using SAS programme (6.08 version). The 
Translog cost function has to be estimated with the cost share equations as a multiple 
regression system. In this case, current endogenous variables in the equation (1) are used 
as regressors in other cost share equations (2). OLS estimates are biased and inconsistent, 
because a critical assumption o f OLS is that the regressors are not correlated with the 
residual. Therefore, the Seemingly Unrelated Regressions (SUR) method was used to 
estimate the system of equations. It is known that the Seemingly Unrelated Regression 
(SUR) estimation method is useful when we believe that error terms are 
contemporaneously correlated across equations. The SUR estimation method uses the 
estimates of the covariance of residuals across equations in an attempt to improve the 
efficiency o f estimates3.
Furthermore, we can gain additional degrees o f freedom by estimating the cost 
function and the derived cost share equations together as a multiple regression system, 
because the cost share equations do not introduce any additional unknown parameters 
into the estimation. Therefore, it is known that the system estimates method is more 
efficient than the single equation estimates generated by the cost function alone.
3 SAS Users’ Guide, 5th Edition.
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The ‘syslin’ procedure in SAS statistical programme was used in estimating 
parameters in the system of equations composed with equation (1) and (2). Estimation 
was carried out with total firms and by size of firms separately. The estimation results 
were reported in Appendix 7, because the estimated results of cost function are not the 
main concern in this study. The estimations of the model by the SUR technique were 
statistically significant
Adjusted R2 showing explaining degree of explanatory variables are shown as 
high (0.987 for total firms, 0.9571 - 0.9748 for different size o f firms). F-values showing 
the adequacy of the model are shown as statistically significant. Most of the estimates 
were statistically significant, despite the fact that the large number o f variables to be 
estimated were included in the regression. Among 36 coefficients, 24 were found to be 
statistically significant at 1% probability level and the goodness o f fit (the associated 
standard errors and T values o f these estimates) were satisfactory.
Durbin-Watson valued showing adequacy o f the model were estimated as about
1.4 except in the very large firms (1.06). If D-W value is near 2 , it means error terms are 
normally distributed and there is no relationship between residuals. I f  the D-W value is 
near to 0 or 4, it means there is positive or negative relations between residuals, 
therefore, the model is not adequate. We can say the estimation model used in this 
analysis is adequate.
In order to examine whether the estimated cost function shows an adequate cost 
structure or not, we investigated Allen’s own substitution elasticities. The elasticities 
must be estimated negative to satisfy the condition. The elasticities can be calculated as 
below;
O-,, = Tn / SHt - 1
Yu = estimated coefficient o f ith input factor
SHi=average share ratio of ith factor in the cost function
Table 9-12 Allen’s own substitution elasticities of each input factor__________
Total Firms Small/Medium
Firms
Large
Firms
Very large 
Firms
Material factor -0.0989 -0.1322 -0.0868 -0.0747
Labour factor -0.8037 -0.9580 -0.9662 -0.8126
Subcontracting factor -0.1160 -0.0935 -0.1264 -0.1692
Fixed factor -0.1105 -0.1438 -0.0501 -0.1018
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The substitution elasticities by groups are shown in Table 9-12. The substitution 
elasticities in each group were all observed to be negative. Therefore, we may consider 
the cost function was estimated adequately and we can estimate the further efficiency 
measures from the cost function.
9.5 Results
9.5.1 Economies of Scale
In the total sample, overall economy of scale was estimated as 0.98 and it is 
statistically significant at one percent level. However, as the value is nearly one, we can 
interpret it as ‘constant returns to scale’ in the Korean housebuilding industry. However, 
when we divided the sample into three groups by size of firms, the results were slightly 
different. For all groups of firms, ‘increasing returns to scale’ was observed as shown in 
Table 9-13. Especially in the case o f a large group o f firms, highest increasing returns to 
scale was detected (0 .86). The economies o f scale were all statistically significant at one 
percent level.
Table 9-13 Economies o f scale
Total firms 
(201)
Small/Medium 
Firms (55)
Large firms 
(75)
Very large 
firms (71)
Means of total sales 
(million won)
267,452 51,426 179,075 788,505
Overall economy of scale 
(Se)
0.98***
(0 .0 0 2 )
0.94***
(0.013)
0 .8 6 ***
(0.014)
0.97***
(0.006)
- construction business 6.04
(4.413)
8.63
(6.441)
5.96***
(0.697)
9 44*** 
(0.242)
- housebuilding business 30.36
(32.318)
-78.94
(84.991)
23.48
(18.633)
8.37***
(2.289)
- other business 8.47
(12.609)
-7 81*** 
(9.370)
3.94
(4.289)
4 i9***
(0.189)
( ): standard error * : significant at 10 % level *** : significant at 1 % level
Se< 1:increasing returns to scale, Se=l:constant returns to scale, Se>l:decreasing returns to scale
When we considered the economy of scale in the individual business, every case 
showed ‘decreasing returns to scale’ except the case of housebuilding and other business 
in small/medium firms. The construction business in particular, showed significant 
‘decreasing returns to scale’ in both large and very large firms. In the case o f very large 
firms, all individual businesses showed statistically significant ‘decreasing returns to 
scale’. To find out any difference between type o f firms in each size o f firms, the sample
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was divided into subgroups. Table 9-14, 9-15, 9-16 gave us economies of scale by type 
o f firms in each size o f firms.
Table 9-14 Economies o f scale in small/medium firms
Small/medium 
firms (55)
Type I firms 
(27)
Type II firms 
(28)
Means of total sales 
(million won)
51,426 54,004 48,459
Overall economy of 
scale (Se)
0.94***
(0.013)
0.89***
(0.015)
0.98***
(0.0170)
- construction 8.63
(6.441)
5.27***
(0.276)
11.88
(12.732)
- housebuilding -78.94
(84.991)
-173.42
(172.832)
12.15***
(3.775)
- other business -7 81*** 
(9.370)
1.20***
(0.229)
-16.51
(18.416)
( ): standard error *** : significant at 1 % evel
Se< l:increasing returns to scale, Se=l:constant returns to scale, Se>l.decreasing returns to scale
Table 9-15 Economies o: * scale in large firms
Large firms 
(71)
Type I firms 
(52)
Type II firms 
(19)
Means of total sales 
(million won)
179,075 175,339 189,929
Overall economy of 
scale (Se)
0 .8 6 ***
(0.014)
0 .8 8 ***
(0.016)
0.79***
(0.026)
- construction 5.96***
(0.697)
4 49*** 
(0.161)
10.21***
(2.452)
- housebuilding 23.48
(18.633)
30.51
(25.437)
4.25***
(0.280)
- other business 3.94
(4.289)
8.66***
(2.619)
-8.73
(14.012)
( ): standard error *** : significant at 1 % level
Se< liincreasing returns to scale, Se=l:constant returns to scale, Se>l.decreasing returns to scale
Table 9-16 Economies o:? scale in very large firms
Very large firms 
(75)
Type I firms 
(58)
Type II firms 
(47)
Means of total sales 
(million won)
788,505 817,433 683,001
Overall economy of 
scale (Se)
0.97***
(0.006)
0.98***
(0.007)
0.93***
(0 .0 1 1 )
- construction 9 44*** 
(0.242)
8.65***
(0.190)
12.31***
(0.353)
- housebuilding 8.37***
(2.289)
8.61***
(2.975)
7.52***
(0.363)
- other business 4  i9***
(0.189)
4.02***
(0.181)
4 7 3 *** 
(0.551)
( ): standard error *** : significant at 1 % level
Se< 1:increasing returns to scale, Se=l:constant returns to scale, Se>l:decreasing returns to scale
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These results gave some interesting information to us. In the case of 
small/medium firms, type I firms showed slightly higher ‘economies of scale’ than type 
II firms. It is also noteworthy that for construction business, significant ‘decreasing 
returns to scale’ was detected in type I firms, whereas for housebuilding business, 
significant ‘decreasing return to sale’ was detected in type II firms. In case o f large firms 
and very large firms, type II firms showed higher economies of scale than type I firms. 
For all individual business, ‘decreasing returns to scale’ were commonly detected.
Summarising the above results, we can say ‘increasing returns to scale’ were 
observed in the Korean housebuilding industry. This means that if a firm extended its 
business scale, the firm could expect cost efficiency by reducing its average cost. This 
suggests an enlargement strategy o f business size was advantageous under the current 
cost structure. The degree of scale economies were slightly different in each size of firm. 
Large firms whose total sales was about 179,075 million won showed the highest scale 
economy (0 .86). Small/medium firms showed higher economy scale (0.94) than very 
large firms (0.97). When we considered it by type o f firms in each size o f firms, the sub­
samples showed slightly different estimates. In small/ medium firms, type I firms 
showed higher economies o f scale, whereas in large and very large firms, type II firms 
showed higher economies o f scale. This suggests that there may be optimum scale 
showing highest economy of scale.
9.5.2 Economies of Scope
All the results o f overall economies of scope and economies of scope in the 
individual product were estimated as being greater than zero as shown in Table 9-17. 
This means strong economies o f scope were detected in the most businesses. In 
particular, economies o f scope in construction (1.01) and housebuilding (0.90) were 
somewhat higher than other unrelated business (0.46). All the results were also 
statistically significant at one percent level. This means that diversifying into other 
businesses -related or unrelated - may be efficient in the Korean housebuilding industry. 
Table 90 also shows economies o f scope in each size of firms. There was no difference 
between large firms and medium/small firms. However, very large firms showed higher 
economies o f scope (1.71). Individual scope economies were shown differently by size 
o f firms. All individual scope economies were detected as being highest in very large 
firms. It is outstanding that in the case of large firms, overall scope economy and
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individual scope economies are observed as being lower than those of small/medium 
firms (except for the case o f other business).
Table 9-17 Economies of scope
Total firms Small/medium Large firms Very large firms
(201) firms (55) (71) (75)
Overall economy of j 4^*** 1.33*** 1.30*** j  7j***
scope (See) (0.005) (0.009) (0.007) (0.005)
- construction (SCI) 1.01*** 0.88*** 0 79*** 0 g9***
(0.008) (0 .011) (0.008) (0.002)
- housebuilding (SC2) 0.90*** 0.87*** 0.81*** q 39***
(0.006) (0 .011) (0.008) (0.002)
- other business (SC3) 0.46*** 0.46*** 0.51*** 0.82***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004)
( ): standard error *** : significant at 1 % level
SC e < 0 : diseconomies of scope, SC e > 0 : economies of scope
When we measured the economies o f scope by type o f firms, we found similar 
results to the above. Both firms showed statistically strong economies of scope. Type II 
firms showed higher overall scope economy. Type I firms showed higher individual 
scope economy in the construction business, whereas type II firms showed higher 
individual scope economy in housebuilding and other business. This means that type II 
firms can get higher cost efficient effect from diversification strategy.
Table 9-18 Economy of scope by type o f firms
Type I firms (137) Type II firms (64)
Overall economy of 1.43*** 1.59***
scope(SCe) (0.005) (0.005)
- construction j 01*** q 90***
(0.008) (0.006)
- housebuilding 0 .88*** 0.92***
(0.006) (0.007)
- other business 0.50*** 0 .68***
(0.003) (0.008)
( ): standard error *** : significant at 1 % level
SC e ^  0 . diseconomies of scope, SC e ^  0 . economies of scope
Economies of scope by type of firms in each size o f firm were tried; however, there is no 
difference in economies of scope between type of firms.
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9.5.3 Inter-product Cost Complementarity
Table 9-19 shows cost complementarity o f total sample firms and of each size 
group o f firms. In total firms, significant inter-product cost complementarity was 
observed between construction and other business. This suggests that building firms got 
cost efficiency when they carried out construction and other business at the same time.
Table 9-19 Cost complementarity
Output combination 
(CMii)
Total firms 
(201)
Small/Medium 
firms (55)
Large firms 
(71)
Very large 
firms (75)
-construction
/housebuilding
-8.55E-10
(5.79E-10)
-8.73E-10
(3.49E-08)
-6.56E-10***
(2.57E-10)
-1.30E-11
(2.89E-11)
-construction 
/other business
-1.41E-08*
(9.54E-09)
-5.24E-08**
(7.45E-07)
-3.15E-08
(4.43E-08)
1.24E-10***
(2.04E-11)
-housebuilding 
/other business
-6.69E-10
(4.91E-09)
3.56E-09**
(1.90E-10)
-5.92E-08*
(2.21E-08)
1.93E-10***
(3.35E-11)
CMij <0 : cost complementarity between y4 and yj.
CMjj >0 : cost non-complementarity between y, and yj.
* : significant at 10 % level ** : significant at 5 % level *** : significant at 1 % level
There were some differences in each size o f firms. In the case o f small/medium 
firms, significant cost complementarity was observed only between construction and 
other business. A significant cost complementarity between housebuilding and other 
business was not observed. In the case o f large firms, significant cost complementarity 
was detected between construction and housebuilding and between housebuilding and 
other business. In the case o f very large firms, significant cost complementarity was 
lacking between construction and other business and between housebuilding and other 
business.
The results mean that if  small firms performed construction and other business 
simultaneously, they could get cost complementarity. It also says that large firms could 
get cost efficiency through diversification into related business (between construction 
and housebuilding) and unrelated business (between housebuilding and other business). 
In the case of very large firms, the firms could not get any cost efficiency from unrelated 
diversification.
To find any difference between types o f firms in each size o f firms, the sample 
was subdivided. The results are shown in Table 9-20, 9-21, 9-22. In the case of 
small/medium firms, the results were different between types o f firms. Both types of 
firm could achieve cost complementarity only between construction and other business.
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This shows that type II firms could not achieve cost complementarity between 
housebuilding and other business significantly. This result suggests that in small/medium 
firms, joint production o f housebuilding and unrelated other business is not cost efficient. 
It is an unexpected result that type II firms having a high ratio in the housebuilding can 
achieve a cost efficient effect from joint production between construction and other 
business.
Table 9-20 Cost complementarity in small/medium firms
Output combination 
(CM,)
Small/medium 
firms (55)
Type I firms 
(27)
Type II firms 
(25)
-construction
/housebuilding
-8.73E-10
(3.49E-08)
2.03E-10
(3.92E-09)
-1.91E-09
(2.10E-09)
-construction 
/other business
-5.24E-08**
(7.45E-07)
-6.48E-09**
(6.08E-09)
-9.67E-08**
(4.53E-08)
-housebuilding 
/other business
3.56E-09**
(1.90E-10)
8.60E-09
(4.26E-08)
1.53E-08**
(6.94E-09)
CMy <0 : cost complementarity between y4 and y.
CMy >0 : cost non-complementarity between y  and y.
* : significant at 10 % level ** : significant at 5 % level
Table 9-21 Cost complementarity in large firms
Output combination 
(CM,)
Large firms 
(71)
Type I firms 
(60)
Type II firms 
(26)
-construction
/housebuilding
-6.56E-10***
(2.57E-10)
-4.41E-10***
(1.38E-10)
-1.25E-09*
(8.60E-10)
-construction 
/other business
-3.15E-08
(4.43E-08)
-4.24E-08*
(4.26E-09)
-1.60E-09
(1.08E-09)
-housebuilding 
/other business
-5.92E-08**
(2.21E-09)
-8.03E-08
(7.02E-08)
-1.48E-09**
(0.27E-10)
CMy <0 : cost complementarity between y  and y .
CMy >0 : cost non-complementarity between y  and y.
* : significant at 10 % level ** : significant at 5 % level *** : significant at 1 % level
Table 9-22 Cost complementarity in very large firms
Output combination 
(CM,)
Very large firms 
(75)
Type I firms 
(47)
Type II firms 
(26)
-construction
/housebuilding
-1.30E-11
(2.89E-11)
-4.54E-11
(3.67E-11)
-5.48E-12
(1.21E-11)
-construction 
/other business
1.24E-10***
(2.04E-11)
6.35E-11***
(1.86E-11)
1.42E-10**
(6.48E-11)
-housebuilding 
/other business
1.93E-10***
(3.35E-11)
1.49E-10***
(4.08E-11)
1.13E-10**
(4.81E-11)
CMy <0 : cost complementarity between y* and y .
CM, >0: cost non-complementarity between y  and y.
* : significant at 10 % level ** : significant at 5 % level ***: significant at 1 % level
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In large firms, both type of firms showed significant cost complementarity 
between construction and housebuilding. It is noticeable that type I firms achieved 
significant cost complementarity between construction and other business, whereas type 
II firms achieved significant cost complementarity between housebuilding and other 
business. We may confirm that large firms achieve cost efficiency from diversification 
into related business and unrelated business.
Very large firms could expect cost complementarity between construction and 
housebuilding, but not significantly. They did not show cost complementarity between 
construction and other business and between housebuilding and other business. This 
means diversification into various unrelated businesses did not bring cost efficient effects 
for the very large firms. Considering the situation that most o f the large building firms 
are highly diversified into various unrelated business, these results gave meaningful 
implications.
The results of cost complementarity between businesses may be used as a 
guideline of decision making whether the building firms decide business strategy; further 
expansion or reducing business or specialisation on main business.
9.5.4 O ptim um  Scale of the Building Firms
Considering the results of the efficiency measures, there were some differences 
between size o f firms. Large firms showed higher ‘increasing returns to scale’ than any 
other groups and small/medium firms showed higher ‘increasing returns to scale’ than 
very large firms. This suggests that there may be optimum scale showing highest 
economy of scale.
In order to observe the relationship between the estimated economies of scale and 
firms’ sales scale, a graphic approach was tried. Figure 9-15 shows the trend of scale 
economies o f small/medium firms. From the point where total sales is more than 50,000 
million won, ‘increasing returns to scale’ were realised. As the sales increased, scale 
economies appeared to be higher!
Figure 9-16 shows the cases of large firms. It shows a fluctuating trend. We may 
observe that the scale economies were higher than those of small and medium firms. 
From the point where the total sales was greater than about 100,000 million won, 
‘increasing returns to scale’ are realised and as the size of sales increased, the scale
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economies increased. Especially from the point that sales increased greater than 180,000 
million won, scale economies increased into 0.7.
Figure 9-17 shows the case of very large firms. In this case, the scale economies 
were observed but they were nearly approaching one which means ‘constant return to 
scale’. From the point where the sales were greater than 1,000,000 million won, scale 
economies could not be expected.
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Figure 9-15 Scale economies in small/medium firms
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Figure 9-17 Scale economies in very large firms
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Summarising the results in the Korean housebuilding industry, at the point where 
total sales were between 50,000 million won and 1,000,000 million won, economies of 
scale were observed. In particular, where the sales were between around 180,000 and 
300,000 million won, the scale economies were shown as being highest. This level is 
similar to the average sales o f the sample firms (267,452 million won). From the point 
where total sales were greater than 300,000 million won, the scale economies started to 
decrease.
It has been regarded that there is no specific relationship between economy of 
scale and economy o f scope. The economy of scale and economy of scope can exist 
independently or at the same time. Panzar and Willig(1981) explained the relationship 
between economy o f scale and economy of scope as follows; even though there does not 
exist economy of scale in the individual products, it can expect the overall economy of 
scale in multi-production, if there exist strong economy o f scope and high cost 
complementarity. In order to examine the relationship between scale economies and 
scope economies, another graphical examination was tried.
Figures 9-18, 9-19, and 9-20 show the trend. The white line showed the estimated 
economies o f scale and the black line showed the estimated economies o f scope. As the 
size o f total sales increased, the scope economies increased (1.3-1.7). In the case of 
small/medium firms and large firms, consistent increasing scope economies were shown. 
Figure 45 shows the case o f very large firms. In this figure, we may notice that as sales 
increased, scope economies gradually decreased but were still very high between 1.8 and 
1. 6 .
The graphical analyses give some interesting information. Economies of scope 
show a consistent trend with the economies o f scale. In the graphs, the trends o f scope 
economies were moving in a contrary direction to scale economies. This means that scale 
economies increase with the increase o f scope economies. In the case of economies of 
scale, the decision-making point is one. If the estimated scale economy is approaching 
one, it means that the scale economy is decreasing. I f  the scale economy is more than 
one, it means there is no economy o f scale. Therefore, the fact that the graphic trends of 
scale economies are moving contrary to scope economies means that as economies of 
scale increase, economies o f scope also increase. That is, at the points where scale 
economies are high, scope economies also appear high, whereas at the points where scale 
economies are low, scope economies appear low in the Korean housebuilding industry.
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Figure 9-20 Scope economies in very large firms
So far we have examined the firms’ optimum scale showing highest scale 
economies and the relation between scale economies and scope economies. Among 
different sizes of firm, the efficiency measures showed different values. Scale economies 
were shown to be highest in the large firms and scope economies were highest in the 
very large firms. Cost complementarities gave a different result. Small and medium firms 
showed cost complementarities only between construction and other business. Large
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firms showed cost complementarities between construction and housebuilding and 
between housebuilding and other business. The group o f very large firms did not show 
cost complementarities between any business.
To summarise the results in small and medium firms, only the firm having more 
than 50,000 million won sales achieved scale economies. Scope economies were 
observed but cost complementarities were found only between construction and other 
business. In very large firms, nearly ‘constant returns to scale’ were found and cost 
complementarities could not be found. Only scope economies were observed. On the 
other hand, large firms among the total sample firms showed the most efficient 
production structure, that is, the large firms showed the highest scale economies, good 
scope economies and cost complementarities between related and unrelated business. 
The estimated efficiency measures give an idea that too large scale and the too large 
scope never brings ‘efficiency’. The results suggest that the current scale o f the Korean 
housebuilding firms is rather large.
9.6 Findings and Discussion
In this chapter, we examined the efficiency o f the multi-production structure of 
the Korean housebuilding firms. From the analysis, we found the following outstanding 
attributes.
There were some differences in business scale among different size and types of 
firm. Large and very large firms showed a larger business scale in number o f employees, 
sales, and capital than the small/medium firms. However, all firms showed a similar 
production structure. Nearly all o f the firms were involved in various businesses besides 
housebuilding. The difference was that large firms show a high proportion o f the 
construction business, whereas small firms showed high depending ratio on the 
housebuilding business. Another finding was that the housebuilding business was more 
profitable than the construction business, when we considered only direct production 
costs. However, large firms showed a higher profit than those of small and medium 
firms. The reason that small firms, which were more involved in the profitable 
housebuilding business, achieved lower ordinary profit was due to higher overhead costs, 
higher extra costs, and relatively lower extra profits. The result implies that large firms 
get economies o f scale in operating business. Type I firms showed larger scale in
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business than type II firms. The production structure between type I firms and II firms 
were similar with the differences among different size of firms.
According to the efficiency measures estimated from the cost structure of multi­
production firm, the Korean housebuilding firms showed overall economies o f scale, but 
no individual economies of scale in each business. Strong economies of scope in every 
case were observed, and cost complementarity was observed only between construction 
and other business. Further analysis based on different size of firms showed more 
information. First, the group of large firms showed higher ‘increasing returns to scale’ 
than any other size o f firms. Small/medium firms showed higher ‘increasing returns to 
scale’ than very large firms. This implies that there may be optimum scale showing 
highest economy of scale. Second, strong economies o f scope (between 1.3 and 1.7) 
were examined. Besides overall economies o f scope among various businesses and 
individual economies o f scope between paired businesses were found to be significant. In 
particular, when the construction business was performed with the other businesses, the 
economies o f scope value were estimated to be highest (1.01). When housebuilding was 
performed with other business, the economies of scope value were also estimated high. 
This supports the fact that the diversification strategy o f Korean housebuilding firms is 
an efficient strategy in this cost structure. There was no difference or any trend in 
economies o f scope by different size o f firms. Third, cost complementarities between 
paired businesses showed different results among different sizes o f firm. In the case of 
small/medium firms, cost complementarity was observed only between construction and 
other business. In the case of very large firms, cost complementarity was not observed in 
any pair o f businesses. However, in large firms, significant cost complementarity 
between construction and housebuilding business was observed. Among them, type I 
firms showed significant cost complementarity between construction and other business 
and type II firms showed significant cost complementarity between housebuilding and 
other business.
In previous chapter 7, we observed that there was positive relationship between 
firms’ size and the extent o f diversification. The result together with all the results 
estimated in this chapter give important implications. First, the Korean housebuilding 
firms’ diversification is cost efficient. Second, the government’s policy to encourage 
large construction firms to participate in the housebuilding industry in high growth 
period was a right decision from a cost efficiency point. Third, there is ‘optimum scale’ 
showing highest scale economy, scope economy and cost complementarities between
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businesses. Estimated results showed that large firms among different size of firms were 
operating the multi business most cost efficiently.
Taking into consideration the situation that most of the Korean large building 
firms are highly diversified into various related and unrelated businesses, these results 
give another implication. We may say that the current scale of the Korean housebuilding 
firms is rather big. As discussed before, the very large firms showed quite a big 
difference in business scale from the large firms. The large firms showed highest scale 
economies, good scope economies and cost complementarities between related and 
unrelated business and the average size of the large firms was about 179,075 million won 
based on average sales. However, the very large firms showed constant returns to scale, 
and a lack of cost complementarity with related and unrelated business. They showed 
only scope economies. The average size of the very large firms was much larger than 
that o f large firms (788,505 million won, about 4 times larger that that o f large firms). 
This result says that the very large firms were operating their business less efficiently 
than the large firms. This implies that the current size of the building firms participating 
in housebuilding is too big, that is, the multi-production structure of the very large firms 
was not cost efficient. It also suggests that the very large firms need to change their 
strategy toward ‘specialisation’ rather than ‘diversification’ or further ‘expansion into 
new business’.
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Chapter 10 Conclusions
This research aimed to investigate the structure o f the Korean housebuilding 
industry and the building firms and to evaluate the efficiency of production structure. 
The growth of the Korean housebuilding industry and resultant changes observed in the 
growth process were investigated in chapter 2. In chapter 3, the nature of housebuilding 
industry and the current structure o f modem housebuilding industry firms were explored. 
With the emergence of large building firms in the industry, some changes were observed 
in the production process and the production structure. More advanced governance 
structures were introduced in the production process such as long-term contracting, 
partnering systems, and quasi-firm type structures. There was a change in building firms’ 
production structure; a trend of diversification was observed. These trends were 
expressed on the four-cell matrix in chapter 4. From the framework, several research 
questions were derived: do the Korean housebuilding firms either follow the trend in the 
production process and the production structure or show other trends ? Is the trend o f the 
building firms’ production structure fit to the efficiency framework ? Throughout the five 
empirical chapters (chapters 5-9), the research questions were explored and answered 
from several points of views.
Starting with a summary o f the main findings o f this research, this chapter 
unpacks the specialities of the Korean housebuilding industry, the determinants, and 
implications from the empirical results. Policy conclusions and further research follow.
Main findings
The Korean housebuilding industry is an example o f how the government 
initiated growth and intervened in all development stages. The government’s intervention 
in private industry produced rather different attributes in product, production structure, 
and building firms’ strategies. The main findings of this research can be summarised as 
follows.
First, most building firms were dependent on traditional ‘market structure’ 
throughout the development process, that is, ‘contracting’ was observed to be the 
prevalent production structure in land acquisition and development, materials 
purchasing, and labour purchasing. Some o f the large leading firms showed ‘partnering’
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relationships with specialised contractors or materials manufacturers or ‘vertical 
integrated structure’ in materials purchasing. However, this was limited to a small 
number of large building firms and relation with subcontractors was not trust-based and 
not long-term.
Second, based on the cost structure of housebuilding, the production process, 
being highly dependent on contracting, was observed as being inefficient. The 
substitution elasticities and price elasticities o f demand between input factors were 
estimated as being very inelastic. Low productivity was observed and technical progress 
was not found in the Korean housebuilding sector. However, substitution elasticities 
between contracting and labour, and between contracting and material were observed as 
being comparatively high. The result shows that building firms use ‘contracting’ as a 
flexible alternative to manage labours and materials. Another outstanding result was that 
economy of scale was observed in Korean housebuilding. Normally Korean building 
firms have built high-rise apartment houses (about 15-25 floors) on a large scale (on 
average 300-400 dwellings per project and a maximum 2000-3000 dwellings in 1980s).
Third, Korean housebuilding firms have pursued a ‘diversification’ strategy to a 
greater degree than ‘specialisation’ in housebuilding business. Korean housebuilding 
firms did not show high diversity in product and regions, whereas they were diversified 
into other business areas, that is, most of the Korean housebuilding firms focused on 
Seoul and the capital region as their main market and they produced mainly apartment 
houses. The extent and pattern of diversification were found to be different between 
different types of firm and different sizes o f firm. Type I firms are those whose main 
business was construction and later entered housebuilding business, whereas type II 
firms are those whose main business was originally housebuilding. Type I firms showed 
greater diversity than type II firms and large firms showed greater diversity than small 
firms. These are natural results, as type I firms were operating other business before 
entering the housebuilding business. However, it is noteworthy that large firms among 
type II firms showed the greatest diversity among the groups. Taking into consideration 
that type II firms are those whose main business is housebuilding, this result supported 
the fact that Korean housebuilding firms emphasised more on ‘business diversification’ 
than ‘specialisation’ in housebuilding business.
Fourth, Korean housebuilding firms’ diversification could be explained from 
various different perspectives. It is a natural phenomenon that large firms having large
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physical and human resources tend to extend their business to use the excess resources 
efficiently and to heighten market power in the industry. In fact, the Korean government 
encouraged the large contracting firms to participate in the housebuilding business in a 
high growth period and supported the large firms in various policy measures. It was an 
outstanding attribute that type II firms diversified into related business in order to 
compensate for their low profit. It was also noteworthy that among type II firms, those 
who have much experience in the housebuilding business were more diversified into 
unrelated business to restore a low market share of the housebuilding business.
Fifth, as a result o f firms’ diversification strategy, the housebuilding firms 
showed multi-production structure and it was observed as being efficient. It was 
estimated that there were overall economies of scale, strong economies o f scope, and cost 
complementarities between some pair o f business. The estimations were different against 
firms’ size. It was observed that as the size o f firms increased, the extent of 
diversification was also increased. However, the efficiencies were estimated differently 
among four groups o f firms. The group o f large firms showed the most cost-efficient 
production structure. That is, the group of large firms showed the highest scale 
economies, good scope economies, and cost complementarities between related business 
and between unrelated business. The group of very large firms showed only scope 
economies. The group o f small and middle firms showed higher ‘increasing to scale’ 
than the group of very large firms. The results say that there is an optimum scale of 
business showing highest efficiency estimates.
Specialities of the Korean housebuilding industry and the determinants
The Korean housebuilding industry has grown with the government’s 
intervention and under the regulatory circumstance it showed several different attributes 
from those o f the advanced other countries. First, Korean housebuilding firms produced 
mainly standardised apartment houses and the apartment house became a prevalent type 
o f house in the modem housing market. In advanced countries, the detatched house is the 
most favourite house type for family and standardisation has gradually been carried out 
in various types o f house. Unlike other countries, prevalence o f apartment houses 
occurred in response to the demand concentration for apartment houses supported by the 
government. In the mid 1980s, housing shortage was severe in Seoul and the capital
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region. The government encouraged building firms to build apartment houses to solve 
the shortage problem in a short time. It was an effective way to build many houses in 
high density, as there was lack of residential land. Moreover, most house buyers wanted 
apartment houses as they could buy them at a lower price than the market price due to the 
sales price regulation. The sales price regulation for apartment houses played a role in 
guaranteeing demand to the building firms. Eventually, the government’s regulation on 
the housing market, i.e. land use regulation, house price regulation, affected the product 
type in the housing market with increased demand for apartment houses.
Some differences were observed in the production process and building firms’ 
production structure. Based on a four-cell matrix, specialities of the Korean 
housebuilding industry are shown as a dotted line in Figure 10-1. The building firms 
depended on simple ‘contracting’ structure and more improved contracting structure was 
not shown in the production process. On the other hand, they were pursuing 
diversification. This is expressed as dotted line. It is quite a different trend from the 
curved arrow line observed in other advanced countries.
integrated
production
process
fragmented
specialised diversified
production structure 
Figure 10-1 Production pattern of Korean housebuilding firms
The Korean building firms mainly depended on a simple contracting structure in 
the production process. In advanced countries, building firms were very specialised in
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housebuilding and large firms usually made a high investment in specific building assets 
or human resources. A specific relationship was formed between building firms and 
subcontractors, and new types o f governance structure such as ‘partnering’ system, 
‘quasi-firm’ type, or ‘vertical integration’ have stabilised in the production process.
The determinant of the speciality can be considered as different environment of 
Korean housebuilding firms. The Korean government provided various regulations 
throughout the whole development process: regulations on the input factors, especially 
land development regulation and public allocation system of the developed land directly 
limited business chance o f the firms. They brought about high uncertainty for the 
business. Even though building firms applied for a building project, they could not 
anticipate whether they could participate or keep the business till the public land was 
allocated to them by a pre-decided procedure. As a result, building firms could not gain 
profit from land development; furthermore, the firms not gaining the public land were 
not able to keep the housebuilding business. House price regulation limited the building 
profits, therefore, increased the risk o f the business. The regulated circumstances 
provided high uncertainty to the building firms. Most of the interviewees pointed out that 
various regulations in the housebuilding industry generated ‘enforced uncertainty’ as 
well as the uncertainty which naturally existed in the building process.
One of the classic responses to uncertainty was that building firms organised their 
businesses in a way maximising flexibility. That is, the circumstance led building firms 
to choose ‘flexibility’ rather than ‘efficiency’. In the uncertain circumstance, building 
firms wanted to reduce building costs by a contracting alternative. They tended to 
contract out the works requiring high technique, professional know-how, and expensive 
machines and equipment, rather than to invest for them. The perceived uncertainty let 
building firms to behave more opportunistically in the contracting process. As a result, 
simple contracting structure was observed as a governance structure in the production 
process.
Another outstanding difference was that Korean housebuilding firms were 
operating housebuilding business in ‘contracting type’, unlike the ‘development type’ of 
other countries in which private building firms are involved in land development and 
building process o f dwellings. Since the 1980s when the government initiated the 
housebuilding plan and developed residential land and infrastructure, housebuilding 
firms’ business has been restricted. Housebuilding firms could participate in only one or
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two stages, i.e. the construction stage and the sales and maintenance stage. The Korean 
government’s regulation on the private housing sector restricted building firms’ business 
boundary and affected the overall behaviour o f the Korean housebuilding firms. The 
building firms participated in housebuilding as a contractor, not as a developer.
Korean housebuilding firms’ high diversity was another difference from those of 
advanced countries. It was observed that speculative building firms in the advanced 
countries focused on specialisation in housebuilding business and in recent years they 
were pursuing a diversification strategy. This was expressed as a curved arrow curve in 
Figure 10-1. The Korean building firms’ diversity happened during a short growth period 
and the diversification pattern was rather different from other countries. The US and UK 
housebuilding firms showed high diversity in house products and regions, whereas the 
Korean housebuilding firms showed high diversity in business. This means Korean 
housebuilding firms pursued a diversification strategy before specialisation in 
housebuilding.
Interview survey and empirical analysis commonly showed that most of the 
Korean housebuilding firms pursued business diversification rather than specialisation. 
Most interviewees emphasised that uncertainty in housebuilding was the major motive 
for the building firms to divert or diversify into other businesses. Diversification was 
chosen as a ‘survival strategy’ not as a ‘growth strategy’ in conditions o f government 
regulation. If  the building firms operated other businesses besides housebuilding, they 
could survive, even though they could not operate in the housebuilding business for some 
time. They could make profits from other businesses in case they could not continue 
housebuilding due to land development regulation or public allocation system o f land. 
This was one of the reasons why most o f the housebuilding firms showed high diversity 
and even small firms tried to diversify into other businesses.
The multi-production theory and various diversification motive views supported 
the building firms’ diversification strategy. Generally, large firms expanded their 
business easily with enough capital and manpower. In fact, the Korean government 
encouraged large construction firms to participate in housebuilding to achieve the mass 
construction plan effectively and efficiently. The emergence of large firms in the 
housebuilding industry was a motivating force for the firms’ diversification. Empirical 
results from estimating diversification motives supported the fact that the large building 
firms diversified more in related and unrelated business to use their resources more
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efficiently. The building firms could compensate for the loss which resulted from one 
business with profits from the other business and they could get a synergy effect from the 
large-scale multi-businesses. It is noteworthy that among large firms, type II firms whose 
main business is housebuilding showed higher diversity. It supported the fact that the 
building firms diversified to avoid uncertainty and risk in the housebuilding business. In 
fact, many o f the interviewees replied that the housebuilding firms tended to diversify 
into counter-cycle business in order to compensate for reduced profit from housebuilding 
and to keep business in case they could not continue housebuilding. Multi-production 
made it possible for the building firms to operate flexibly to varying demand.
Summarising the discussion, Korean housebuilding firms show different 
production pattern from the advanced countries; depending on simple ‘contracting’ in the 
production process, on the other pursuing diversification before being specialised in 
housebuilding. Government’s various regulations observed throughout the development 
process and firms’ opportunistic behaviour responding to the circumstance were 
considered as main determinants o f the production pattern.
Implications
As the main findings of this research, we may summarise the following five 
factors; prevalence of contracting structure in housebuilding business, inefficiency o f the 
housebuilding business, high diversity o f the building firms, different pattern and motive 
o f the diversification, and efficiency o f the multi-production firms.
The contracting structure seems to contribute to the rapid growth o f the industry 
quantitatively; however, there are some doubts about whether the structure contributes to 
the development o f the industry in the longer term. Throughout the interview, it was 
confirmed that widespread contracting in the production process reduced direct labour 
forces and the firms who employ reduced direct labour forces had little incentive to engage 
apprentices or to concern themselves with training issues. They also had no interest in 
investment on technical innovations both in products and the production process. The 
housebuilding firms did not want to invest in fixed capital on building sites. The relations 
with their contractors were observed to be mere competitive or opportunistic ones, not 
trust-based relations like the other advanced counties. The dependency on ‘contracting’ 
and low investment on the relationship may have resulted in inefficiency o f production
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and may have exacerbated a skill crisis in the building industry in the long run. Most of 
the interviewees were worried about shortage o f skilled labour in the construction 
industry.
Empirical results on the extent o f efficiency o f the housebuilding business 
supported the arguments by showing low substitution between input factors, no technical 
progress, and low productivity in the housebuilding business. This means the building 
firms did not manage input factors flexibly and did not react smoothly against the 
unexpected situations such as input factors’ price change, lack o f supply quantity. The 
fact that technical progress was not observed and productivity was low indicated 
inefficiency o f housebuilding operation. One o f the outstanding results was economy of 
scale observed in the business. This indicated that even though the Korean building firms 
could not expect high profits from land development (due to land development 
regulation), the firms could achieve profits from standardised large-scale operation. The 
economy o f scale must be a main force to lead mass production o f the standardised 
apartment houses in 1980s and must be an important motive for a large number o f firms 
to enter into the industry.
The Korean housebuilding firms’ high diversity was supported by various 
theories, i.e. economies o f scale and scope, various motive theories o f diversification. 
The efficiency measures of the multi-production structure indicated that the Korean 
housebuilding firms’ diversification was a cost efficient strategy. From the multi- 
production structure, most o f the building firms could get a cost savings and synergy 
effect by showing high scale economy, scope economy and cost complementarities 
between businesses. The estimated efficiency measures also suggested that there was 
optimal scale. It was observed that as the firms’ size increased, the extent of 
diversification increased; however, the efficiency measures were differently estimated 
among different size of firms. The group o f large firms showed the highest diversity. The 
group o f very large firms showed higher diversity than the group o f large firms, but their 
business was operated less efficiently than that of the group o f large firms.
This means that current housebuilding firms’ business scale is too large. Taking 
into consideration that most o f the designated firms are included in the very large group, 
the designation system that the Korean government operated was not an effective policy. 
The government should have not endeavoured for large construction firms to participate 
in the housebuilding industry. It was observed that the group of small firms had operated
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business more efficiently than the very large group o f firms. This suggests that the group 
of very large firms need to change their strategy towards ‘specialisation’ or ‘reducing 
their business scale’ rather than further ‘diversification’ to achieve more cost efficiency.
Here, we need to consider the building firms’ production structure and 
diversification patterns more carefully. It is necessary to note the timing o f the building 
firms’ diversification. The Korean housebuilding firms diversified into other businesses 
from the beginning o f growth and the extent o f diversity has gradually decreased since 
1990 when the growth o f the housing market became moderate. This means that 
diversification of the Korean housebuilding firms was carried out simultaneously during 
the industry’s high growth period. This result means that Korean housebuilding firms 
pursued diversification into other business, depending on contracting out most of the 
housebuilding works to the other smaller firms or contractors. They sought 
diversification before they were specialised in housebuilding. The building firms’ 
behaviour, such as low investment in building technology, lack o f innovation in 
production process, lack of labour training, high dependence on contracting, and high 
diversification can be interpreted as a preparatory process to divert to other business 
when the housebuilding cycle is in recession. The building firms’ strategy may be 
considered as a short-term strategy in changing environments before specialisation in 
housebuilding has been achieved. It may be considered as an inadequate strategy. Some 
o f the interviewees said they just followed the diversification trends o f large firms. This 
is a ‘copying’ behaviour to leading firms’ behaviours in the same industry. It is not 
considered as a desirable one and it may lead to delay o f the development o f the industry. 
In order to achieve development o f the housebuilding industry, more investment is 
necessary in technology and human resources. Now, housebuilding firms have to pay 
strong attention to finding more efficient governance structure and to diagnosing their 
current strategy.
This research contributed to the understanding o f the housebuilding industry in 
principle and also contributed to the understanding o f the Korean housebuilding sector. 
Korean society underwent some drastic changes, and so did the housing sector. Housing 
demand changed in both quantity and quality and housing consumption accelerated with 
rising income. During the changing circumstance, the government intervened at all 
development stages. The Korean housebuilding industry is an example o f regulated 
industries.
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A number o f lessons can be learned from this research. First, the government 
intervention seems to contribute to the rapid growth o f the industry, however, strong 
regulations on the industry such as land use control, land development regulation, and 
sales price regulation negatively affected efficiency o f the overall industry. Under the 
various regulations in housebuilding, housebuilding firms did not invest on technical 
innovations both in products and the production process. The relations with their 
contractors were observed to be mere competitive or opportunistic and the cost structure 
was found to be inefficient. Current housebuilding firms’ business scale was observed as 
too large and their business was assessed as economically inefficient. Furthermore, 
participation of large building firms in housebuilding resulted in rapid diversification in 
production structure, before specialisation in housebuilding. Taking all these matters into 
account, the government’s direct intervention in the Korean housebuilding industry 
seems to be an ineffective way to deal with sound development o f the industry. This 
means that the housebuilding industry would be better developed, if  it were minimally 
controlled. The government should make good guidelines for development. If necessary, 
intervention in the industry should be done by indirect ways such as taxation and 
financing. Second, the Korean housing industry has to be actively motivated. 
Participation o f the small and medium housebuilders should be encouraged. To help 
small and medium firms’ active participation, enough residential land should be supplied 
by easy land conversion. The housing finance system has to be strengthened for building 
firms. The key strategy is to make business circumstances so that many small, but 
capable, firms compete with each other for high-quality housing production. I f  all these 
efforts o f the government were made, modernisation o f the Korean housebuilding 
industry and efficient functioning o f the industry could be achieved.
Further research
This thesis was restricted to two types of analysis; descriptive analysis and 
evaluative analysis at both project level and firm level. Descriptive analysis was carried 
out based on secondary data and the interview survey’s results. Evaluative analysis was 
performed with publicly produced data. However, there were some limitations in getting 
adequate data for the evaluative analysis. First, efficiency analysis for the housebuilding 
project was performed by cost analysis. In the analysis, land factor was not included as
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we could not get land costs in each project. If all input factor’s data had been available, 
more sophisticated analysis could have been possible. Besides the cost analysis, further 
detail analysis on efficiency o f the production process is necessary. I f  some adequate 
data were available, quantitative analysis to investigate the extent o f technical innovation 
and organisational innovation, the extent o f investment on building plant and equipment 
would be possible.
Second, in analysing the building firms’ multi-production structure, not enough 
data were available. We needed more detail sales data in the construction business and 
other businesses. I f  we could have got more detail data from the businesses, we would 
have used the existing diversification indices to describe the extent and pattern of 
building firms’ diversification and compared them to those o f other industries or those of 
other countries. Furthermore, we could get the data only for three years from 1993 to 
1995; therefore, the analysis was limited to recent three years. If  we could get data for a 
longer period, we could observe some trends and changes of the efficiency.
Third, it will be desirable to try a comparative research on the efficiency o f 
housebuilding between regulated cases and deregulated cases. Since 1993, there have 
been some changes in the policy of the Korean housebuilding industry. Price regulation 
was applied only in Seoul and some large cities. In rural areas and small cities or town, 
sale price o f houses was gradually liberalised. Land development regulation has been 
rather mitigated since 1992. Private building firms can develop small-scale projects even 
in the city and are allowed to develop residential land in the semi-agricultural and semi­
forest areas. With the deregulated policies, the Korean housebuilding firms’ business 
behaviours might be rather different. If the Korean building firms could develop 
residential land by themselves and could build any size o f dwellings and sell the products 
at autonomous prices by their own decision, they could have got more profit from 
housebuilding and building firms’ behaviour might be different. Deregulation in the 
housebuilding industry gives possibility for further research. Depending on data 
availability, we may try a comparative research on the efficiency o f housebuilding 
between regulated cases and deregulated cases and between the public sector and the 
private sector. Regulated projects before 1993 and deregulated projects after 1993 would 
be comparative cases for efficiency analysis. Furthermore, after the policy changes, study 
on the differences o f the building firms’ strategy at business level and at firm level would
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be another research area. The same research can be tried as a comparative study between 
Korea and other countries, if adequate data are available in both countries.
This thesis may be considered as an initiative research to analyse the relationship 
between growth o f industry, firms’ behaviour, and the government’s role. Starting from 
this study, more improved research can be expected.
248
Appendixes
Appendix 1 The government intervention in the housebuilding business 
Appendix 2 Contents of research, data source and research methodology 
Appendix 3 Interviewed firms 
Appendix 4 Questionnaire for Interview Survey 
Appendix 5 Estimated cost function and share equations of apartment 
housebuilding 
Appendix 6 Operational definition of financial ratios 
Appendix 7 Estimated Multi-product cost functions
249
Appendix 1 The government intervention in the housebuilding business
Objectives Enforcement
year
Influences on the 
housebuilding business
(1) Regulation on the 
qualification of the 
housebuilding firms
• registration system
• designation system
-to persuade the 
construction firms 
to participate in 
the housebuilding 
industry
-to specialise the 
firms and to 
improve the 
quality of houses
1979
1981
1990 
(stop to 
designate)
entry barrier
to enlarge the size of firms 
and scale of business
(2) Intervention on input 
factors
-land input
• land use regulation
• public land 
development
• public allocation system 
of the developed land
-to protect the 
environment 
and to prohibit the 
haphazard 
development of 
land
-to make large 
scale residential 
development 
easier
1971
1991 (revised)
-to enlarge the 
residential area 
and to improve 
the efficiency of 
the land use 
1980
-the government 
started to 
involve in the 
residential land 
development
1988
(strengthened) 
-to prohibit the 
private land 
development 
except the case 
of small scale 
development
1989 
1993
(abolished)
-entry barrier into the 
housebuilding industry 
-delay the business
-to provide residential land to 
the firms and enlarge the 
construction of houses
.high land cost 
.high overhead cost 
(interest cost etc)
->influence on profitability
-interruption of business 
chance
-influence on marketability of 
the houses built on the bad 
location
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-capital input
• pre-selling of houses
• issuance of debentures
-to encourage the 
private
construction firms 
to participate in 
the housebuilding
business
66
1978
1993 (revised) 
1989
-to mitigate firms’ financial 
difficulty
66
(3) Regulations on 
production process
• installation of arterial 
facilities
• regulations on the scale 
of houses
• obligatory supply ratio 
of small-scale houses
-to protect society 
from the activities 
of opportunistic 
firms
-to expand the 
small-scale house 
for low-income 
household
1978-
1988-
1973
1988
(strengthened)
1979
1981,1993 
(strengthened)
-delay of business 
-interruption of business 
chance
entry barrier
-increase of overhead cost
-influence on profitability
-influence on cost & 
profitability
-influence on marketability of 
the houses
-interruption of business 
chance
(4) Regulation on the 
product
• sale price regulation 
house price ceiling system
• adjusted construction 
cost system
-to stabilise 
housing price
-to expand the 
production of 
housing 
-to persuade the 
housebuilding 
firms participating 
in the housing 
project
1977
1982
(strengthened)
1989+
-interruption of business 
chance
-influence on profit 
-influence on housing quality 
and R&D investment
-influence on profitability
* bold year means firstly enforced year of each regulation.
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Appendix 2 Contents of research, data source and research methodology
Research areas Contents Data source and 
research methodology
Housebuilding
business
(business level analysis)
-business objectives 
-business strategies 
-governance structure 
.in-house activity/ subcontracting
-interview survey 
.total 24 firms 
(10 designated firms,
12 registered firms, and 
2 small housebuilders) 
-secondary data
Cost efficiency of the 
housebuilding business
(business level analysis)
-cost structure analysis -statistical analysis 
from secondary data 
.total 823 firms 
.6 time period 
(1986-1994)
Diversification
strategy
(firm level analysis)
-diversification status 
.the extent of diversification 
.the pattern of diversification
-descriptive analysis 
from secondary data 
(KSIC data)
.total 143 firms 
.4 time period 
(1980-1995)
-performance analysis -financial ratio analysis 
from secondary data 
.total 143 firms 
.3 time period 
(1985, 1990, 1995)
-relationship between 
diversity and performance
-ANOVA analysis 
from secondary data
-development of diversification 
index
-motivation of diversification
-same as the above
-statistical analysis 
from secondary data 
.total 143 firms 
.3 time period 
(1985, 1990, 1995)
Economic efficiency of 
diversified firms
(firm level analysis)
-cost structure analysis of 
multi-product firms 
.economies of scale 
.economies of scope 
.cost complimentarity 
.optimum scale
-statistical analysis 
from secondary data 
.total 318 firms 
.3 time period 
(1993, 1994, 1995)
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Appendix 3 Interviewed firms
Designated firms
Establi
-shed
year
Main
business
regions
Nature of firm Capital
(lOOmillion
won)
Total sales 
(lOOmillion 
won)
Housebuilding
sales
(lOOmillion
won)
Average 
number 
of houses 
built 
(3 years)
1 .Hyundai 
Sanup
1986 Seoul Subsidiary of 
big business 
group
720 15,457 10,000 23,000
2 .Daewoo 1984 Seoul Subsidiary of 
big business 
group
5,654 21,082 4,026 20,700
3.Samick 1968 Seoul Independent
firm
240 4,250 1,216 2,935
4.Kaeryong 1970 Daejeon Subsidiary of 
big business 
group
343 1,610 520 620
5.Chunggu 1973 Daegu Subsidiary of 
big business 
group
700 5,734 3,589 5,146
6 .Sunkyung 1962 Seoul Subsidiary of 
big business 
group
554 8,218 2,085 4,580
7.Sinhan 1968 Seoul
Kyunggi
Independent
firm
395 2,168 896 985
8 .Daedong 1987 Seoul,
Chang-
won
Independent
firm
100 2,239 733 2,360
9Woobang 1978 Daejeon
Seoul
Subsidiary of 
big business 
group
265 5,728 3,766 7,800
lO.Dongsin 1977 Seoul Independent
firm
700 1,988 1,395 2,000
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Registered firms
Establi
-shed
year
Main
business
regions
Nature of firm Capital
(lOOmillion
won)
Total sales 
(lOOmillion 
won)
Housebuilding
sales
(lOOmillion
won)
Average 
number 
of houses 
built 
(3 years)
1.Korea S 1989 Seoul Subsidiary of 
big business 
group
572 4,324 2,372 7,768
2.Duckwon 1983 Seoul Independent
firm
25 4 2 223
3Woolim 1991 Seoul,
Kyunggi
Independent
firm
53 420 420 1,002
4.Kumsung
backjo
1984 Daejeon Independent
firm
36 254 150 50
5.Sinho 1987 Daejeon Independent
firm
155 980 700 615
6 .Dongmoon 1984 Seoul
Kyunggi
Independent
firm
50 651 584 564
7. Booyoung 1983 Seoul
Kyunggi
Independent
firm
110 1,191 877 6,800
8 .Taesan 1985 Seoul
Kyunggi
Independent
firm
52 462 438 789
9.Soehae 1984 Seoul,
Kyunggi
Independent
firm
37 733 715 568
lO.Dongsung 1984 Seoul,
Kyunggi
Subsidiary of 
big business 
group
150 2134 1,106 1,580
ll.Saewon 1980 Chungju
Kyunggi
Independent
firm
- 446 381 68
12.Saekyung 1946 Seoul,
Kyunggi
Independent
firm
- 128 28 97
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Appendix 4 Questionnaire for Interview Survey
I. Output
1 .How many houses did you build in recent years ?
 _____________________    (unit: dwellings, starting base)
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
Apartment
Row house
Multi family unit in a 
private house
Single detached house
2. How much were total sales in 1985, 1990, 1995 ? (million won)
3. How much were housebuilding sales in 1985, 1990, 1995 ? (million won)
4. How much were net profits in housing sales in 1985, 1990, 1995 ? (million won)
5. What were the ratios of ‘development type work’ and ‘contracting type work’ among 
the total sales ?
________________   (unit: %)
1985 1990 1995
Development 
type work
Contracting type 
work
Total sales
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II. Labour force and contracting
1. How many employees do you have at present ?
Office manpower On-site manpower Total manpower
Main office
-office
-on-site
Local subsidiaries
-office
-on-site
2. Approximately what percentage (%) of your work is normally carried out by
(a) labour-only-contractors?
(b) supply-fix-contractor ?
3 .What is contracting ratio in each work ?
Please choose major contract type in each work, 
(labour-only-contract or supply-fix-contract)
(unit: %)
Contracting ratio Supply-fix-
contract
Labour-only-
contract
Foundation work (& piling work)
Excavation work
Reinforcing concrete work 
(steel work)
Brick laying & stone work
Plaster & water proof work
Internal work (heat insulation, 
windows, glazing, furniture)
Painting & colouring work
Landscaping
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4. Are you operating a ‘partnering system’ with your subcontractors ?
5.How many ‘collaborators’ do you have ?
6 . Who is the most influential decision maker in choosing collaborators ?
( 1) top manager
(2) housebuilding division manager
(3) on-site manager
7.What are the items you consider when you choose collaborators?
( 1) construction output /experience
(2) management skill (financial state, labour management, safety management)
(3) technology /skill retained (number of technicians, skilled labour)
(4) equipment and plant retained
(5) ability o f manager and human relationship
(6) others ?
8 . How long have you worked with your collaborators (on average) ?
9. What kind o f support are you providing to your collaborators?
( 1) favourable payment method (i.e. cash payment, financial support)
(2 ) transfer and provision o f technology
(3) employees’ training or education
(4) others
10 .What kind o f pricing method do you usually use when you contract with your 
collaborators ?
( 1) private contract
(2 ) estimated cost or average cost
(3) competitive bidding among nominated bidders
(4) competitive bidding(lowest tendering method)
11. How satisfied are you with your collaborators or subcontractors ?
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III. Residential Land
1. How much residential land have you retained ?
________ _^____________ (py°ng)
Area
Seoul
Capital region
Largest 5 cities
Other areas
Total
1 pyong=3.3 m
2. What is the ratio o f public/private land which you have worked ?
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
Public land
Private land
3. What is the most important thing to be considered when you buy land ?
4. Do you have an opinion about the government’s land regulation ?
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IV. Construction Materials
1. What is the purchasing source o f each of the construction materials? (please show in 
percentage)
Purchase 
directly from 
manufacturers
Retailers/
agency
Contracting In-house
production
Production 
within own 
business group
Cement
Remicon
Reinforcing
bar
Aggregates
Concrete file
Panel wood
Sanitary
fixture
Window,
glazing
Cement block
2. Who is the person in charge of purchasing materials?
( 1) material division in main office under purchase plan.
(2 ) on-site manager whenever necessary.
(3) others
3. How frequently do you purchase materials ?
(1) Daily/weekly
(2) Monthly
(3) Bi-annually
(4) annually
(5) anytime when necessary
4. Are there any materials you produce within your firms or within your business group ? 
If  yes, what kind o f materials?
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5.Do you have any manufacturing factory for pre-fabricated materials? 
If  yes, how much are you producing per year?
6 . Are you operating a ‘partnering system’ with material manufacturers ?
7.How many material collaborators do you have ?
8 . How long have you worked with your collaborators (on average) ?
9. What kind o f support are you providing for your collaborators?
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V. Business Objectives and Strategies
1. What are the objectives o f the housebuilding business ? 
Please choose two items in order of priority.
(1) profit maximisation
(2) high growth
(3) sales maximisation
(4) increase of market share
(5) extension of business areas
(6) continuous growth
(7) acceptable return
(8) quality of performance
(9) honesty and high reputation in the business
(10) good relationship with other workforce, 
modernisation of production etc.
2 .What are the strategies you are pursuing in order to achieve the business objectives ? 
Please write two in order o f priority.
3. Was there any change in the business objectives and strategies during the 1980s and 
1990s ?
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VI. Future plan
1 .If your firm is a subsidiary o f a business group, are there any other businesses 
within your group related to housebuilding?
If  yes, what business ?
2. Are you operating any other businesses within your firm ?
3. Do you have any plans to start new business in the future ?
If  you have such plans, what kind of business are you interested in ?
4. What is the reason ?
VII. Do you have any opinions about the government’s regulation ?
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Appendix 5 Estimated cost function and share equations 
of apartment housebuilding
1 Estimated cost function of apartment building
Parameter Standard T for HO: Prob > |T|
Variables estimate error parameter=0
INTERCEPT 1.47406 0.018143 81.248 0.0001
LogY -0.000355 0.001972 -0.18 0.8573
LogWl 0.255903 0.006954 36.798 0.0001
LogW2 0.222174 0.006459 34.397 0.0001
LogW3 0.311128 0.007857 39.597 0.0001
LogW4 0.160967 0.00602 26.74 0.0001
LogW5 0.049828 0.00339 14.699 0.0001
!/2(logWl)2 0.168297 0.002026 83.082 0.0001
LogWl*LogW2 -0.057319 0.001326 -43.227 0.0001
LogWl*LogW3 -0.075768 0.001306 -58.015 0.0001
LogWl*LogW4 -0.034469 0.001295 -26.622 0.0001
LogWl*LogW5 -0.000741 0.000718 -1.032 0.3023
1/2(LogW2)2 0.125464 0.001437 87.298 0.0001
LogW2*LogW3 -0.048385 0.001157 -41.835 0.0001
LogW2*LogW4 -0.017178 0.001007 -17.065 0.0001
LogW2*LogW5 -0.002582 0.000541 -4.774 0.0001
Vi( LogW3)2 0.143171 0.001355 105.652 0.0001
LogW3*LogW4 -0.014313 0.001108 -12.914 0.0001
LogW3*LogW5 -0.004704 0.000629 -7.474 0.0001
1/2(LogW4)2 0.06742 0.001361 49.529 0.0001
LogW4*LogW5 -0.001461 0.000571 -2.557 0.0108
!/2(logW5)2 0.009487 0.000392 24.2 0.0001
LogY*LogWl 0.00033 0.000522 0.633 0.5273
LogY*LogW2 0.000904 0.000471 1.92 0.0553
LogY*LogW3 -0.002182 0.000598 -3.647 0.0003
LogY*LogW4 0.001235 0.000419 2.943 0.0034
LogY*LogW5 -0.000286 0.000238 -1.202 0.2297
(LogY)2 0.000263 0.000237 1.109 0.2676
T -0.006849 0.003701 -1.851 0.0647
LogY*T 0.000243 0.00021 1.159 0.2468
LogWl*T -0.003566 0.000451 -7.913 0.0001
LogW2*T 0.001789 0.000377 4.748 0.0001
LogW3*T 0.003152 0.000479 6.587 0.0001
LogW4*T -0.001503 0.000353 -4.257 0.0001
LogW5*T 0.000127 0.000204 0.623 0.5337
T*T 0.000885 0.000459 1.93 0.054
Adjusted R2 
Durbin-Watson
0.9927
1.668
Y : sales
Wl:materials W2:labour W3:subcontracting W4:overhead W5:plant 
T: Time
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2 Material factor share equation estimation
Variables
Parameter
estimate
Standard
error
T for HO: 
parameter=0
Prob > |T|
INTERCEPT
LogWl
LogW2
LogW3
LogW4
LogW5
LogY
T
0.255903
0.168297
-0.057319
-0.075768
-0.034469
-0.000741
0.00033
-0.003566
0.006954
0.002026
0.001326
0.001306
0.001295
0.000718
0.000522
0.000451
36.798
83.082
-43.227
-58.015
-26.622
-1.032
0.633
-7.913
0.0001
0.0001
0.0001
0.0001
0.0001
0.3023
0.5272
0.0001
Durbin Watson 1.475
3 Labour factor share equation estimation
Variables
Parameter
estimate
Standard
error
T for HO: 
parameter=0
Prob > |T|
INTERCEPT
LogWl
LogW2
LogW3
LogW4
LogW5
LogY
T
0.222174
-0.057319
0.125464
-0.048385
-0.017178
-0.002582
0.000904
0.001789
0.006459
0.001326
0.001437
0.001157
0.001007
0.000541
0.000471
0.000377
34.397
-43.227
87.298
-41.835
-17.065
-4.774
1.92
4.748
0.0001
0.0001
0.0001
0.0001
0.0001
0.0001
0.0553
0.0001
Durbin-Watson 1.532
4 Overhead factor share equation estimation
Variables
Parameter
estimate
Standard
error
T for HO: 
parameter=0
Prob > |T|
INTERCEPT
LogWl
LogW2
LogW3
LogW4
LogW5
LogY
T
0.160967
-0.034469
-0.017178
-0.014313
0.06742
-0.001461
0.001235
-0.001503
0.00602
0.001295
0.001007
0.001108
0.001361
0.000571
0.000419
0.000353
26.74
-26.622
-17.065
-12.914
49.529
-2.557
2.943
-4.257
0.0001
0.0001
0.0001
0.0001
0.0001
0.0108
0.0034
0.0001
Durbin-Watson 1.56
5 Plant factor share equation estimation
Variables
Parameter
estimate
Standard
error
T for HO: 
parameter=0
Prob > |T|
INTERCEPT
LogWl
LogW2
LogW3
LogW4
LogW5
LogY
T
0.049828
-0.000741
-0.002582
-0.004704
-0.001461
0.009487
-0.000286
0.000127
0.00339
0.000718
0.000541
0.000629
0.000571
0.000392
0.000238
0.000204
14.699
-1.032
-4.774
-7.474
-2.557
24.2
-1.202
0.623
0.0001
0.3023
0.0001
0.0001
0.0108
0.0001
0.2297
0.5337
Durbin-Watson 1.78
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Appendix 6 Operational definition of financial ratios
Calculation method
Profitable
ratio
Net profit to total 
assets
Net profit before tax/ average assets between beginning and end of 
year
Ordinary profit to 
total assets
Ordinary profit / average assets between beginning and end of year
Net profit to equity 
capital
Net profit before tax/average equity capital between beginning and 
end of year
Ordinary profit to 
equity capital
Ordinary profit /average equity capital between beginning and end 
of year
Net profit to total 
sales
Net profit before tax/ total sales
Ordinary profit to 
total sales
Ordinary profit / total sales
Interest cost to sales Financial expenses/ sales
Asset
utilisation
ratio
Turnover to total 
assets
Net sales/ total assets
Turnover to capital Net sales/ capital
Turnover to net 
working capital
Net sales/ net working capital (current assets + current debt)
Turnover to fixed 
assets
Net sales/ net fixed assets
Financial
structure
measures
Net worth(equity) 
To total assets ratio
Equity capital / total assets* 100
Debt ratio Total liability/ total assets* 100
Current ratio Current assets/ current liabilities * 100
Fixed ratio Fixed assets/ capital *100
Fixed assets to long 
term capital ratio
Fixed assets/ (capital +fixed liabilities) *100
Growth
measures
Total assets growth 
ratio
((total assets in the end of year/ total assets in the end of preceding 
year)-l)* 100
Equity capital 
growth ratio
((equity capital in the end of year/ equity capital in the end of 
preceding year)-1 )* 100
Net sales growth 
ratio
((net sales in the end of year/ net sales in the end of preceding year)- 
1)* 100
Ordinary profit 
growth ratio
((ordinary profit in the end of year/ ordinary profit in the end of 
preceding year)-1 )* 100
Net profit growth 
ratio
((net profit in the end of year/ net profit in the end of preceding 
year)-l)* 100
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Appendix 7 Estimated multi-product cost functions
1 Cost function o f total firms
- Seemingly unrelated regression estimation
Variables Parameter
estimate
Standard
error
T for HO: 
parameter=0
Prob > |T|
INTERCEPT 0.499082 0.475209 1.05 0.2951
LogYl 0.565653 0.050474 11.207 0.0001
LogY2 0.684407 0.07028 9.738 0.0001
LogY3 -0.111638 0.030302 -3.684 0.0003
l/2(logYl)2 0.167961 0.004727 35.534 0.0001
LogYl *logY2 -0.175835 0.005025 -34.993 0.0001
LogYl *logY3 0.001335 0.002031 0.657 0.5118
l/2(logY2)2 0.155188 0.006739 23.029 0.0001
LogY2*logY3 0.006296 0.002612 2.41 0.017
l/2(logY3)2 0.006568 0.001506 4.363 0.0001
LogWl 0.29209 0.016709 17.481 0.0001
LogW2 0.217515 0.029605 7.347 0.0001
LogW3 0.259681 0.020861 12.448 0.0001
LogW4 0.230713 0.019818 11.642 0.0001
l/2(logW l)2 0.170457 0.002691 63.337 0.0001
LogWl *logW2 -0.010628 0.002528 -4.204 0.0001
LogWl *logW3 -0.066633 0.002583 -25.793 0.0001
LogWl *logW4 -0.093196 0.002289 -40.716 0.0001
l/2(logW2)2 0.009394 0.004614 2.036 0.0434
LogW2*logW3 0.003279 0.003318 0.988 0.3244
LogW2*logW4 -0.002045 0.003084 -0.663 0.5081
l/2(logW3)2 0.159393 0.004213 37.829 0.0001
LogW3*logW4 -0.096039 0.002795 -34.364 0.0001
l/2(logW4)2 0.19128 0.003495 54.728 0.0001
LogYl*logWl -0.003602 0.001256 -2.868 0.0047
LogYl *logW2 0.000277 0.00211 0.131 0.8957
LogYl *logW3 -0.003536 0.001495 -2.364 0.0192
LogYl *logW4 0.006861 0.00144 4.766 0.0001
LogY2*logWl 0.007921 0.001468 5.395 0.0001
LogY2*logW2 -0.012835 0.002505 -5.123 0.0001
LogY2*logW3 0.00052 0.001761 0.295 0.7682
LogY2*logW4 0.004393 0.001689 2.601 0.0101
LogY3*logWl -0.001423 0.000722 -1.972 0.0502
LogY3*logW2 -4.84E-05 0.001286 -0.038 0.97
LogY3*logW3 0.008015 0.000878 9.127 0.0001
LogY3*logW4 -0.006543 0.000851 -7.688 0.0001
Adjusted R2 
Durbin-Watson
0.981
1.556
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-Material factor share equation estimation (SHI)
Variables Parameter Standard T for HO: Prob > |T|
estimate error parameter=0
INTERCEPT 0.29209 0.016709 17.481 0.0001
LogWl 0.170457 0.002691 63.337 0.0001
LogW2 -0.010628 0.002528 -4.204 0.0001
LogW3 -0.066633 0.002583 -25.793 0.0001
LogW4 -0.093196 0.002289 -40.716 0.0001
LogYl -0.003602 0.001256 -2.868 0.0046
LogY2 0.007921 0.001468 5.395 0.0001
LogY3 -0.001423 0.000722 -1.972 0.05
Durbin-Watson 0.966
-Labour factor share equation estimation (SH2)
Variables Parameter
estimate
Standard
error
T for HO: 
parameter=0
Prob > |T|
INTERCEPT 0.217515 0.029605 7.347 0.0001
LogWl -0.010628 0.002528 -4.204 0.0001
LogW2 0.009394 0.004614 2.036 0.0431
LogW3 0.003279 0.003318 0.988 0.3242
LogW4 -0.002045 0.003084 -0.663 0.508
LogYl 0.000277 0.00211 0.131 0.8956
LogY2 -0.012835 0.002505 -5.123 0.0001
LogY3 -4.84E-05 0.001286 -0.038 0.97
Durbin-Watson 1.261
-Fixed factor share equation estimation (SH3)
Variables Parameter Standard T for HO: Prob > |T|
estimate error parameter=0
INTERCEPT 0.259681 0.020861 12.448 0.0001
LogWl -0.066633 0.002583 -25.793 0.0001
LogW2 0.003279 0.003318 0.988 0.3242
LogW3 0.159393 0.004213 37.829 0.0001
LogW4 -0.096039 0.002795 -34.364 0.0001
LogYl -0.003536 0.001495 -2.364 0.0191
LogY2 0.00052 0.001761 0.295 0.7681
LogY3 0.008015 0.000878 9.127 0.0001
Durbin-Watson 1.453
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2 Cost function of small/ medium firms
-Seemingly unrelated regression estimation
Variables Parameter Standard T for HO: Prob > |T|
estimate error parameter=0
INTERCEPT -4.969102 2.790233 -1.781 0.0909
LogYl 1.256688 0.278909 4.506 0.0002
LogY2 0.929829 0.325561 2.856 0.0101
LogY3 0.034673 0.12563 0.276 0.7855
l/2(logYl)2 0.127441 0.020195 6.31 0.0001
LogYl *logY2 -0.199093 0.016641 -11.964 0.0001
LogYl*logY3 -0.005677 0.007531 -0.754 0.4602
l/2(logY2)2 0.160754 0.023684 6.788 0.0001
LogY2*logY3 0.001561 0.009305 0.168 0.8685
l/2(logY3)2 0.003373 0.006556 0.514 0.6129
LogWl 0.330614 0.05372 6.154 0.0001
LogW2 0.531183 0.101381 5.239 0.0001
LogW3 0.090538 0.064561 1.402 0.1769
LogW4 0.047665 0.072354 0.659 0.5179
l/2(logW l)2 0.162302 0.005138 31.59 0.0001
LogWl *logW2 -0.013743 0.004909 -2.799 0.0114
LogWl *logW3 -0.067501 0.004539 -14.871 0.0001
LogWl *logW4 -0.081058 0.004311 -18.801 0.0001
l/2(logW2)2 -0.008599 0.009939 -0.865 0.3977
LogW2*logW3 0.008851 0.006333 1.398 0.1784
LogW2*logW4 0.013491 0.006813 1.98 0.0624
l/2(logW3)2 0.168322 0.0068 24.753 0.0001
LogW3*logW4 -0.109672 0.004723 -23.22 0.0001
l/2(logW4)2 0.17724 0.006575 26.955 0.0001
LogYl *logWl -0.010129 0.00296 -3.422 0.0029
LogYl *logW2 -0.006301 0.005404 -1.166 0.258
LogYl *logW3 0.006819 0.003505 1.945 0.0667
LogYl *logW4 0.009612 0.00382 2.516 0.021
LogY2*logWl 0.009122 0.004014 2.272 0.0349
LogY2*logW2 -0.027772 0.00741 -3.748 0.0014
LogY2*logW3 0.005705 0.004844 1.178 0.2534
LogY2*logW4 0.012945 0.005206 2.486 0.0224
LogY3*logWl 0.001392 0.001793 0.776 0.4472
LogY3*logW2 -0.006434 0.003333 -1.93 0.0686
LogY3*logW3 0.007901 0.002155 3.667 0.0016
LogY3*logW4 -0.002858 0.002368 -1.207 0.2423
Adjusted R2 0.96
Durbin-Watson 1.466
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-Material factor share equation estimation (SHI)
Variables Parameter Standard T for HO: Prob > |T|
estimate error parameter=0
INTERCEPT 0.330614 0.05372 6.154 0.0001
LogWl 0.162302 0.005138 31.59 0.0001
LogW2 -0.013743 0.004909 -2.799 0.0074
LogW3 -0.067501 0.004539 -14.871 0.0001
LogW4 -0.081058 0.004311 -18.801 0.0001
LogYl -0.010129 0.00296 -3.422 0.0013
LogY2 0.009122 0.004014 2.272 0.0277
LogY3 0.001392 0.001793 0.776 0.4415
Durbin-Watson 1.628
-Labour factor share equation estimation (SH2)
Variables Parameter Standard T for HO: Prob > |T|
estimate error parameter=0
INTERCEPT 0.531183 0.101381 5.239 0.0001
LogWl -0.013743 0.004909 -2.799 0.0074
LogW2 -0.008599 0.009939 -0.865 0.3913
LogW3 0.008851 0.006333 1.398 0.1688
LogW4 0.013491 0.006813 1.98 0.0536
LogYl -0.006301 0.005404 -1.166 0.2495
LogY2 -0.027772 0.00741 -3.748 0.0005
LogY3 -0.006434 0.003333 -1.93 0.0596
Durbin-Watson 1.685
-Fixed factor share equation estimation (SH3)
Variables Parameter Standard T for HO: Prob > |T|
estimate error parameter=0
INTERCEPT 0.090538 0.064561 1.402 0.1674
LogWl -0.067501 0.004539 -14.871 0.0001
LogW2 0.008851 0.006333 1.398 0.1688
LogW3 0.168322 0.0068 24.753 0.0001
LogW4 -0.109672 0.004723 -23.22 0.0001
LogYl 0.006819 0.003505 1.945 0.0577
LogY2 0.005705 0.004844 1.178 0.2448
LogY3 0.007901 0.002155 3.667 0.0006
Durbin-Watson 1.536
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3 Cost function of large firms
-Seemingly unrelated regression estimation
Variables Parameter
estimate
Standard
error
T for HO: 
parameter=0
Prob > |T|
INTERCEPT -10.70179 3.848098 -2.781 0.0087
LogYl 1.477095 0.342532 4.312 0.0001
LogY2 1.854868 0.344934 5.377 0.0001
LogY3 0.129067 0.093598 1.379 0.1767
l/2(logYl)2 0.095649 0.013243 7.222 0.0001
LogYl *logY2 -0.195173 0.020639 -9.456 0.0001
LogYl *logY3 -0.003033 0.004338 -0.699 0.489
l/2(logY2)2 0.072526 0.014078 5.152 0.0001
LogY2*logY3 -0.011335 0.004634 -2.446 0.0196
l/2(logY3)2 0.006713 0.001956 3.431 0.0016
LogWl 0.461426 0.041755 11.051 0.0001
LogW2 -0.013247 0.083454 -0.159 0.8748
LogW3 0.392932 0.047611 8.253 0.0001
LogW4 0.158889 0.05468 2.906 0.0063
l/2(logW l)2 0.170796 0.003962 43.109 0.0001
LogWl *logW2 0.002569 0.004215 0.609 0.5462
LogWl *logW3 -0.059897 0.00419 -14.295 0.0001
LogWl *logW4 -0.113467 0.00369 -30.75 0.0001
l/2(logW2)2 -0.008997 0.009186 -0.979 0.3341
LogW2*logW3 0.007892 0.005632 1.401 0.1699
LogW2*logW4 -0.001463 0.005598 -0.261 0.7953
l/2(logW3)2 0.153677 0.007804 19.692 0.0001
LogW3*logW4 -0.101671 0.00462 -22.005 0.0001
l/2(logW4)2 0.216601 0.005461 39.663 0.0001
LogYl*logWl -0.014878 0.002978 -4.996 0.0001
LogYl *logW2 0.020573 0.005853 3.515 0.0012
LogYl *logW3 -0.012908 0.003124 -4.132 0.0002
LogYl *logW4 0.007214 0.003743 1.927 0.0621
LogY2*logWl 0.001731 0.002007 0.862 0.3943
LogY2*logW2 -0.008161 0.00403 -2.025 0.0505
LogY2*logW3 -0.000671 0.002204 -0.305 0.7624
LogY2*logW4 0.007101 0.002669 2.661 0.0117
LogY3*logWl -0.002321 0.000776 -2.99 0.0051
LogY3*logW2 0.001294 0.001612 0.803 0.4275
LogY3*logW3 0.00467 0.000857 5.447 0.0001
LogY3*logW4 -0.003643 0.001029 -3.542 0.0011
Adjusted R2 
Durbin-Watson
0.9571
1.409
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-Material factor share equation estimation (SHI)
Variables Parameter Standard T for HO: Prob > |T|
estimate error parameter=0
INTERCEPT 0.461426 0.041755 11.051 0.0001
LogWl 0.170796 0.003962 43.109 0.0001
LogW2 0.002569 0.004215 0.609 0.5444
LogW3 -0.059897 0.00419 -14.295 0.0001
LogW4 -0.113467 0.00369 -30.75 0.0001
LogYl -0.014878 0.002978 -4.996 0.0001
LogY2 0.001731 0.002007 0.862 0.3917
LogY3 -0.002321 0.000776 -2.99 0.004
Durbin-Watson 1.179
-Labour factor share equation estimation (SH2)
Variables Parameter Standard T for HO: Prob > |T|
estimate error parameter^
INTERCEPT -0.013247 0.083454 -0.159 0.8744
LogWl 0.002569 0.004215 0.609 0.5444
LogW2 -0.008997 0.009186 -0.979 0.3311
LogW3 0.007892 0.005632 1.401 0.166
LogW4 -0.001463 0.005598 -0.261 0.7947
LogYl 0.020573 0.005853 3.515 0.0008
LogY2 -0.008161 0.00403 -2.025 0.0471
LogY3 0.001294 0.001612 0.803 0.4251
Durbin-Watson 1.39
-Fixed factor share equation estimation (SH3)
Variables Parameter
estimate
Standard
error
T for HO: 
parameter=0
Prob > |T|
INTERCEPT 0.392932 0.047611 8.253 0.0001
LogWl -0.059897 0.00419 -14.295 0.0001
LogW2 0.007892 0.005632 1.401 0.166
LogW3 0.153677 0.007804 19.692 0.0001
LogW4 -0.101671 0.00462 -22.005 0.0001
LogYl -0.012908 0.003124 -4.132 0.0001
LogY2 -0.000671 0.002204 -0.305 0.7616
LogY3 0.00467 0.000857 5.447 0.0001
Durbin-Watson 1.611
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4 Cost function o f very large firms
-Seemingly unrelated regression estimation
Variables Parameter
estimate
Standard
error
T for HO: 
parameter^
Prob > |T|
INTERCEPT 6.119841 2.657146 2.303 0.0267
LogYl -0.370683 0.238061 -1.557 0.1275
LogY2 0.586277 0.24465 2.396 0.0215
LogY3 0.077909 0.088102 0.884 0.382
l/2(logYl)2 0.218402 0.012359 17.672 0.0001
LogYl *logY2 -0.144644 0.013856 -10.439 0.0001
LogYl *logY3 -0.005419 0.005707 -0.95 0.3482
l/2(logY2)2 0.134546 0.012385 10.864 0.0001
LogY2*logY3 0.000275 0.006057 0.045 0.964
l/2(logY3)2 0.002207 0.004361 0.506 0.6156
LogWl 0.217684 0.04345 5.01 0.0001
LogW2 0.266277 0.058891 4.522 0.0001
LogW3 0.308747 0.041036 7.524 0.0001
LogW4 0.207291 0.039522 5.245 0.0001
l/2(logW l)2 0.178886 0.003484 51.347 0.0001
LogWl *logW2 -0.003256 0.00344 -0.947 0.3496
LogWl *logW3 -0.07143 0.003214 -22.224 0.0001
LogWl *logW4 -0.1042 0.002967 -35.121 0.0001
l/2(logW2)2 0.008764 0.004976 1.761 0.086
LogW2*logW3 0.005518 0.003339 1.653 0.1064
LogW2*logW4 -0.011026 0.003374 -3.268 0.0023
l/2(logW3)2 0.146572 0.005268 27.821 0.0001
LogW3*logW4 -0.08066 0.004152 -19.426 0.0001
l/2(logW4)2 0.195886 0.005216 37.552 0.0001
LogYl *logWl 0.00667 0.002534 2.632 0.0121
LogYl *logW2 -0.005571 0.003411 -1.633 0.1105
LogYl *logW3 -0.011969 0.002389 -5.01 0.0001
LogYl *logW4 0.01087 0.002324 4.678 0.0001
LogY2*logWl 0.005322 0.002493 2.135 0.0391
LogY2*logW2 -0.011831 0.003374 -3.506 0.0012
LogY2*logW3 -0.000782 0.0023 -0.34 0.7356
LogY2*logW4 0.007291 0.002273 3.208 0.0027
LogY3*logWl -0.005909 0.001206 -4.9 0.0001
LogY3*logW2 0.002204 0.00163 1.352 0.1842
LogY3*logW3 0.013969 0.001103 12.661 0.0001
LogY3*logW4 -0.010264 0.001083 -9.481 0.0001
Adjusted R2 
Duibin-Watson
0.9748
1.06
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-Material factor share equation estimation (SHI)
Variables Parameter Standard T for HO: Prob > |T|
estimate error parameter=0
INTERCEPT 0.217684 0.04345 5.01 0.0001
LogWl 0.178886 0.003484 51.347 0.0001
LogW2 -0.003256 0.00344 -0.947 0.3472
LogW3 -0.07143 0.003214 -22.224 0.0001
LogW4 -0.1042 0.002967 -35.121 0.0001
LogYl 0.00667 0.002534 2.632 0.0105
LogY2 0.005322 0.002493 2.135 0.0364
LogY3 -0.005909 0.001206 -4.9 0.0001
Durbin-Watson 1.079
-Labour factor share equation estimation (SH2)
Variables Parameter Standard T for HO: Prob > |T|
estimate error parameters
INTERCEPT 0.266277 0.058891 4.522 0.0001
LogWl -0.003256 0.00344 -0.947 0.3472
LogW2 0.008764 0.004976 1.761 0.0827
LogW3 0.005518 0.003339 1.653 0.1031
LogW4 -0.011026 0.003374 -3.268 0.0017
LogYl -0.005571 0.003411 -1.633 0.1071
LogY2 -0.011831 0.003374 -3.506 0.0008
LogY3 0.002204 0.00163 1.352 0.181
Durbin-Watson 1.052
-Fixed factor share equation estimation (SH3)
Variables Parameter Standard T for HO: Prob > |T|
estimate error parameters
INTERCEPT 0.308747 0.041036 7.524 0.0001
LogWl -0.07143 0.003214 -22.224 0.0001
LogW2 0.005518 0.003339 1.653 0.1031
LogW3 0.146572 0.005268 27.821 0.0001
LogW4 -0.08066 0.004152 -19.426 0.0001
LogYl -0.011969 0.002389 -5.01 0.0001
LogY2 -0.000782 0.0023 -0.34 0.7348
LogY3 0.013969 0.001103 12.661 0.0001
Durbin-Watson 1.522
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